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PREFACE 
 
This doctoral dissertation has been written within the framework of the project ‘Strengthening 
the European Court of Human Rights: More Accountability through Better Legal Reasoning,’ 
which is funded by the European Research Council (ERC). Under the leadership of Professor 
Eva Brems, the project studies the European Court of Human Rights’ case law with the aim of 
proposing innovative solutions to strengthen the consistency and persuasiveness of the Court’s 
legal reasoning. 
One of the project’s major themes is ‘Mainstreaming Diversity.’ Under this theme, the 
project seeks to include the concerns of non-dominant groups in the Court’s reasoning. This 
objective grew out of the realization that the Court’s record is at best mixed when it comes to 
taking into account the diversities of groups such as women, people with disabilities, and 
religious and cultural minorities. While references to the specificities of these groups are 
occasionally made in the Court’s reasoning, there is no consistent effort at mainstreaming them, 
nor a clear methodology or approach to do so. In line with the objective pursued under 
‘Mainstreaming Diversity,’ this dissertation seeks to more fully and systematically integrate the 
concerns of members of non-dominant cultural and religious groups into the Court’s legal 
reasoning.  
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SUMMARY 
 
Like many courts in Europe and elsewhere, the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘Court’ or 
the ‘Strasbourg Court’) has been grappling with the challenges posed by contemporary cultural 
and religious diversity. Applicants from a variety of cultural and religious backgrounds have 
increasingly brought longstanding conceptions underlying the Court’s legal reasoning under 
growing pressure: from Sikh men wanting to wear the turban to Roma members seeking to 
preserve their travelling lifestyle and Muslim women battling headscarf bans. Three provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) have been the site where this pressure 
has been most vividly felt: non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR), freedom of religion (Article 9 
ECHR), and the right to respect for one’s cultural lifestyle (Article 8 ECHR). For the most part, 
however, the Court has failed to rise to the challenge. At times, these types of claims have been 
met with neglect; at others, with trivialization and even delegitimation. This dissertation 
addresses these shortcomings in the legal reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights.   
The research is motivated by two sets of questions. At a descriptive level, the questions 
are: What are the assumptions or conceptions implicitly defining the European Convention 
human rights subject (‘ECHR subject’), against which religious and cultural claimants are 
judged? In particular, which experiences, features or views are regarded as essential or 
‘universal’ in the construction of this subject and which ones are marginalized as invisible, 
negligible or ‘particular’? Moreover, what kinds of consequences do these assumptions carry for 
religious and cultural applicants and their groups? Do they create exclusions and hierarchies 
between them?  If so, what forms or shapes do such exclusions and hierarchies take and at what 
levels do they occur (e.g., within groups, across groups)? At a normative level, the research 
questions are: Should the Court avoid these exclusions and hierarchies – or open up these 
‘universals’? If so, on what basis and how exactly might the Court do this?  
The dissertation proceeds in three major parts, each of which identifies ‘universals’ in the 
ECHR subject at a different level. First, it identifies exclusions and hierarchies within the 
abstract category of ‘human’. It argues that the Court has, to some extent, opened up the abstract 
universal human rights subject by acknowledging the constructed vulnerability of some groups. 
Yet traces of invulnerability foreclose fuller inclusion of cultural and religious group members. 
Second, the dissertation identifies exclusions and hierarchies within the religious and cultural 
ECHR subject, that is to say, across different religious and cultural groups. The dissertation 
argues that operating as one of the ‘universals’ of freedom of religion is a Protestant, belief-
centered notion of religion, which favors internal and disembodied forms of religious 
subjectivity over external and embodied ones. The dissertation further unveils one of the 
‘universals’ embedded in the right to respect for family life: the nuclear family idealized in some 
parts of Western Europe that disadvantages other forms of family life. Last, the dissertation 
identifies exclusions and hierarchies within sub-religious and sub-cultural ECHR subjects, 
namely within groups. It shows how such exclusions and hierarchies arise from elevating a 
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particular cultural or religious practice to the norm, as if it were the group paradigmatic practice. 
This practice is subsequently either fixed as the ‘essence’ of group identity or associated with 
negative stereotypes.  
The dissertation puts forward two central arguments. The first argument is that, in 
articulating the ECHR subject, the Court endorses various ‘universals’ that hamper the full and 
equal inclusion of a range of religious and cultural ‘others’. Though these ‘universals’ may 
manifest themselves in various forms and take place at different levels, they all respond to the 
same exclusionary logic: the experiences of some are confused with the experiences of all and 
posited as the yardstick against which everyone is judged. Indeed, the hidden (and not so hidden) 
workings of such ‘universals’ have not just led to the trivialization and marginalization of 
applicants’ experiences. Most worryingly, these workings have sometimes led to the devaluation 
or delegitimation of these experiences. The second central argument of this dissertation is that 
the Court should redress the exclusionary and inegalitarian character of such ‘universals’. To this 
end, the dissertation offers a multilayered framework aimed at opening up the ECHR subject at 
the three levels identified above: (i) within the abstract human rights subject; (ii) across religious 
and cultural groups; and (iii) within religious and cultural groups. In so doing, the framework 
intends to more fully realize religious and cultural equality in European Human Rights 
Convention Law. 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Zoals vele rechtscolleges in Europa en daarbuiten worstelt het Europees Hof voor de Rechten 
van de Mens (het 'Hof') met de uitdagingen die de hedendaagse culturele en religieuze diversiteit 
met zich meebrengt. Steeds vaker stellen verzoekers de hardnekkige opvattingen die aan de basis 
liggen van de juridische redenering van het Hof onder toenemende druk: van Sikh mannen die de 
tulband willen dragen tot Roma die hun reizende levensstijl willen behouden en moslimvrouwen 
die hoofddoekenverboden bevechten. Drie artikels van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten 
van de Mens ('EVRM') vormen het strijdtoneel waarop de druk het meest nadrukkelijk gevoeld 
wordt: non-discriminatie (Artikel 14 EVRM), vrijheid van godsdienst (Artikel 9 EVRM), en het 
recht op eerbied voor culturele levensstijl (Artikel 8 EVRM). Echter, het Hof heeft grotendeels 
gefaald om aan de gestelde uitdagingen tegemoet te komen. Soms heeft het Hof de eisen van de 
aangehaalde verzoekers beantwoordt met veronachtzaming; op andere momenten heeft het ze 
getrivialiseerd. Het onderzoek dat in deze dissertatie gepresenteerd wordt behandeld deze 
tekortkomingen. 
Het onderzoek is gemotiveerd door twee onderzoeksvragen. Op het vlak van beschrijving 
wordt de volgende vraag gesteld: Wat zijn de bijzondere veronderstellingen of opvattingen die 
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impliciet het Europees mensenrechtensubject definiëren en ten opzichte waarvan religieuze en 
culturele verzoekers beoordeeld worden? Meer bepaald, welke ervaringen, kenmerken of 
gezichtspunten worden beschouwd als essentieel of 'universeel' in de constructie van het 
Europees mensenrechtensubject en welke worden naar de marge verdrongen als onzichtbaar, 
verwaarloosbaar of 'particulier'? Bovendien wordt bevraagd welke gevolgen deze 
veronderstellingen met zich meedragen voor religieuze en culturele verzoekers en de groep 
waartoe ze behoren. Creëren de veronderstellingen uitsluitingen en hierarchieën? Zo ja, welke 
vormen nemen dergelijke uitsluitingen en hierarchieën aan en op welke niveaus vinden ze plaats 
(bvb. binnen groepen of tussen groepen)? De normatieve onderzoeksvragen zijn: Moet het Hof 
deze uitsluitingen en hierarchieën vermijden - of moet het de beschreven 'universele' opvattingen 
openstellen? Zo ja, op welke basis en hoe kan het Hof dit precies doen? 
 Deze dissertatie bestaat uit drie grote delen. Elk deel identificeert 'universelen' in het 
Europees mensenrechtensubject op verschillende niveaus. De dissertatie identificeert eerst 
uitsluitingen en hierarchieën binnen de abstracte categorie 'mens'. Er wordt geargumenteerd dat, 
hoewel het Hof het abstracte universele mensenrechtensubject openstelt door de sociaal 
geconstrueerde kwetsbaarheid van sommige groepen te erkennen, sporen van onkwetsbaarheid 
meer volledige inclusie van culturele en religieuze groepsleden verhinderen. Ten tweede 
identificeert de dissertatie uitsluitingen en hierarchieën binnen het religieuze en culturele 
Europees mensenrechtensubject, namelijk tussen verschillende religieuze en culturele groepen. 
Er wordt geargumenteerd dat één van de operatieve 'universelen' van godsdienstvrijheid een 
Protestantse, geloofsgeoriënteerde (i.p.v. geloofsuitingsgeoriënteerde) opvatting van godsdienst 
is die interne en van uiting losgemaakte vormen van religieuze subjectiviteit bevoordeelt over 
externe en aan uiting verbonden vormen. De dissertatie onthult verder één van de ‘universelen’ 
werkzaam binnen het recht op eerbied voor het familieleven: een opvatting van de kernfamilie 
die geïdealiseerd wordt in sommige delen van West Europa en die andere vormen van 
familieleven benadeelt. Tenslotte identificeert de dissertatie uitsluitingen en hierarchieën binnen 
sub-religieuze en sub-culturele Europese mensenrechtensubjecten, namelijk binnen groepen. Er 
wordt aangetoond hoe dergelijke uitsluitingen en hierarchieën ontstaan doordat bijzondere 
culturele of religieuze praktijken verheven worden tot de norm, alsof deze de paradigmatische 
groepspraktijk weerspiegelt. Deze praktijk wordt vervolgens ofwel beschouwd als de 'essentie' 
van groepsidentiteit ofwel verbonden met negatieve stereotypen. 
 De dissertatie stelt twee centrale argumenten voorop. Het eerste argument is dat het Hof, 
in zijn beschrijving van het Europees mensenrechtensubject, verschillende 'universelen' 
onderschrijft die in de weg staan aan de volledige en gelijkwaardige inclusie van een reeks 
religieuze en culturele 'anderen'. Hoewel deze 'universelen' zich in verscheidene vormen en op 
verschillende niveaus uiten, beantwoorden ze allemaal aan dezelfde logica van uitsluiting: de 
ervaringen van enkelen worden verward met de ervaringen van allen en vooropgesteld als de 
maatstaf waartegen iedereen wordt beoordeeld. Inderdaad, de verborgen (en niet zo verborgen) 
werkingen van dergelijke 'universelen' hebben niet alleen geleid tot de trivialisering en 
marginalisering van de ervaringen van verzoekers. Ze liggen ook, op zeer verontrustende wijze, 
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aan de basis van de onderwaardering en delegitimering van sommige van deze ervaringen. Het 
tweede centrale argument is dat het Hof het uitsluitende en inegalitaire karakter van de 
geïdentificeerde 'universelen' dient aan te pakken. Met dit doel voor ogen biedt de dissertatie een 
meerlagig kader aan voor het openstellen van het Europees mensenrechtensubject op de drie 
hierboven beschreven niveaus: (i) binnen het abstracte mensenrechtensubject, (ii) tussen 
verschillende religieuze en culturele groepen, en (iii) binnen religieuze en culturele groepen. 
Zodoende wordt beoogd een meer volwaardige inclusie en gelijkheid tot stand te brengen binnen 
het recht van de Europese mensenrechten. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Hope lies, perhaps, in the idea that international human rights 
law has not yet exhausted the critical energy of human rights as 
an endlessly recursive interaction concerning inclusions and 
exclusions in which every inclusion necessarily creates new, 
unforeseen exclusions, and in which every lived exclusion births 
new claims for inclusion. 
-- Anna Grear
1
 
 
Plurality is ‘an inescapable characteristic of contemporary societies’2 and European societies are 
obviously no exception. The phenomenon is of course far from new – Europe has always been 
linguistically, religiously and culturally diverse.
3
 Diversity, however, has deepened and 
broadened over the past few decades, following post-World-War-II migration and refugee 
movements. Migration, in particular, has most recently diversified
4
 in forms and levels that have 
sometimes led to ‘super-diversity’.5 The novelty, for some, does not lie in the phenomenon of 
cultural and religious diversity as such but rather in ‘the unfamiliar – the extra-European, and 
above all, the extra-Judeo Christian’ dimension.6 The ‘Rest,’ once ‘geographically distant,’7 is 
                                                          
1
 Grear, Anna, ‘“Framing the Project” of International Human Rights Law: Reflections on the Dysfunctional 
“Family” of the Universal Declaration’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds.) THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 34.  
2
 Ballard, Roger et al. ‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and Accommodation’ in Ralph Grillo et al. (eds.) LEGAL 
PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Ashgate, 2009) at 11.  
3
 See, e.g., Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, ‘Living Together: Combining Diversity and 
Freedom in 21st-centry Europe’ (Council of Europe, 2011) at 9 (recalling that Europe has always been diverse). See 
also Malik, Maleiha, ‘The “Other” Citizens: Religion in a Multicultural Europe’ in Camil Ungureanu and Lorenzo 
Zucca (eds.) LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 95 (arguing that assuming that ‘the presence of non-Christian minorities in Europe is a “new” 
phenomenon, ignores the presence –and precedent – of religious minorities such as Jews.’).  
4
 Shah, Prakash, ‘Transnational Family Relations in Migration Contexts: British Variations on European Themes’, 
RELIGARE Working Paper No. 7 (March 2011) at 1.  
5
 Steven Vertovec has coined the term ‘super-diversity’ to underline unprecedented levels and kinds of complexity. 
Vertovec, Steven, ‘Super-diversity and Its Implications’, 30(6) Ethnic and Racial Studies (2007) 1024-1054.  
6
 Ballard, Roger, ‘When, Why and How Far Should Legal Systems Take Cognisance of Cultural Diversity’, 
Presentation prepared for delivery at an International Congress on Justice and Human Values in Europe, Karlsruhe, 
9
th
 – 11th May 2007 at 2, available at <http://www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/karlsruhe.pdf> accessed 2 
February 2014.  
7
 Malik, Maleiha, ‘The “Other” Citizens: Religion in a Multicultural Europe’ in Camil Ungureanu and Lorenzo 
Zucca (eds.) LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 95 (referring to ‘non-European cultures with whom colonial states had contact in the past.’). 
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now in the ‘West’ sharing ‘the same geographical, temporal, and spatial sphere’8 and, by all 
accounts, is here to say.
9
  
Law, including human rights law, is certainly one of the sites where the challenges 
brought by this de facto plurality have been most vividly felt.
10
 Individuals from different 
religious and cultural backgrounds have turned to courts in search of protection of aspects of 
their religion or cultures, putting under increasing pressure dominant legal conceptions and 
traditional background assumptions.
11
 As new issues enter the legal arena, scholars strive to 
come to grips with ‘the already-there factual heterogeneity’,12 with a reality where religious and 
cultural variations abound not only across but also within groups. One of the major questions 
dominating legal academic debates is whether law should take account of this diverse reality, and 
if so, how, on what basis, and to what extent.
13
 For some, it is not even a matter of whether law 
should attend to this reality but, rather, whether it can do so.
14
   
Like many courts in Europe and elsewhere, the European Court of Human Rights (the 
‘Court’ or the ‘Strasbourg Court’) has been grappling with the challenges posed by 
contemporary cultural and religious diversity, mostly in the context of non-discrimination, 
freedom of religion and the right to respect for one’s cultural lifestyle. Claims have come from 
Sikh applicants looking to wear their turban,
15
 Roma claimants seeking protection of their 
travelling lifestyle,
16
 Muslim students battling headscarf bans,
17
 and Kurdish applicants 
                                                          
8
 Ibid.: ‘Now, both Europeans and their “others” from non-Western cultures inhabit the same geographical, temporal 
and spatial sphere’.  
9
 See, e.g., Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, ‘Living Together: Combining Diversity and 
Freedom in 21st-centry Europe’ (Council of Europe, 2011) at 9 (highlighting that ‘most of those who have come to 
Europe in recent decades, and their descendants, are here to stay’.). 
10
 For an insightful discussion on how human rights law is used ‘to frame multicultural issues’ see Special Issue of 
the Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 30(4) 2012.  
11
 For an illuminating list of the types of legal demands and challenges that this pluralization has brought, see 
Ballard, Roger et al. ‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and Accommodation’ in Ralph Grillo et al. (eds.) LEGAL 
PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Ashgate, 2009) at 10. See also, Bader, Veit, Alidadi, Katayoun and 
Vermeulen, Floris, ‘Religious Diversity and Reasonable Accommodation in the Workplace in Six European 
Countries: An Introduction’, 13(2-3) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law (2013) at 55 (arguing that 
‘[l]liberal democratic states in Europe are increasingly confronted with claims to accommodate a wide variety of 
religious beliefs and practices, and this puts pressure on entrenched institutional arrangements . . .’).  
12
 Alidadi, Katayoun and Foblets, Marie-Claire, ‘Framing Multicultural Challenges in Freedom of Religion Terms: 
Limitations of Minimal Human Rights for Managing Religious Diversity in Europe’, 30(4) Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights (2012) at 389. 
13
 See, e.g., Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Le Droit et la Diversité Culturelle: Cartographie d’un Champ en Construction’  in LE 
DROIT ET LA DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE (Sous la direction de Julie Ringelheim) at 3 (arguing, however, that the 
problem is rather which diversity should law take into account); Ballard, Roger, ‘When, Why and How Far Should 
Legal Systems Take Cognisance of Cultural Diversity’, Presentation prepared for delivery at an International 
Congress on Justice and Human Values in Europe, Karlsruhe, 9
th
 – 11th May 2007 at 2 available at 
<http://www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/karlsruhe.pdf> accessed 2 February 2014; and Ballard, Roger et al. 
‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and Accommodation’ in Ralph Grillo et al. (eds.) LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY (Ashgate, 2009) at 11.  
14
 For instance, in a notable study, legal and religious scholar, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, has claimed: ‘Legally 
encompassing the religious ways of people in an intensely pluralist society is most likely impossible’. Sullivan, 
Winnifred Fallers, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 138.  
15
 See, e.g.,  ECtHR, Ranjit Singh v. France, 30 June 2009 and ECtHR, Jasvir Singh v. France, 30 June 2009.  
16
 See, e.g., ECtHR (GC) Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 2001. 
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demanding protection of their language.
18
 Similarly, albeit rather obliquely, demands have come 
from migrants in search of protection of forms of family life that, over and over, have fallen 
outside the nuclear model of parents and minor children.
19
  
The European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) offers explicit bases for some of 
these claims. For example, Article 9 ECHR (freedom of religion),
20
 Article 14 ECHR 
(prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion)
21
 and, more tangentially, Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 (the right of parents to ensure that their children’s education is in conformity with 
their religious convictions)
22
 explicitly enable religious claims. Yet, as a classic individual 
human rights instrument, the ECHR does not provide an express basis for cultural claims (e.g., 
right to respect for one’s traditions or customs) or language claims (e.g., language rights) apart 
from Article 14 ECHR (which prohibits discrimination on the basis of language)
23
 and Articles 5 
§ 2
24
  and 6 § 3 (a) and (e) ECHR
25
 (which guarantee the right to be informed in one’s language 
as part of the protection against arbitrary arrest and the right to a fair trial, respectively).  
The absence of express provisions guaranteeing respect for language and cultural rights 
has not however prevented the Court from deriving language and cultural implications from 
various ECHR provisions. For instance, in a path-breaking interpretation of the ECHR, the Court 
has inserted the right to respect for one’s cultural lifestyle as part of Article 8 ECHR (right to 
respect for private and family life).
26
 It has also drawn language implications in the context of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Dogru v. France, 4 December 2008 and ECtHR, Kervanci v. France, 4 December 2008.    
18
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, 2 February 2010. 
19
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Konstatinov v. the Netherlands, 26 April 2007.  
20
 Article 9 ECHR provides: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
21
 Article 14 ECHR states: ‘The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. No one shall be discriminated against by any 
public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1’. Emphasis added.  
22
 Article 2 of Protocol 1 provides: ‘No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions’. Emphasis added.  
23
 Article 14 ECHR states: ‘The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. No one shall be discriminated against by any 
public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1’. Emphasis added.  
24
 Article 5 § 2 ECHR states: ‘Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him’. Emphasis added. 
25
  Article 6 § 3 (a) ECHR provides: ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him’. Article 6 § 3 (e) ECHR adds: ‘to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court’. Emphasis added.  
26
 See, e.g., ECtHR (GC) Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 2001. See discussion in Chapter II. Article 8 
ECHR states: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
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Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression) as well as in the context of Article 2 of Protocol 1 (the 
right to education) and Article 3 of Protocol 1 (the right to free elections).
27
 What is more, over 
the past decade or so, there have been several doctrinal openings in the Court’s jurisprudence 
towards a more inclusive and diverse protection of applicants’ religious and cultural practices.28  
Yet, so far, these openings have not resulted in actual, definitive and profound shifts in 
the Court’s case law.29 In fact, a considerable part of the scholarship seems to agree that the 
overall picture when it comes to the ECHR protection of religious and cultural diversity remains, 
at best, mixed.
30
 For instance, while the Court has been said to play ‘an increasingly positive 
role’ in some areas of its freedom of religion jurisprudence (i.e., religious groups’ rights)31 in 
other areas, it has been widely criticized for inadequately protecting
32
 and even marginalizing 
some groups.
33
 One leading law and religion scholar has tellingly spoken of the ‘(un)protection 
of individual religious identity in the Strasbourg case law.’34 Another scholar has pointed to the 
‘cracks in the intellectual architecture’35 of the Court’s Article 9 ECHR jurisprudence.36 This is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.  
27
 Moreover, several ECHR provisions – in particular Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression), Article 11 ECHR 
(freedom of assembly and association) and Article 3 of Protocol 1 (the right to free elections) – offer a basis to 
protect (political) expression, organization, and participation in defense of group members’ traditions, language or 
religion. For an analysis of the role of these three ECHR provisions in the protection of minority groups, see Peroni, 
Lourdes, ‘Religious and Ethnic Minorities in the European Court of Human Rights: Democratic Pluralism Unfolded’ 
in Jane Boulden and Will Kymlicka (eds.) INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO GOVERNING ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014).  
28
 See discussion in the Introduction to Part I, and especially, Chapters I and II. 
29
 See discussion in Chapter II. 
30
 See infra Section II and, especially, Chapters II and IV.  
31
 Evans, Carolyn, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the 
Intellectual Architecture’, 26 Journal of Law and Religion (2010-2011) at 322. 
32
 Ibid. (arguing that this positive jurisprudence has not translated into greater protection for religious individuals in 
many instances’.). For a critique of the Court’s approach to facially neutral laws that disproportionately burden 
religious practitioners, see Evans, Carolyn, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Oxford University Press, 2001) at 198-199; for a critique of the Court’s case law on religious 
discrimination, see Henrard, Kristin, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and the 
European Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the Freedom of Religion and 
Related Duties of State Neutrality’ 5(1) Erasmus Law Review (2012) 59-77; and for a critique of the long upheld but 
recently abandoned ‘freedom to resign’ doctrine, see Ouald Chaib, Saila, ‘Religious Accommodation in the 
Workplace: Improving the Legal Reasoning of the ECtHR’ in Katayoun Alidadi, Marie-Claire Foblets and Jogchum 
Vrielink (eds.) A TEST OF FAITH? : RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND ACCOMMODATION IN THE EUROPEAN WORKPLACE 
(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2012) 33-58 and Vickers, Lucy, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
WORKPLACE (Hart Publishing, 2008).  
33
 Danchin, Peter G., ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights’, 32 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2011) 663-747. 
34
 Martínez-Torrón, Javier, ‘The (Un)Protection of Individual Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law’, 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2012) 1-25. 
35
 Evans, Carolyn, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the 
Intellectual Architecture’, 26 Journal of Law and Religion (2010-2011) 321-343.  
36
 It is not uncommon to read ECHR scholars arguing that the Court has failed to take freedom of religion seriously. 
See, e.g., Evans, Carolyn, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 201. 
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an unfortunate state of affairs for a Court that is largely thought – and rightly so – to be one of 
the most established and robust regimes of human rights protection.
37
  
The study that follows is an attempt to give deeper scrutiny to this state of affairs. It 
exposes and challenges the religious and cultural exclusions and inequalities created by several 
assumptions and notions underpinning the Strasbourg Court’s legal reasoning. In so doing, it 
aims to encourage re-thinking of unstated norms that all too often pass for natural and universal 
but in fact hinder fuller equal protection of religious and cultural diversity in today’s Europe.  
 
I. Aims and Scope of the Study  
 
A. Aims 
The aim of this study is two-fold. The first aim is to uncover some of the most fundamental 
closures along religious and cultural lines in the European Convention Human Rights Subject 
(‘ECHR subject’). The second aim is to suggest ways in which this subject may be opened up to 
diversity so as to more fully realize religious and cultural inclusion and equality in Strasbourg. 
For the purposes of this Ph.D., by ‘ECHR subject’, I mean how the Strasbourg Court 
paradigmatically imagines, understands and represents the human beings who turn to it for 
protection.
38
 Similarly, by ‘ECHR cultural and religious subject’, I understand how the Court 
paradigmatically imagines, understands and represents the human beings who come before it in 
search of protection of specific aspects of their religion and culture.
39
 Moreover, for current 
purposes, ‘closures’ is understood as the assumptions, notions and concepts underpinning the 
Court’s construction of the ECHR subject and the ECHR cultural and religious subject that 
operate to exclude a wide range of ‘others’.40 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 See, e.g., Danchin, Peter G. and Forman, Lisa, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities’ in Peter Danchin and Elizabeth Cole (eds.), PROTECTING THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Columbia University Press, 2002) at 192 (arguing 
that the Court ‘has established itself as the most effective regional system for the protection of human rights in the 
world’.).  
38
 I, follow, to a basic extent, Kathryn Abrams’ understanding of the legal subject in the U.S. context. Abrams, 
Kathryn, ‘The Legal Subject in Exile’, 51 Duke Law Journal (2001) 21-74. 
39
 Most of the time, the Court does not describe its conceptions of these subjects in explicit terms, which means that 
these conceptions usually have to be inferred or drawn ‘from the interstices of judicial argument’. Ibid. at 30 
(making this point about American courts’ conception of the legal subject).  
40
 I borrow the term ‘closures’ and its understanding from Anna Grear. Grear uses the term mostly to refer to the 
privileging of certain characteristics of the ‘human’ in international human rights law – those traditionally associated 
with the liberal, male template – that operate to exclude a wide range of ‘others’ who do not exhibit such 
characteristics. See Grear, Anna, REDIRECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF CORPORATE LEGAL 
HUMANITY (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 96-113. 
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B. Scope  
This study examines claims seeking protection of particular aspects of applicants’ culture or 
religion (hereinafter, ‘cultural and religious claims’ or ‘claims of culture and religion’).41 For 
present purposes – and especially for the purpose of identifying the relevant claims to be 
included in the study – culture is understood in an anthropological sense as ‘the way of life of 
individuals and communities, as reflected in shared beliefs, language, traditions and customs’.42 
My focus is therefore on claims requiring the Court to take into account and give weight to these 
specificities – either alone or on a par with the protection of those of others – rather than on 
claims asking these specificities to be ignored.  
The study is careful to avoid – and in fact explicitly critiques43 – the now largely 
condemned ‘essentialist’ view of culture: a conception once dominant but contested in 
anthropology claiming that ‘group[s] [are] defined by a distinctive culture and that cultures are 
discrete, clearly bounded and internally homogenous’.44 In fact, as I attempt to make clear later 
on in this study,
45
 I object to conceiving of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ – and of applicants’ religious 
and cultural practices/traditions/ways of life – as ‘natural’ or ‘brute timeless facts of nature,’46 
dissociated from specific historical and social contexts and processes.
47
 Anthropologists have 
rejected this view in favor of ‘an understanding of culture as historically produced, globally 
interconnected, internally contested, and marked with ambiguous boundaries of identity and 
practice’.48 I am aware that grasping such a complex and changing conception of culture may be 
                                                          
41
 This Ph.D. does not examine cases in which Respondent States justify interferences with applicants’ rights in 
order to protect cultural or religious aspects of the majority or minorities within their territories.  
42
 Donders, Yvonne, ‘Do Cultural Diversity and Human Rights Make a Good Match?’ 199 International Social 
Science Journal (2010) at 18. Emphasis added.  
43
 See especially Chapters IV and VI. 
44
 Cowan, Jane K., Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte and Wilson, Richard A., ‘Introduction’ in Jane K. Cowan et al. (eds.) 
CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 3. Several legal 
scholars have explicitly rejected essentialist notions of culture and religion. See, e.g., Sunder, Madhavi, ‘Cultural 
Dissent’, 54 Stanford Law Review (2001) 495-567. In the ECHR context, see, e.g., Farget, Doris, ‘Defining Roma 
Identity in the European Court of Human Rights’, 19 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2012) 
291-316 and Hoffmann, Florian and Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Par-delà l’Universalisme et le Relativisme: La Cour 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et les Dilemmes de la Diversité Culturelle’, 52 Revue Interdisciplinaire 
d’Etudes Juridiques (2004) 109-142. 
45
 See especially Chapters IV and VI. 
46
 Preis, Ann-Belinda S., ‘Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique’, 18(2) Human Rights 
Quarterly (1996) at 313 (quoting Rosaldo, Renato, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
[Beacon Press, 1989] at 39). 
47
 Ibid.  
48
 Merry, Sally Engle, ‘Changing Rights, Changing Culture’ in Jane K. Cowan et al. (eds.) CULTURE AND RIGHTS: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 41. See also, Steedly, Mary Margaret, 
‘What Is Culture? Does It Matter?’ in Marjorie Garber, Paul B. Franklin and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (eds.), FIELD 
WORK: SITES IN LITERARY AND CULTURAL STUDIES (Routledge, 1996) 18-25: ‘[A]nthropological conceptualizations 
of culture are much more complicated these days than they once were. With postmodernism and post-structuralism, 
diaspora and transnationalism . . . our notions of culture have gotten much more fluid, conflictual, disorderly, blurry, 
mobile, and generally unstable and uncertain’. Ibid. at 23. 
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all the more challenging for the law
49
 – even in the more concrete context of adjudication – but I 
will argue that the effort is nonetheless vital to eschew hierarchies and exclusions both across 
and within groups. 
Traditionally, human rights debates and studies on cultural and religious diversity are 
framed in terms of respect and protection of linguistic, religious and ethno-cultural minorities.
50
 
The object of my study, however, is not defined by the (minority) status of the group in question; 
rather, it is determined by the nature and content of the claims brought before the Court.
51
 In 
other words, I do not approach the study from the angle of minority protection but from the angle 
of protection of cultural or religious aspects.
52
 There are several reasons for choosing this 
approach.  
In the first place, there are serious definitional difficulties surrounding the term 
‘minority’. Crucially, there is no internationally agreed definition of minority.53 One telling 
example is the case of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (‘FCNM’). Admitting that at that stage it was impossible to arrive at a 
definition capable of gaining support of all Member States, the FCNM opted for a ‘pragmatic 
approach’ and offered no definition of ‘national minority’.54 Unsurprisingly, the Strasbourg 
Court has not attempted to define it either.
55
 An influential definition offered in international law 
has been that of Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. His definition emphasizes several 
elements, in particular, inferior number with respect to the population of a State, nationality, and 
non-dominant position.
56
 While the third element remains important, the first two have been 
                                                          
49
 Law tends to essentialize and fix culture and religion as part of its task of ‘developing general principles to 
include, ideally, all possible cases’. Cowan, Jane K., Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte and Wilson, Richard A., 
‘Introduction’ in Jane K. Cowan et al. (eds.) CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) at 21. For an examination and critique of law’s essentialist conception of culture, see, e.g.,  
Sunder, Madhavi, ‘Cultural Dissent’ 54 Stanford Law Review (2001) 495-567. 
50
 See Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS PAR LA 
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Bruylant, 2006) at 3. 
51
 I follow Julie Ringelheim in the adoption of this approach for reasons similar to hers. Ibid. at 3-6. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 There is for example no definition in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suggested a definition in its Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an 
Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 
1 February 1993. For an analysis of the minority concept in international law, see e.g., Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Minority 
Rights in a Time of Multiculturalism – The Evolving Scope of the Framework Convention on the Protection of 
National Minorities,’ 10(1) Human Rights Law Review (2010) 99-128.  
54
 See Explanatory Report, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 15 February 1995, 
paragraph 12 available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_H(95)10_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf> 
accessed 2 February 2014. 
55
 See Tulkens, Françoise and Piedimonte, Stefano, ‘The Protection of National Minorities in the Case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, 7th Meeting, Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of 
National Minorities (DH-MIN), Strasbourg, 12-13 March, 2008. The Strasbourg Court grapples with the issue most 
notably in ECtHR (GC), Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, 17 February 2004, §§§ 46, 68 and 69. 
56
 Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1979) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 at 96: ‘A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
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challenged.
57
 The numerical element reveals the relative (and, therefore, uncertain) character of 
the term: minority vis-à-vis whom?
58
 Do group members numerically inferior regionally but not 
nationally ‘count’ as minorities?59 What is more, some may be part of the majority linguistically 
but not religiously
60
 while others may identify with the religious majority but still belong to 
ethnic and cultural minorities.
61
 Sometimes, a numerical majority may be in a non-dominant 
position.
62
  
In the second place, and in connection with all of the above, there are serious analytical 
limitations of adopting an approach based on the notion of minority for the analysis of the areas 
of the Court’s case law I am interested in. Indeed, if one were to follow this approach despite the 
above-mentioned difficulties, one will soon realize that, while a large number of religious and 
cultural claims involve minority group members, many others do not. Take the freedom of 
religion cases. One of the most telling examples involves cases brought by Muslim applicants 
against Turkey, where Islam is the majority religion. Islam may be the dominant religion in 
Turkey but certainly not in Europe.
63
 Moreover, a considerable number of religious freedom 
claims are brought by Christians, including Coptic Christians,
64
 Pentecostal Christians
65
 and 
Seventh Day Adventists.
66
 As Christians, these applicants may be part of the religious majority 
in a particular State but remain minorities within their religious tradition. As I will show in 
Chapter IV, the lines of exclusion and inequality do not necessarily run along religious traditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language’.  
57
 See, e.g., Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Minority Rights: International 
Standards and Guidance for Implementation’ (2010) at 2-3 available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf > accessed 2 February 2014. With respect to 
the nationality condition, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities has established that ‘citizenship should not be an a priori requirement for the enjoyment of minority 
rights’. See Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Minority Rights in a Time of Multiculturalism – The Evolving Scope of the 
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities,’ 10(1) Human Rights Law Review (2010) at 114. 
Ringelheim argues that the approach of the Advisory Committee ‘is more inclusive than the traditional international 
law stance on the issue’. Ibid. at 115. For a discussion of the problems arising from minority definitions, see, e.g., 
Gilbert, Geoff, ‘Religious Minorities and Their Rights: A Problem of Approach,’ 5 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights (1997) 97-134. 
58
 See Minow, Martha, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (Cornell 
University Press, 1990) at 22 (footnote 5). 
59
 See, e.g., Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS 
PAR LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Bruylant, 2006) at 5. 
60
 Ibid. at 6. 
61
 See Malik, Maleiha, ‘The “Other” Citizens: Religion in a Multicultural Europe’ in Camil Ungureanu and Lorenzo 
Zucca (eds.) LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 95 (arguing that ‘even Christians who are from racial, ethnic and cultural minorities will face forms 
of exclusion from the European public space’.). 
62
 The well-known example is the case of the apartheid regime in South Africa.  
63
 See, e.g., ECtHR (GC), Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 10 November 2005.  
64
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 15 January 2013.   
65
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Larissis and Others v. Greece, 24 February 1998. 
66
 See, e.g., ECmmHR, Konttinen v. Finland, 3 December 1996.  
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(e.g., Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). In short, and as Julie Ringelheim insightfully points out, 
relying exclusively on a minority-majority framework is unduly reductionist of social reality.
67
  
For this and the other reasons stated above – and even when the majority-minority 
scheme retains some currency
68
 – given the aims of my study, I avoid as much as possible 
frameworks that do not allow me to adequately ponder or bring into sharper focus more complex 
issues, including power relations. Indeed, it has been argued that the traditional minority focus 
on numbers tends to obscure the fundamental problem: ‘abuse of dominant positions that are 
based on exclusive collective identities’.69 My concern is power differentials rather than 
numbers. Some authors have adopted a concept of minority that captures this concern. For 
example, Alcoff and Mohanty employ it to signify ‘the nonhegemonic, the nondominant, the 
position that has to be explained rather than assumed, or the identity that is not taken for granted 
but is on trial’.70 While this conceptualization of minority does offer the kind of analytical 
purchase required for my study, I still avoid making the notion of minority the central analytical 
notion of my investigation for the reasons stated earlier.   
 
C. Some Caveats   
 
A number of caveats are in order before moving on to the next section. In the first place, the fact 
that this Ph.D. focuses on religious and cultural closures in the ECHR subject does not mean that 
the Court’s jurisprudence exhibits no openings whatsoever in the areas I examine. In the second 
place, this study does not claim to cover all fundamental closures across the Court’s cultural and 
religious diversity spectrum but only those that I find most obvious, vital and pressing. Lastly, 
though the focus of this Ph.D. is on exclusions and hierarchies along religious and cultural lines, 
the claim is by no means that these are (or should be) the central – let alone sole – forms of 
exclusion and inequality that matter in legal analysis. Quite the contrary, my wish is that this 
study encourages further interrogation of how cultural and religious forms of exclusion and 
inequality may interact with others, in particular those based on gender, race, class and 
nationality.  
 
 
                                                          
67
 Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS PAR LA 
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Bruylant, 2006) at 5. 
68
 See, e.g., Alcoff, Linda Martin and Mohanty, Satya P., ‘Reconsidering Identity Politics: An Introduction’ in Linda 
Martin Alcoff, Michael Hames-Garcia, Satya P. Mohanty and Paula M.L. Moya (eds.) IDENTITY POLITICS 
RECONSIDERED  (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) at 7 (arguing that minority ‘is a convenient way to incorporate 
diversity of differences and forms of oppression’).  
69
 Fortman, Bas de Gaay, ‘Minority Rights: A Major Misconception?’ 33(2) Human Rights Quarterly (2011) at 277. 
70
 Alcoff, Linda Martin and Mohanty, Satya P., ‘Reconsidering Identity Politics: An Introduction’ in Linda Martin 
Alcoff, Michael Hames-Garcia, Satya P. Mohanty and Paula M.L. Moya (eds.) IDENTITY POLITICS RECONSIDERED  
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) at 8. These authors also offer an illuminating political notion of ‘minority’ to signify 
‘struggle, a position that is under contestation or actually embattled, that does not enjoy equality of status, of power, 
or of respect’. Ibid.  
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II. Situating the Study within Wider Debates  
This study may be viewed as part of wider critiques of human rights law that challenge the 
marginalization of a range of beneficiaries from the universal human rights subject. Critiques of 
this sort call into question the universality of human rights law by pointing to existing exclusions 
and hierarchies within the ‘human’ of human rights. Though they come from different quarters, 
their exponents have identified ‘both disguised particularisms in universalism (its androcentrism, 
heterosexism and Eurocentrism) and the exclusions and disparagement towards certain 
collectivities that it entails’.71 Their quarrel is thus with the deficits of universality understood as 
‘all-inclusiveness’,72 that is, as the inclusion of all human beings within its credo.73 These kinds 
of critiques go to the core of the universal human rights project whose ‘most fundamental 
premise purports to apply equally “without distinction”, to “everyone”’.74   
Indeed, universality as ‘all-inclusiveness’ is reflected throughout the language of 
foundational human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(‘UDHR’).75 This notion of universality is embodied for instance in the Preamble proclaiming 
‘the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ and defining the UDHR ‘as 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples’.76 In particular, it is embodied in the 
‘everyone’ and the ‘no one’ inserted across nearly all provisions starting with Article 2: 
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.77 Similar ‘everyones’ and ‘no ones’ are 
found throughout the texts of other human rights instruments, including the ECHR whose first 
provision states: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
                                                          
71
 Cowan, Jane K., Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte and Wilson, Richard A., ‘Introduction’ in Jane K. Cowan et al. (eds.) 
CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 15.  
72
 Brems, Eva, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) at 4-5 and 20 (identifying 
‘all-inclusiveness’ as one of the ‘central features’ of the contemporary concept of universality).  
73
 Ibid. This is the understanding of universality I use for the purposes of this study. This Ph.D. is not therefore 
concerned with other concepts of universality. In particular, it is not concerned with universality in an 
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the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’.78 This all-inclusiveness impulse 
is re-affirmed by the prohibition of non-discrimination contained in Article 14 ECHR: ‘The 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status’. It is therefore clear that universality as ‘all-inclusiveness’ – or ‘universality of the 
subjects of human rights’79 – far from being a controversial notion, is deeply connected with the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination.
80
   
Yet, and despite its inclusive rhetorical force, international human rights law remains 
fraught with a paradox: the ‘everyone’ within the ‘human family’ co-exists with a variety of 
outsiders or ‘non-everyones’ in a rather ‘dysfunctional family’.81 As Douzinas and Gearty put it, 
‘[t]he “everyone” of the universal human subject is shadowed by the various categories of 
exclusion and marginalization’.82 Recent genealogical studies of international human rights law 
show that this paradox in fact rests on a fundamental contradiction lying at the origins of the 
universal subject.
83
 At the genesis of human rights law, Anna Grear explains, are two competing 
impulses. On one side, there is the inclusiveness impulse reflected in the emphasis on ‘the unity 
of the human race as a species’ (an ‘inclusive species-notion’), as a reaction to the horrendous 
affront of the Nazi regime to humanity.
84
 On the other side, however, there is what Grear calls 
‘the discourse of quasi-disembodiment’, imported into the human rights project from the notion 
of ‘natural man’ – a naturalistic construct that posited rationality as the characteristic of human 
nature ‘by subtracting from embodied persons what made them unique, situated, distinctive and 
nuanced’.85 This essentially rational human being, far from being disembodied or abstract, turned 
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out to have a specific male body, given the historical fusion of rationality with masculinity in 
Western philosophy.
86
 Hence Grear’s use of the term ‘quasi-disembodiment’: the empty 
disembodied human rights subject is not really completely empty or disembodied.
87
 Upendra 
Baxi explains the exclusionary function that rationality and autonomous will as the ‘criteria of 
individuation’ have played in what he calls the ‘modern’ paradigm of human rights:   
 
The criteria of individuation in the European liberal tradition of thought furnished some of the most 
powerful ideas in constructing a model of human rights. Only those beings were to be regarded as 
‘human’ who were possessed of the capacity of reason and autonomous moral will. What counted 
as reason and will varied in the course of the long development of the European liberal tradition. 
However, in its major phases of development “slaves”, heathens, barbarians, colonized peoples, 
indigenous populations, women, children, the impoverished and the insane have been at various 
times and in various ways thought unworthy of being bearers of human rights. These discursive 
devices of Enlightenment rationality were devices of exclusion.
88
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The particular (male) features of the ‘disembodied’ subject have been more recently confirmed 
by the post-UDHR ‘production of new categories of human rights’, whose beneficiaries are a 
range of historically excluded groups.
89
 It has been argued that ‘the very need’ for human rights 
instruments directed at specific right holders (e.g., women, minorities, children, people with 
disabilities) is in fact evidence of the existence of various marginalized subjectivities within 
international human rights law.
90
 Anna Grear observes in this regard: ‘It is precisely the felt/lived 
sense of exclusion, hierarchical marginalization or invisibility that has driven women and a range 
of other marginalized “others” to seek the specific enumeration of their rights’.91 In similar 
terms, Douzinas remarks that the ‘original rights of “man” [broke up and proliferated] into the 
rights of various types of subject, e.g., rights of workers, women, children, refugees’ in a 
mechanism of expansion that first asserts similarity with and then difference from those already 
admitted as ‘human’.92  
In sum, Grear’s genealogical reading of human rights law reveals ‘quasi-disembodiment 
and the abstraction of legal rights discourse to be ongoing sites of exclusion for human beings in 
human rights law, especially for those beings who do not fit the submerged template of “full 
humanity” implicated in the abstract universal’.93 Contemporary critical accounts of human 
rights are well aware of the contradictions between these exclusions and the universality 
impulse.
94
 Though these critics come from different corners, many of them ultimately attempt to 
address the same concern: the marginalization and exclusion of those who do not fit the 
dominant constructions of the human rights subject.
95
 Take for example two of the most well-
known critiques of mainstream human rights accounts: (i) the feminist critique and (ii) what 
some scholars have renamed the ‘particularist’ critique (to refer to those who, unlike cultural 
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relativists, do not reject the legitimacy of human rights as such).
96
 One common thread running 
through these critiques despite their varied dimensions and concerns – and the thread that is most 
relevant for the purposes of this study – is a concern with universality understood as ‘all-
inclusiveness’. Referring to these critiques, Eva Brems argues that ‘[b]oth start from finding that 
the liberal concept of human rights was developed by the dominant group, excluding the group 
whose perspective they defend, making this conception of human rights inadequate for their 
group’.97 Moreover, they both ultimately want the same: ‘changes in the human rights system so 
as to incorporate either a gender perspective or a perspective of cultural diversity’.98  
Feminists have challenged the presumed universality of human rights law by exposing 
the gendered premises that operate to marginalize women.
99
 They have taken issue with the idea 
that the human of human rights law is ‘gender-free’ and that it is therefore unnecessary to add a 
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gender dimension to human rights violations.
100
 Dianne Otto, for instance, argues that ‘women’s 
full inclusion in universal representations of humanity may be an impossibility so long as the 
universal (masculine) subject continues to rely for its universality on the contrast with feminized 
particularities’.101 Otto shows how three gendered subjectivities – the ‘wife and mother’,102 the 
‘formally equal with men’103 and the ‘victim’104 – survived in the UDHR and persisted in later 
human rights covenants, re-affirming women’s marginalization from full humanity.105 An 
example of the ‘formally equally to men’ subjectivity is the rejection of the proposal to add 
explicit references to women to the UDHR because that would have undermined the ‘everyone’ 
of the declaration and included rights that were not universal.
106
 On this rejection, Otto argues: 
‘[The detractors] failed to understand that their imagined universal subject was gendered; their 
abstract bearer of human rights possessed masculine characteristics’.107  
As noted above, ‘particularist’ critiques of human rights law echo this aspect of the 
feminist critique: the charge that the universal human rights subject is not actually universal. 
This is why it is not surprising that demands from both non-Western particularist and feminist 
critiques ask that human rights law take their particularities into account.
108
 Eva Brems argues:  
 
The widespread idea that the universality of human rights needs a trans- or supra- cultural and 
historical foundation leads to presenting the ‘human’ in human rights as an abstract, 
decontextualized individual. An abstract individual however does not exist. Neutrality and 
decontextualization may be pursued in good faith but it is inevitable that the product of this effort 
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still reflects the dominant culture. The so-called abstract human being is in fact molded on the 
dominant Western male culture. Universal human rights constructed with this abstract human being 
in mind have an effect of exclusion: the less one complies with the implied norm, the less one feels 
at home in human rights.
109
  
 
So, far from rejecting human rights universality, particularist critiques within the so-called 
“cultural relativism” ask instead for ‘improved universality’ or inclusion in human rights law.110 
I will not give a comprehensive overview of the ‘universalism-cultural relativism’ debate. There 
are several broader aspects to it that have been exhaustively examined in the literature
111
 and that 
clearly exceed the scope of my study.
112
 Moreover, in recent years, there have been growing 
scholarly efforts to de-essentialize (and de-dichotomize) the debate and move beyond the divide. 
Brems is in fact not alone in her attempt to re-conceptualize the ‘universalism v. cultural 
relativism’ discussion in less dichotomous terms. A number of other scholars have proposed to 
move away from the traditional framing arguing that it rests on a range of reductionist views 
(e.g., ‘West/East or ‘North/South,’113 ‘culture/reason,’114 and ‘culture/rights’115). Amidst these 
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attempts to overcome the sharp dichotomies (and the stalemate) between universalism and 
cultural relativism, the idea seems to have taken hold that respect for cultural diversity is not 
necessarily incompatible with the universality of human rights.
116
   
Critiques of exclusion of the type raised by feminists and particularists can be similarly 
raised with respect to the ECHR.
117
 In this study, I argue that major closures of the type 
discussed above remain in place in the ECHR subject. In particular, I show that a series of 
allegedly universal subjectivities reproduce exclusions and hierarchies of culture and religion at 
different levels. Indeed, despite several relatively recent openings – most notably, the creation of 
a specific right to respect for (minority) lifestyle as part of the general right to respect for private 
and family life and the growing attention to substantive equality reflected in the notions of 
indirect discrimination and differential treatment of those differently situated
118
 – many scholars 
seem to agree that the overall picture in Strasbourg remains at best mixed and ambivalent.
119
 In 
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fact, one repeated scholarly critique is that the principles surrounding these ECHR openings 
remain largely theoretical: gaps persist between their enunciation and their actual application in 
particular cases.
120
 For instance, the door may have been opened to indirect discrimination, but 
religious and cultural claims against seemingly neutral norms have rarely gone through.
121
 
Likewise, the Court may have recognized a right to respect for minority lifestyle but, in reality, it 
has seldom found a violation of this right.
122
   
Though part of the ECHR scholarship is highly critical of this state of affairs, most of it 
tends to bypass its deeper roots.
123
 Significant effort has been put into critiquing doctrinal aspects 
of the Court’s legal reasoning.124 Some commentators, in particular freedom of religion scholars, 
have exposed the exclusionary effects of these doctrinal aspects.
125
 Considerable attention has 
also been given to the need to move beyond formal equality
126
 and various proposals have 
already emerged as a result, most notably the notion of reasonable accommodation.
127
 Yet little 
energy has been devoted to bringing into view – let alone subvert and transform – the deeper 
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embedded assumptions that inform such exclusionary modes of reasoning and the vacillation to 
go beyond formal equality. This study sustains that these underlying assumptions need first to be 
exposed, critically examined and rethought if substantive equality and a more robust protection 
of cultural and religious diversity is to take hold. These are assumptions that underlie the Court’s 
conceptions of the individual behind freedom of religion or respect for cultural lifestyle claims; 
conceptions of certain religious or cultural groups; and conceptions of religion and family life 
more broadly.  
Freedom of religion scholars appear to be increasingly aware of the need to reach and 
rethink several of these assumptions, in particular, those behind the conceptions of ‘religion’ and 
religious subjectivity. In recent years, a handful of commentators have started to attend to the 
deeper, structural limitations underlying the Court’s freedom of religion case law.128 In the 
process, they have importantly hinted at the particularities that the seemingly paradigmatic 
bearer of freedom of religion exhibits in Strasbourg (cerebral,
129
 autonomous
130
 and private
131
) 
and at the ‘others’ that this constructed bearer has (re-)produced as a result.132 While these are no 
doubt crucial insights, this kind of literature takes only tangential issue with exposing and 
challenging the features of the ‘universals’ embedded in the Court’s implicit assumptions. The 
fact remains that the freedom of religion ‘universal’ as well as several cultural ‘universals’ 
continue to be, for the most part, veiled by a certain ‘surface universalism:’ ‘a thin layer of 
universalizing rhetoric’ that makes it look like the Court is describing individuals’ experiences in 
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universal terms.
133
 The study I offer can be viewed as an attempt to more fully reveal the ‘faces’ 
of the universals behind these veils.  
 
III. Research Questions  
 
This Ph.D. draws upon and seeks to contribute to the critical academic debates discussed above 
by exposing and contesting the contours of some of the ‘universals’ responsible for the            
(re-)production of exclusions and hierarchies of religion and culture in Strasbourg. To this end, I 
ask two sets of questions. At a descriptive level, I ask: What are the assumptions or conceptions 
implicitly defining the ‘ECHR subject’ against which religious and cultural claimants are 
judged? In particular, which experiences, features or views are regarded as essential or 
‘universal’ in the construction of this subject and which ones are marginalized as invisible, 
negligible or ‘particular’? Moreover, what kinds of consequences do these assumptions carry for 
religious and cultural applicants and their groups? Do they create exclusions and hierarchies 
between them?  If so, what forms or shapes do such exclusions and hierarchies take and at what 
levels do they occur (e.g., within groups, across groups)? At a normative level, the research 
questions are: Should the Court avoid these exclusions and hierarchies – or open up these 
‘universals’? If so, on what basis and how exactly might the Court do this?  
 
IV. Thesis and Normative Basis   
 
The thesis I advance in this study is two-fold. The first central argument is that there are several 
fundamental closures in the ‘universals’ of the ECHR subject hampering fuller and more equal 
inclusion of a range of religious and cultural ‘others’. These closures manifest themselves in 
various forms and take place at different levels. Yet they all respond to the same exclusionary 
logic: the experiences of some are confused with the experiences of all and posited as the 
yardstick against which everyone is judged. Indeed, the workings of such universals have not just 
led to the trivialization and marginalization of applicants’ experiences. Most worryingly, they 
have sometimes led to their devaluation and delegitimation. The second central argument is that 
the Court should open up such ‘universals’ in order to avoid exclusion and inequality.  
The overall thesis proceeds in three major parts, each of which identifies these closures 
and proposes to open up the ECHR subject at a different level (hence the reference to the overall 
resulting framework as ‘multilayered’). First, it identifies exclusions and hierarchies within the 
abstract category of ‘human’. It argues that the Court has, to some extent, opened up the abstract 
universal human rights subject by acknowledging the constructed vulnerability of some groups. 
Yet traces of invulnerability foreclose fuller inclusion of cultural and religious group members. 
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Second, the dissertation identifies exclusions and hierarchies within the religious and cultural 
ECHR subject, that is to say, across different religious and cultural groups. The dissertation 
argues that operating as one of the ‘universals’ of freedom of religion is a Protestant, belief-
centered notion of religion, which favors internal and disembodied forms of religious 
subjectivity over external and embodied ones. The dissertation further unveils one of the 
‘universals’ of the right to respect for family life: the nuclear family idealized in some parts of 
Western Europe. Last, the dissertation identifies exclusions and hierarchies within sub-religious 
and sub-cultural ECHR subjects, namely within groups. It shows how such exclusions and 
hierarchies arise from elevating a particular cultural or religious practice to the norm, as if it 
were the group paradigmatic practice. This practice is subsequently either fixed as the ‘essence’ 
of group identity or associated with negative stereotypes.    
My arguments – and the framework I propose – are normatively anchored in a 
substantive conception of equality. This notion of equality grows out of the realization of the 
limits of formal equality and its paramount principle that individuals should be treated the 
same.
134
 This sameness-of-treatment version of equality rests on several assumptions, including: 
(i) that characteristics such as sex, race and religion should be irrelevant (i.e., law should be sex-
blind, race-blind, religion-blind, etc.) and (ii) that what matters is the ‘abstract individual’, 
detached from her particular characteristics (e.g., gender, race, religion) and her specific 
contexts.
135
 Substantive equality, on the contrary, does not bracket off the individual’s specific 
context or circumstances and the role of her gender, religion or race within them.
136
 Moreover, 
substantive equality is not just sensitive to identical treatment but also, and crucially, to 
differential outcomes or effects.
137
 It is thus concerned with equality in result. Thus, substantive 
equality does not disapprove of – and in fact sometimes requires – differential treatment when 
this is necessary to avoid or redress differential consequences.
138
 Sandra Fredman calls this 
dimension of substantive equality ‘transformative’ because, instead of asking the removal of 
‘difference’, it demands the removal of the disadvantage attached to it.139 This dimension of 
substantive equality is sensitive to the fact that in reality ‘the abstract individual is clothed with 
the characteristics of the dominant group, which are then asserted as if they were universal’.140  
Though mostly grounded on this dimension and rationale of substantive equality, my 
arguments and framework go yet deeper in an attempt to incorporate the following insight: 
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equality does not just require recognizing ‘difference’ – or, more precisely, the disadvantage 
attached to it – but simultaneously interrogating how ‘difference’ is produced in the first place.141 
Understanding how difference comes about requires acknowledging that ‘difference’ is not 
inherent but relational: it expresses comparisons between people (different from whom?).
142
 The 
problem is that the ‘whom’ is most of the time left unstated. Since dominant institutional 
arrangements are designed with only some people in mind, those not contemplated in such 
arrangements appear ‘different’, ‘visible’, if not ‘deviant’.143 It is therefore vital to seek out the 
‘unstated point of reference when assessing others’.144 Otherwise, we risk leaving unchallenged 
standards that privilege some but disadvantage others.
145
 Martha Minow observes:  
 
From the point of reference of this norm, we determine who is different and who is normal. Women 
are different in relation to the unstated male norm. Blacks, Mormons, Jews, and Arabs are different 
in relation to the unstated white, Christian norm. Handicapped persons are different in relation to 
the unstated norm of able-bodiedness, or, as some have described it, the vantage point of the 
“Temporarily Able Persons.” The unstated point of comparison is not neutral, but particular, and 
not inevitable, but only seemingly so when left unstated.
146
  
 
Thus, it is not just the disadvantage attached to ‘difference’ that I want to reach. Crucially, I 
additionally aim to investigate the other side of the coin: advantage or privilege.
147
 In particular – 
and this is one of the crucial aspects of my study – I interrogate the workings of hegemonic 
cultural or religious forces, usually so intertwined in legal frameworks and modes of reasoning, 
that they are hardly noticeable and oftentimes viewed as ‘natural’ or ‘universal’.148 In exposing 
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and challenging several taken-for-granted assumptions operating at different levels of the ECHR 
‘universal’, I thus wish to reach the more structural inequalities embedded therein.  
In particular, I show that a failure to recognize the particulars cloaked in these 
‘universals’ often results in a failure to address several forms of inequality. One of these forms 
operates by ignoring the particularities of those who do not fit the ‘universal’: whereas the 
particularities of some are already taken into account in the ‘universal’, the specificities of others 
are not. Another form of inequality operates by requiring those who do not fit to mold 
themselves into – or conform to – the ‘universal’: whereas those who are already represented in 
the ‘universal’ live comfortably by their own standards, those who are not are required to live by 
standards that are not theirs. A third form of inequality occurs when the particularities of those 
who do not fit operate as the (devalued) ‘opposite’ of the (valued) ‘universal’ in binary 
constructions that serve to re-affirm the latter. The former thus acts as the ‘other’ or ‘the non-
universal against which the universal is defined’.149 In one way or another, all these forms of 
inequality ultimately reaffirm the ‘universal’ as the standard against which an array of cultural 
and religious group members are rendered invisible, assimilated or ‘othered.’ In essence, all of 
them point to what Nancy Fraser calls ‘misrecognition’, a harm that arises when 
‘institutionalized patterns of cultural value . . . constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, 
wholly other, or simply invisible’.150  
Fraser proposes rethinking misrecognition as status subordination rather than as ‘free-
standing cultural harm’.151 ‘What requires recognition’, she claims, ‘is not group-specific identity 
but the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction’.152 Fraser’s 
‘status model’ is an attempt to mitigate the pitfalls of the ‘identity model’ (including religious 
and cultural identity), which all too often obscures the ways in which these identities are socially, 
institutionally and historically produced.
153
 The claim is that emphasis on ‘difference’ and 
‘identity’ shields from view the subordination and disadvantage produced by patterns of cultural 
value that constitute ‘some categories of social actors as normative and others as deficient or 
inferior’.154 Fraser’s model, therefore, does not see culture as ‘free-floating’ but as ‘socially 
grounded’ and aims not at ‘valorizing group identity but rather at overcoming subordination’.155 
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In summary, this Ph.D. exposes and contests assumptions and conceptions in the Court’s 
legal reasoning that ‘constitute some [religious and cultural] actors as inferior, excluded, wholly 
other, or simply invisible’.156 In an attempt to redress these forms of subordination, I employ two 
simultaneous strategies: (i) taking under-recognized specificities into account (ii) outing the 
distinctiveness of ‘dominant and advantaged groups’ that has been ‘falsely parading as 
universal’.157 
 
V. Methodology 
 
A. ECHR Provisions Covered 
Though various ECHR Articles may serve as a direct or indirect basis for religious and cultural 
claims, this study does not offer a comprehensive examination of all ECHR provisions under 
which such claims have been brought.
158
 Rather, it focuses primarily on three of them – Articles 
8, 9 and 14 ECHR – for these are the provisions that offer the most common and direct grounds 
for claims of the nature examined in this Ph.D. As a matter of fact, these are the provisions under 
which applicants have most frequently brought direct claims of culture and religion and the ones 
under which the most significant jurisprudential developments have taken place.
159
  
There are further reasons for focusing my analysis on these three ECHR provisions. Two 
of them – Article 9 and Article 14 ECHR – have long been neglected by the Court and, as a 
result, remain largely underdeveloped. Indeed, it took decades for the Court to find the first 
Article 9 ECHR violation
160
 to the bewilderment of several ECHR scholars. Some of these 
scholars have spoken of ‘a history of avoidance;’161 others of decades of ‘dead letter’.162 Marie-
Bénédicte Dembour, for instance, puzzles over the fact that ‘over thirty years elapsed before the 
Court identified that something had gone wrong in Europe as far as freedom of religion was 
concerned’.163 And Danchin and Forman show how the pattern has long been to examine cases 
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on grounds other than Article 9 ECHR wherever possible.
164
 Even nowadays, the statistical 
figures continue to astound. A look at the Court’s most recent table of violations reveals that, in 
the period of 1959-2012, the Court has found only forty-six violations of Article 9 ECHR,
165
 
ahead of just five other ECHR provisions, namely the prohibition of slavery and forced labor,
166
 
no punishment without law,
167
 the right to marry,
168
 the right to education
169
 and the right not be 
tried or punished twice.
170
 The total number of Article 9 ECHR violations looks particularly 
small when compared with the amount of violations of other rights and freedoms subject to 
similar limitations: Article 8 ECHR (nine hundred and forty violations); Article 10 ECHR (five 
hundred and twelve) and Article 11 ECHR (a hundred and forty one).
171
 Of course, this state of 
affairs is not only the Court’s responsibility. As a complaint-driven system, much of the 
development of the ECHR provisions obviously depends on the number and types of 
applications that actually reach Strasbourg.
172
 Yet the available statistics do give worrying 
signals, confirming the critiques often made in the literature. 
Article 14 ECHR features a much higher number of violations than Article 9 ECHR in 
the same period (one hundred and ninety nine). However, the Court’s tendency has long been – 
and still is – to refuse separate analysis under this provision once the issues have been decided 
(and, especially, a violation found) under other ECHR provisions.
173
 While it is true that the 
ECHR non-discrimination is now ‘larger and bolder’, it remains overall ‘marginal’ and has only 
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evolved recently after ‘a period of stagnation’.174 Unsurprisingly, authors have referred to Article 
14 ECHR as ‘a second-class guarantee’175 and, most poignantly, as ‘a Cinderella provision’.176  
As for Article 8 ECHR, my additional reasons for its selection are of a different nature. 
First, this is the Article within which the Court has, in a groundbreaking move, inserted a 
specific right to protection of (minority) cultural lifestyle. To the extent that Article 8 ECHR is 
now the direct and main basis for advancing and deciding cultural claims, its examination takes 
priority over other ECHR provisions that may concern similar issues more indirectly and 
peripherally (e.g., Article 1 of Protocol 1, Article 12 ECHR). Second, Article 8 ECHR has been 
the silent site of two sets of cultural claims that, perhaps because of their ‘quiet’ nature (given 
either their small number or their obliquity), have largely escaped both the Court’s and scholars’ 
radars. The first group of these claims concerns language minorities’ claims for respect of the 
linguistic integrity of their names; the second, migrants’ claims for respect of their right to family 
life. In these two groups of cases, the Court has failed to recognize the cultural aspect of family 
life and names.  
A number of caveats are in order. First, language-related claims decided under the right 
to respect for correspondence of Article 8 ECHR are included only as part of my background 
analysis. This is because applicants’ demands in these cases do not generally concern respect for 
their language as such, at least not to the same extent as language-related-name claims. Second, 
cultural claims examined under other ECHR provisions, most notably Article 1 of Protocol 1, are 
included mostly as part of my background analysis. So are language-related claims decided 
under other ECHR provisions, particularly Article 2 of Protocol 1 (the right to education) and 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 (the right to free elections). Last, Article 2 of Protocol 1, though a 
provision of important implications for religious claims, remains largely outside the scope of my 
study, principally because it raises wider complex issues that merit their own, separate, fuller 
examination. This provision is, in any event, rather tangentially and instrumentally related to 
religious claims.  
 
B. ECHR Sub-sets of Case Law Not Covered  
 
Article 14 ECHR case law is examined to the extent that is relevant to the types of claims I focus 
on in this study. As for Article 9 ECHR, my analysis largely excludes two lines of case law. 
First, unless relevant to the object of this study, it does not study Article 9 ECHR case law from 
the angle of Church-State relations. A focus on issues concerning Church-State relations would 
in fact be deeply diversionary, as the distinctiveness and complexity of the questions and 
challenges they raise require separate, thorough consideration. Second, I do not focus on what 
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Martinez Torron terms ‘the institutional side’ of freedom of religion177 or the claims brought by 
what Carolyn Evans calls ‘institutional applicants’ (e.g., churches and religious communities).178 
This body of case law primarily concerns associational or organizational issues (e.g., recognition 
of legal entity status and autonomy in the organization of internal affairs)
179
 as well as property 
issues (e.g., taxation and protection of monasteries),
180
 both of which are rather instrumental in 
the enjoyment of freedom of religion.
181
 The most fundamental reason for the exclusion of this 
group of cases is because the Court has shown itself highly protective of freedom of religion in 
this area as opposed to other spheres.
182
 The fact that one of the principal aims of my study is to 
uncover the closures lying at the heart of the cultural and religious exclusions and hierarchies in 
the ECHR naturally excludes areas where the Court has offered high levels of protection.  
 
C. Case Law Selection  
 
The selected cases comprise a mix of ‘high-profile’ cases – which I define as Grand Chamber 
and widely-cited cases in the Court’s jurisprudence – and less known cases. Moreover, the 
selection makes sure to combine Grand Chamber judgments, Chamber judgments and 
inadmissibility decisions. Though the sample is by no means complete, it is substantial enough to 
allow for meaningful analysis and conclusions. It includes judgments and decisions passed by the 
Commission and the Court until 15 July 2013.  
(i) Article 9 ECHR – Freedom of Religion  
 
My sample includes a total number of a hundred and fifteen judgments/decisions, most of them 
identified through the Court’s HUDOC database under Article 9 ECHR.183 I have additionally 
identified many of the cases compromising the sample through existing literature, the snowball 
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method (some cases led to others) and bi-weekly team discussions of the Court’s latest case law 
at the Human Rights Center (these discussions are internally known as ‘the Strasbourg Club’). 
The sample makes sure to include all Level of Importance ‘1’ judgments/decisions from this 
database. This level is assigned by the Court itself and means that the ruling in question makes a 
significant contribution to the development, clarification or modification of its case-law. 
Moreover, the selection makes sure to include nearly all judgments/decisions
184
 featuring in the 
2013 ‘Freedom of Religion’ Factsheet prepared by the Court. Last, the selection includes several 
cases concerning parental rights – which, in fact, are ultimately about religious discrimination 
but still typically examined by the Court under Article 8 ECHR.   
 
(ii) Article 8 ECHR – Cultural Lifestyle  
 
While the selection of freedom of religion case law is a relatively straightforward enterprise in 
the HUDOC database, the collection of cultural lifestyle cases is not. This is because the right to 
respect for one’s cultural lifestyle is just one of the rights protected under Article 8 ECHR. 
Therefore, in order to identify the relevant cases, I employed a combination of the following 
methods: existing literature, use of specific search terms in the HUDOC database,
185
 the Court’s 
factsheets,
186
 the snowball method, and the ‘Strasbourg Club’ discussions. I employed the 
following search terms in the HUDOC database: ‘way of life’, ‘cultural practice’, ‘minority 
lifestyle’, and ‘lifestyle’. As a result, the cultural lifestyle sample includes a total of twenty 
cases.
187
  
 
(iii) Article 8 ECHR – Language 
 
The language-related name case law falls under the right to respect for private and family life of 
Article 8 ECHR. Since this provision, as mentioned earlier, covers other rights, the search of 
relevant cases in the HUDOC database proceeded on the basis of key terms: ‘minority’, 
‘language’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘name’. Additionally, I have relied on existing literature, the Court’s 
own factsheets
188
 and other documents,
189
 the snowball method, and the ‘Strasbourg Club’ 
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discussions. A list of these cases – along with other language cases (under other ECHR 
provisions) informing my overall analysis – may be found in the Case Law Annex under 
‘Language’. The list comprises a total of twenty-two cases.  
 
(iv) Article 8 ECHR – Family Life 
 
In my search of the relevant case law concerning the right to respect for family life, I have 
employed exactly the same methods as the ones used in the above-mentioned Article 8 ECHR 
searches: existing literature, Court’s documents, snowball method and search terms in the 
HUDOC database, which included: ‘extended family’, ‘sisters’, ‘brothers’, ‘siblings’, ‘adult 
children’, ‘adult(s)’, ‘extended relatives’, ‘distant relatives’, ‘grandparents’, ‘niece’, and 
‘nephew’. The point of departure of my search was the Court’s own document ‘Key Case Law 
Issues: The Concepts of Private and Family Life’ of 24 January 2007. In total, I have examined 
eighty-five cases.  
 
(v) Article 14 ECHR – Non-discrimination  
 
Most of the relevant Article 14 cases have been found through an analysis of Article 9 ECHR 
and Article 8 ECHR case law, existing literature and the snowball method. Additionally, I have 
resorted to HUDOC searches (i.e., Article 14-Article 9 and Article 14-Article 8; the latter was 
further refined through the insertion of the search language and traditional lifestyle terms 
mentioned above). References to these cases are scattered through the Case Law Annex.  
 
(vi) Group Vulnerability 
 
Chapter I of this thesis is devoted to an assessment of the Court’s emerging concept of 
‘vulnerable groups’. The following HUDOC terms have been employed in the search: 
‘vulnerable group’, ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘vulnerable individual’ and ‘vulnerable position’. A list 
of the ‘vulnerable group’ and related case law may be found in the Case Law Annex under 
‘Group Vulnerability’. They are in total sixteen rulings.  
 
(vii) Other ECHR Provisions  
 
In addition to the previously-mentioned case law, a number of high-profile rulings from others 
areas of the Court’s case law are included mostly as background information. Though very few 
of them are explicitly mentioned in this study, they have certainly informed my overall analysis. 
These cases range widely from those concerning freedom of association to the right to education 
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and the right to free elections. In total, they are twenty-one cases. The full list can be found in the 
Case Law Annex under ‘Other’.  
 
(viii) Case Law Selection in Chapter VI 
 
In this Chapter, the case law selection follows a slightly different pattern, more suitable for the 
purposes and questions therein addressed. Therefore, the selection criteria and the resulting 
sample are discussed in detail in a specific section dedicated to the methodology at the beginning 
of the Chapter.   
 
D. Framework and Modes of Analysis 
 
This study combines description, criticism and prescription but the overall approach remains 
largely critical. The analysis, though case-law oriented, is theoretically informed by a range of 
critical frameworks coming principally from critical human rights theory, feminist legal theory, 
and postmodern critiques (in particular, the anti-essentialist critique). The reason for these 
choices lies in the purposes of my study: the identification and disruption of exclusionary 
mechanisms not always apparent to the naked eye. All of them – critical human rights theory, 
feminist legal theory, and postmodern critiques – offer the theoretical resources apt for the task at 
hand. Indeed, as it might have become clear from the discussion in Section II above, critical 
accounts of human rights highlight their ambivalence ‘for producing and cloaking privilege and 
yet, simultaneously . . . for the unveiling of oppression’.190 This problematization of and 
ambivalence towards human rights law distinguishes these accounts from mainstream or 
traditional ones.
191
  
Feminist legal theory and postmodern critiques, in turn, are renowned for their critical 
force. Indeed, as I more fully explain at the beginning of Parts II and III, respectively, feminists 
are well-known for successfully exposing the law’s gendered assumptions that reinforce 
women’s inequality and oppression192 and postmodern theorists for challenging the unitary and 
essentialist character of categories (including identity and group categories) for their 
exclusionary character.
193
 In particular, postmodern feminist critique is especially known for 
refusing to reduce ‘reality to one key factor,’ that, for this reason, ignores other factors ‘that do 
not fit’.194 While the insights from critical human rights theory appear most obviously in Chapter 
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I, those from feminist legal theorists and from the postmodern critique feature most fully in 
Chapters IV, V and VI.   
My analytical framework is not only informed by insights from these theories. It 
integrates further tools from deconstruction and critical discourse analysis. The former, famously 
associated with Derrida, is well-known for its capacity to challenge taken-for-granted 
assumptions;
195
 the latter for reaching the ideological underpinnings of seemingly innocuous 
language.
196
 Given the nature of the legal claims I deal with in this study (religious and cultural), 
my framework also includes insights from anthropology and religious studies. While some 
insights from anthropology are scattered through my thesis,
197
 the insights from religious studies 
are most fully at work in Chapter IV.
198
  
In short, this study proceeds across methodological and disciplinary boundaries. Given its 
purposes and object, a purely legalistic analysis exclusively focused on doctrinal issues would 
have not enabled me to adequately uncover and critique the background assumptions embedded 
in the Court’s legal reasoning. Of course, this does not mean that the framework of my analysis 
excludes legal scholarship. Scholarly works on equality and non-discrimination (including 
emerging legal scholarship on vulnerability), on law and religion, on minority rights and on the 
ECHR are at the heart of my analytic framework.  
Though this thesis is largely characterized by a critical assessment of the Court’s legal 
reasoning, it is not all about critique. It is also deeply concerned with relevance and practicality. 
Indeed, my intention is that this kind of critical assessment serves as a basis for exploring and 
suggesting possible avenues of change. As I noted at the beginning of this section, this study also 
has a prescriptive dimension. Most of the proposed prescriptions build upon existing lines of the 
Court’s case law. While my initial idea was to adopt a comparative approach – and ultimately to 
reach out other jurisdictions in search of ‘solutions’ – I immediately abandoned the project after 
noticing that some of the ‘recipes’ were actually ‘home’, sometimes even in exactly the same 
area that exhibited the most problematic aspects.
199
 In a way, this realization has allowed me to 
suggest more realistic strategies that, precisely for resting on the bases of what is already ‘there’, 
may be more easily and fruitfully implemented. I show how such strategies might pan out in 
practice at the end of Parts I, II and III.  
 
VI. Structure of the Study  
 
This study is divided into three Parts. Part I deals with closures at the level of the abstract 
universal ECHR subject and unveils the inegalitarian and exclusionary implications of these 
closures for cultural and religious applicants. In fact – and perhaps somehow ironically – Part I 
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starts off by examining a major opening in the ECHR subject: the concept of ‘vulnerable 
groups’. Yet Part I soon makes clear that this subject – the vulnerable group member – has yet to 
make her/his (further) appearance in the context of claims of religion, cultural lifestyle and 
language. Part II examines the closures at the level of the ECHR religious and cultural subject, 
that is to say, the closures that create exclusions and hierarchies across cultural and religious 
groups. Part III looks at the closures at the level of the ECHR sub- religious and cultural subject, 
meaning the closures that produce exclusions and hierarchies within religious and cultural 
groups. Part I comprises three Chapters, Part II includes two Chapters and Part III contains one 
Chapter. 
Chapter I lays the groundwork for my analysis in the next two Chapters of Part I. It 
critically examines the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’, a notion developed by the Court to refer 
to groups as varied as Roma, people with disabilities and asylum seekers. One of the central 
arguments in this Chapter is that the insertion of this concept in the Court’s jurisprudence 
represents a fundamental step towards a more inclusive universal human rights subject. The 
thrust of this argument is that, it is in response to the exclusions of human rights law that the 
Court has been forced to attend to the constructed disadvantage of certain groups. In so doing, it 
has deployed the concept of group vulnerability. At the same time, however, Chapter I urges a 
critical deployment of the concept, pointing to its inherent pitfalls and warning that it otherwise 
runs the risk of reinstating the very exclusions it seeks to put an end to. The overall assessment 
of the concept remains optimistic: the emergence of group vulnerability is a positive 
development given its capacity to push for a more inclusive ECHR human rights subject and to 
encourage more powerful scrutiny of inequality. This Chapter is based on a Journal Article 
written together with Alexandra Timmer. For this reason, it keeps the first person plural 
throughout even though the rest of the Ph.D. uses the first person singular; caveat lector.  
For all the positive tone of Chapter I, Chapter II is critical. It argues that the vulnerable 
group member of other areas of the Court’s case law is largely absent in the context of religion 
and language claims and has hardly ever made any meaningful appearance in the context of 
cultural lifestyle claims. Chapter II shows that, in fact, these areas of the Court’s case law are 
rather inhabited by an invulnerable subject. One of the central arguments of this Chapter is that 
the Court’s analytical gaze has so far been wrongly placed on the seemingly invulnerable 
religious and cultural applicant, rather than on the social or institutional arrangements that 
heighten her vulnerability. This Chapter, however, is not merely critical. It is also meant as an 
exploration of the potential of group vulnerability to advance substantive equality in the context 
of claims of culture and religion. In this regard, Chapter II argues that group vulnerability holds 
out great potential to shift the focus of analysis towards the societal arrangements that heighten 
the vulnerability of some religious/cultural/linguistic groups while lessening the vulnerability of 
others.  
Chapter III, the most practically-oriented of all Chapters, is specifically devoted to 
language claims and is ultimately a hands-on exploration of what group-vulnerability analysis 
may look like in practice. After offering an overview of the Court’s language case law and 
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explaining the bases guiding my analysis, Chapter III redrafts the Court’s judgment in Kemal 
Taşkın and Others v. Turkey,200 a case concerning the refusal to register the applicants’ Kurdish 
names on the basis that the letters ‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘x’ do not exist in the Turkish alphabet. I show 
how both the reasoning and the outcome of the case would have been different, had the Court 
incorporated vulnerable-group analysis. 
Chapter IV focuses on freedom of religion. The main argument is that, by elevating 
interiority and disembodiment (i.e., the ‘forum internum’) as the primary characteristics of 
‘religion’, the Court implicitly articulates a conception of religion that is largely Protestant and 
that, as a result, is inherently exclusionary of a host of religious ‘others’ that do not exhibit such 
characteristics. Incorporating insights from religious studies and employing deconstructive 
analysis, Chapter IV thus challenges the account of religion that the Court has (re)produced in 
Strasbourg. It contends that, in construing freedom of religion in terms of a binary opposition 
between the forum internum and the forum externum, the Court has given priority to the former 
over the latter, giving rise to a hierarchical relationship between the two terms. The Chapter 
argues against this sharply dichotomized way of reasoning about freedom of religion. It sustains 
that legally imagining belief and practice in binary terms gives rise to a fixed opposition and 
hierarchical relations between the religious forms associated with one term or the other. 
Moreover, the Chapter proposes that the relationship between belief and practice be reconceived 
in more interconnected ways. The thrust of the argument is that, by considering belief and 
practice more interrelatedly, the Court may avoid producing inegalitarian relations between the 
religions associated with one or the other side of the dichotomy. In other words, the Court needs 
to reject sharp dichotomization in order to construct a more inclusive account of ‘legal’ religion 
in Strasbourg. 
Chapter V deals with family life claims in the context of migration case law. It argues 
that the concept of family life, as developed by the Court, has a Janus-faced character. On the 
one hand, the concept has an inclusive, open-ended face: the existence or non-existence of family 
life is determined on the basis of the real existence in practice of close personal ties. On the other 
hand, and despite its radical inclusive potential, this face of family life paradoxically co-exists 
with a more restrictive, exclusionary face: that of the ‘core’ family, namely parents and minor 
children. This narrow conception appears most prominently in the spheres of entry and expulsion 
of non-nationals. The thrust of the argument in Chapter V is that this limited and limiting 
conception of family life privileges an ideal mainstream cultural form of family (the nuclear 
family) while disadvantaging others such as the extended family.  
Chapter VI is the most experimental in character and the one that examines the 
‘universals’ inhabiting within cultural and religious groups. Using language as the main entry 
point of analysis (thanks to tools borrowed from critical discourse analysis) and incorporating 
insights from post-modern critiques (in particular, from the anti-essentialist critique), Chapter VI 
reveals the exclusionary and inegalitarian implications of positing some religious and cultural 
practices as representative of the whole group. This Chapter in fact deals with two versions of 
                                                          
200
 ECtHR, Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, 2 February 2010.  
44 
 
this reductionist, exclusionary process. In the first version, the Court posits one cultural or 
religious practice/way of life as the paradigmatic one and fixes it as the ‘essence’ of group 
identity. In the second version, the Court similarly portrays the experience of some group 
members as the experience of all but then equates it with negative stereotypes. The two versions 
involve a reductionist process – the group or collective is reduced to one general trait and then 
posited as the group trait. Yet there is one fundamental difference between the two versions: 
whereas under the first form the trait is valued or esteemed, under the second form the trait is 
devalued or delegitimized. 
All three Parts conclude by harnessing the strategies and approaches suggested in each of 
its Chapters. In turn, a General Conclusion, ties together the strategies outlined at the end of the 
three Parts. The General Conclusion, moreover, gathers the images of the ‘universals’ identified 
throughout the study in an overall ‘picture’ and closes by identifying some issues for future 
research.  
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PART I  
OPENING UP THE ABSTRACT ECHR SUBJECT 
 
 
In reality, the abstract individual is clothed with the 
characteristics of the dominant group, which are then 
asserted as if they were universal. Only those who can 
conform to this norm are sufficiently ‘alike’ to be 
entitled to ‘like treatment’. The result is that formal 
equality demands conformity as a price for equal 
treatment.  
 
-- Sandra Fredman
201
  
 
 
After decades of assessing equality from a formal perspective – that is, of assuming that 
everybody should be treated the same and of tackling formal distinctions on certain grounds 
lacking objective and reasonable justification – the Strasbourg Court has gradually moved 
towards an idea of equality whose central concern is ‘not whether the law makes distinctions, but 
whether the effect of the law is to perpetuate disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion or 
oppression’.202  
Thus, in the context of Article 14 ECHR, the Court has shown growing awareness that 
seemingly neutral norms can in reality disproportionately burden some groups.
203
 This 
understanding of equality finds one of its clearest articulations in the concept of indirect 
discrimination famously applied in D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, a case concerning the 
segregation of Roma children, following the application of a supposedly neutral norm that placed 
them in special schools.
204
 The Court reiterated that ‘a general policy or measure that has 
disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be considered discriminatory 
notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group . . . and that discrimination 
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potentially contrary to the Convention may result from a de facto situation’.205 Another 
articulation of this substantive approach to equality can be found in the call for different 
treatment of those differently situated. The principle was embraced in Thlimmenos v. Greece,
206
 
albeit hardly ever after applied. Thlimmenos concerned a Jehovah’s Witness denied access to the 
profession of accountant due to a past conviction for refusing to serve in the military for religious 
reasons. In finding a violation of Article 14 jointly with Article 9 ECHR, the Court’s Grand 
Chamber held: ‘The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights 
guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and 
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly 
different’.207 These developments have received ample scholarly attention; they have rightly 
been viewed as two major openings of the non-discrimination provision towards substantive 
equality.
208
 
Yet one recent major opening towards substantive equality has so far escaped the 
scholarly radar: the emergence and development of ‘group vulnerability.’ Indeed, recent years 
have seen the appearance of a new kind of human rights subject in Strasbourg. The human rights 
subject in question is not the abstract universal but a specific group member who shares the 
attribute of vulnerability with other human beings. The vulnerability of this group member is not 
however the same as everyone else’s. It is rather differentiated, heightened by specific socio-
historical contexts or institutional arrangements. In other words, this ‘new’ ECHR subject is 
more vulnerable than others to experience human rights violations, including inequality and 
discrimination. The Strasbourg Court has so far used the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ to refer 
to groups as varied as Roma, people with mental disabilities and asylum seekers. 
The notion of group vulnerability emerges not only in the context of Article 14 ECHR 
but also in the context of substantive ECHR provisions, most notably Articles 3 and 8 ECHR 
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alone. The concept comes to consolidate the shift away from the abstract individual (paramount 
in formal equality)
209
 towards a ‘collective and social dimension of non-discrimination’ 
(preeminent in substantive equality).
210
 Indeed, the insertion of group vulnerability in the Court’s 
case law promises to consider how societal contexts and arrangements render some groups more 
vulnerable than others and to understand how the individuals situated in society through those 
groups may more likely suffer human rights violations, including discrimination. The concept 
arrives at a time where equality law is called upon to ‘effectively deal with more subtle and 
entrenched forms of discrimination, disadvantage and stereotyping’.211  
All this, however, does not mean that the Court’s formalistic approach to equality has 
disappeared from view in Strasbourg. The equality as sameness-of-treatment approach 
stubbornly underlies the Court’s reasoning in various areas, most relevantly in cases concerning 
applicants’ complaints against seemingly neutral rules burdening their religious practice, 
language or cultural lifestyle. In many of these cases, the Court follows a mechanical application 
of formal equality, without investigating the advantages possibly built into the rule for some and 
the ensuing disadvantages for others. Indeed, after more than a decade of its appearance,
212
 the 
concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ remains largely absent in freedom of religion/religious 
discrimination case law.
213
 Moreover, and even though the notion of ‘vulnerable groups’ was 
coined in the context of a case concerning the protection of a minority applicant’s lifestyle,214 the 
concept remains for the most part ‘in exile’215 in this area. Admittedly, these blanks in the 
Court’s jurisprudential map may be due to the fact that the concept of group vulnerability is still 
in its infancy. At the same time, nonetheless, the absence of group vulnerability in these areas 
may simply suggest that the Court is still trapped in a formal-equality state of mind that makes it 
unlikely to view as disproportionate or discriminatory supposedly neutral norms or practices. 
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The discussion in this Part proceeds in three Chapters. Chapter I charts and evaluates the 
concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ developed by the Court in recent years. It argues that the insertion 
of the concept in the Strasbourg case law is, on the whole, a positive development given its 
capacity to push for a more inclusive ECHR human rights subject and to encourage more 
powerful scrutiny of inequality. At the same, however, Chapter I urges a critical deployment of 
the concept, pointing to its inherent pitfalls and warning that it otherwise runs the risk of 
reinstating the very exclusions it seeks to put an end to. Chapter I lays the theoretical and 
jurisprudential groundwork for the analysis in Chapters II and III. Chapter II explores the 
potential of group vulnerability for the assessment of cultural and religious claims and argues for 
its critical application in cases concerning seemingly neutral rules or practices with differential 
or disproportionate impact on certain group members. Chapter III illustrates this potential by 
applying group-vulnerability reasoning in the context of a language-based claim made by 
members of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. While the discussion in Chapter I is largely critical, 
the one in Chapter II is rather exploratory. In Chapter III, finally, the discussion is more 
practically oriented.  
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CHAPTER I 
VULNERABLE GROUPS: THE PROMISE OF AN EMERGING CONCEPT IN EUROPEAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS CONVENTION LAW

 
 
 
Introduction   
 
Though each and every move of the Strasbourg Court is intensely followed these days,
216
 one 
recent development in the front lines of its reasoning has so far escaped scholarly attention: the 
emergence of the concept of vulnerable groups. The Strasbourg Court originally used this 
concept in relation to the Roma minority. ‘[A]s a result of their turbulent history’, the Court has 
held, ‘the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority’ in need 
of special protection.
217
 In recent years, the concept has gained legal momentum when the Court 
started to regard people with mental disabilities as a ‘particularly vulnerable group in society, 
who have suffered considerable discrimination in the past.
218
 The list of vulnerable groups has 
been most recently expanded to asylum seekers
219
 and people living with HIV.
220
 
In this Chapter, we trace the characterization and implications of the concept of 
vulnerable groups in the Strasbourg case law. Arguing for a reflective use of group vulnerability, 
we offer a critical assessment of the concept by reference both to theoretical debates on 
vulnerability and to the Court’s case law.221 We show that the Court’s use of the term ‘vulnerable 
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groups’ is not mere rhetorical flourish. The term does something: it allows the Court to address 
different aspects of inequality in a more substantive manner and to open up the abstract human 
rights subject. We argue that, for these reasons, the emergence of the concept represents a 
positive development in the Court’s case law. Yet, for all its inclusive potential and its power to 
further substantive equality, the concept also risks sustaining the very exclusion and inequality it 
aims to redress. We therefore maintain that, if the Court wishes to retain the capability of 
‘vulnerable groups’ to fulfill its equality mission, it will have to attend to the stigmatizing, 
essentializing and stereotyping risks associated to the concept.  
Our analysis proceeds in four parts. We begin by locating the broader theoretical context 
within which vulnerability has been used as a critical tool and by exploring the links between 
vulnerability and human rights (I). We continue with an assessment of the ways in which the 
Court has evoked the notion of vulnerable groups, highlighting the pitfalls inherent in the 
concept and offering guidance on how the Court could circumvent them. (II). Then, we evaluate 
the consequences that the Court’s use of vulnerable groups has had in its case law and show how 
the concept has reinvigorated the Strasbourg antidiscrimination and equality case law. (III). 
Lastly, we offer some thoughts on whether the Court’s use of the vulnerable-group concept may 
lead the Court to overstep its proper subsidiary role (IV). 
  
I. The Concept of Vulnerability and Its Relationship to Human Rights 
Vulnerability is a concept fraught with paradox. To start with, the concept is in common use but 
its meaning is imprecise and contested. Confusing,
222
 complex,
223
 vague,
224
 ambiguous
225
 are but 
a few of the labels scholars across disciplines have used to refer to it. (Bio)ethics and law, in 
particular, are disciplines which have spawned an extensive literature on vulnerability. As the 
purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the Strasbourg Court’s deployment of the vulnerable-group 
concept, we will base our account of vulnerability primarily on legal scholarship.  
 
A. Meanings of Vulnerability  
 
A central paradox of vulnerability is that it is both universal and particular. Both of these features 
arise in the first place from our embodiment:
226
 as embodied beings we are all vulnerable, but we 
experience this vulnerability uniquely through our individual bodies. The centrality of the 
corporeal dimension of vulnerability is reflected in the term’s etymology: the term stems from 
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the Latin vulnus, which means, ‘wound.’227 Turning first to the meaning of vulnerability in the 
universal sense, it comes as no surprise that harm and suffering feature centrally in most 
accounts of vulnerability.
228
 Mary Neal neatly summarizes the literature:  
[V]ulnerability speaks to our universal capacity for suffering, in two ways. First, I am 
vulnerable because I depend upon the co-operation of others (including, importantly, the 
State) . . . Second, I am vulnerable because I am penetrable; I am permanently open and 
exposed to hurts and harms of various kinds.
229
 
Thus, as vulnerable subjects we are constantly susceptible to harm. Harm, of course, comes in 
many varieties that intersect and reinforce one another. Injuries can be bodily, moral,
230
 
psychological,
231
 economic and institutional,
232
 just to mention a few. These different forms of 
harm already hint at the ways in which vulnerability is particular (as well as universal). Our 
‘different forms of embodiment’ and our different positions within ‘webs of economic and 
institutional relationships’233 make that each of us experiences vulnerability uniquely. Martha 
Fineman points out that the experience of vulnerability ‘is greatly influenced by the quality and 
quantity of resources we possess or can command’.234  
Recently, however, theorists have moved towards an understanding of vulnerability that 
expands beyond (universal and particular) suffering, to encompass positive aspects.
235
 Human 
vulnerability is generative of suffering, so the argument runs, but also of empathy, pleasure, 
innovation, social institutions, intimacy and social-connectedness. Martha Fineman argues that 
this generative capacity of vulnerability ‘presents opportunities for innovation and growth, 
creativity, and fulfillment. It makes us reach out to others, form relationships, and build 
institutions’.236 Indeed, Fineman insists that we need to re-conceptualize vulnerability in this 
positive manner in order to get rid of the stigmatizing effects otherwise attached to the term.
237
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B. Vulnerability as a Heuristic Device 
 
Fineman has described vulnerability as a heuristic device that allows us to ‘examine hidden 
assumptions and biases folded into legal . . . practices.’238 The fact that vulnerability can be used 
as a heuristic device points to the next paradox inherent in the concept: it can be deployed both to 
diagnose the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’. In other words, vulnerability is analytically both a descriptive 
and prescriptive tool. The problem is that the bridge between the descriptive and the prescriptive 
powers of vulnerability is not easy to build. Especially ethicists struggle with the question how 
vulnerability can have prescriptive force, since embodied vulnerability is known to trigger both 
care and abuse.
239
 Scholars from different disciplines agree, however, that using vulnerability as 
a critical tool involves exploring how societal or institutional arrangements originate, sustain, 
and reinforce vulnerabilities.
240
 As was mentioned above, part of the reason why people are 
vulnerable is because they are inevitably dependent on the cooperation of others. Vulnerability is 
therefore inherently a ‘relational’ concept,241 which supplements ‘attention to the individual 
subject by placing him/her in social context.’242 In the next Part, we will adopt a similar 
contextual approach to vulnerability in our case law analysis. 
Within the legal literature there is a tension between group-based and universality-based 
deployments of vulnerability. This seems due to the paradoxical nature of the concept. On the 
one hand vulnerability is often used to analyze specific populations
243
 – on the other hand 
Martha Fineman has developed a vulnerability thesis that is expressly universal in its scope and 
‘post identity.’244 Fineman objects to applying the term vulnerability only to specific groups. She 
maintains that, as long as vulnerability is only associated with certain (marginalized) identities, 
the liberal myth that, ‘normally,’ people are self-sufficient, independent, and autonomous is 
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sustained.
245
 This myth – which is in her view pervasive in American society – has led to an 
impoverished notion of what the function of the State is and has moreover legitimized rampant 
inequality. Instead, Fineman proposes to understand vulnerability as a ‘universal, inevitable, 
enduring aspect of the human condition’ and posits that the proper role of the State is to be 
responsive to this.
246
 She presents her vulnerability thesis as an alternative to traditional group-
based U.S. equal protection analysis.
247
 Fineman argues that her analysis is capable of delivering 
substantive equality (where the traditional analysis has failed) because her thesis turns the 
inquiry to the ‘institutional practices that produce the identities and inequalities in the first 
place.’248  
 The vulnerable-group reasoning of the Strasbourg Court seems to fit ill with Fineman’s 
thesis. While Fineman supports vulnerability for its potential of capturing the universal, the 
Court does it for its ability to capture the particular. In our view, however, there is no inherent 
impediment to reconciling these two approaches on a conceptual level – on the contrary; that 
would fit the concept’s paradoxical nature well. When we asked a Strasbourg judge about the 
Court’s reasoning, he replied: ‘All applicants are vulnerable, but some are more vulnerable than 
others.’ The judge thus neatly merged the universal approach with the group-based approach. 
This reply also points to the fact that, as we will show in the next Part, the Court’s reasoning is a 
way of recognizing that people are differently vulnerable; that vulnerability is partially 
constructed depending on economic, political and social processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
Whether the Court in practice manages to handle vulnerability as a critical tool with the care that 
is required – without falling in the pitfalls that Fineman and others warn against – is also the 
subject of the next Part. 
 
C. Human Rights Law and Vulnerability 
 
Before moving on to the case law analysis, it bears standing still for a moment and consider what 
kind of role vulnerability has so far played in the human rights context. At first sight, human 
rights lawyers suffer less from the is/ought-dilemma precisely because they can refer to the 
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human rights corpus, which in essence lays down the rule that abuse of human embodied 
vulnerability is prohibited. However, as we shall see, critically minded human rights scholars 
have shown that the story is not that straightforward. The relationship between vulnerability and 
human rights is a contested terrain.
249
 
In view of the topic of this paper the crucial question is: are human rights so construed as 
to protect the most vulnerable people? On a conceptual level, Anna Grear shows, the answer to 
this question is complex and bifurcated.
250
 Grear argues that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (‘UDHR’)251 paradigm contains two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, the whole 
human rights system is founded on a concern for embodied vulnerability.
252
 Grear presents a 
genealogy of human rights in which she shows that this is the case both during the idea’s early 
articulations in the 18
th
 century and when the UDHR was created as a reaction to the horrors of 
World War II. On the other hand, the liberal legal subject has been imported into the human 
rights structure: archetypically this is a rationalistic and quasi-disembodied subject.
253
 In many 
ways, this subject is conceived of as invulnerable.
254
 What flows from the dominance of the 
liberal quasi-disembodied subject in human rights law is a set of deeply troubling exclusions. 
Drawing on a well-known theme from feminist legal theory,
255
 Grear argues that the many 
groups that do not fit the liberal archetype – women, dispossessed, people of color and 
(especially) asylum seekers – fall outside the scope of the purportedly universal protection of 
human rights.  
Of course, many within the human rights movement are aware that the human rights 
universal fails to include marginalized subjects. In response to this problem, specific treaties 
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have proliferated, such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;
256
 the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women;
257
 the Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
258
 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
259
 
Grear interprets the creation of these specific human rights instruments as repeated critiques of 
‘the closures of the abstract universal’ and ‘the outcome of quasi-disembodiment.’260 Aside from 
the specific treaties, general treaty bodies – in their General Comments and Concluding 
Observations – also regularly emphasize the imperative to pay special attention to the needs of 
particularly vulnerable people.
261
 The same holds true for human rights commissioners.
262
 In 
academic scholarship, lastly, these critiques are mirrored in the writings of what Marie-Bénédicte 
Dembour has termed ‘protest scholars’; those who conceive of human rights as articulating 
‘rightful claims made by or on behalf of the poor, the underprivileged and the oppressed.’263 
So to go back to the question whether human rights law is so construed as to protect the 
most vulnerable people: the answer is yes and no (again a paradox!). Drawing on the work of 
Grear, the subject of human rights law is arguably not an embodied vulnerable subject – let alone 
a highly vulnerable subject. We would wish that the Court is only doing its regular job by 
reasoning from vulnerability, but the Court’s reliance on the concept is more complex than that. 
Our diagnosis is this: in response to the exclusions of human rights law, the Strasbourg Court has 
been forced to attend to the constructed disadvantage of certain groups, and in so doing, has 
deployed the concept of group vulnerability.
264
 As we will now proceed to show, the Court’s 
deployment of the concept has both strengths and weaknesses. 
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II. Characterization and Risks of the Concept of Vulnerable Groups in the Court’s 
Case Law 
 
The rapid development of the concept of vulnerable groups in recent high-profile judgments of 
the Strasbourg case law raises several basic questions. How has the Court evoked the concept of 
group vulnerability? And, are there any risks associated to the Court’s characterization and 
deployment of the concept? Based on these questions, this Part offers a critical assessment of the 
Court’s formulation and use of the concept. 
 
A. Chapman and the Origin of Group Vulnerability 
 
The concept of vulnerable groups was introduced in 2001, in Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 
to refer to the Roma minority.
265
 The case involved a Roma woman who was evicted from her 
own land because she stationed her caravan there without planning permission. The Court 
rejected the applicant’s alleged violation of the right to respect for her minority lifestyle (Article 
8 ECHR). It also dismissed her discrimination complaint (Article 14 ECHR). The applicant’s 
argument was that the U.K. government prevented her from pursuing a lifestyle that she viewed 
as central to her cultural tradition: living and travelling in a caravan. The Court’s Grand Chamber 
held:  
 
As intimated in Buckley, the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority means that 
some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both 
in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in reaching decisions in particular 
cases.
266
  
 
In this early formulation, the vulnerability of Roma seems to arise primarily from the group’s 
minority status and from the lack of consideration of its minority lifestyle in the planning and 
decision-making processes. Group vulnerability does not however play a key role in the Court’s 
proportionality reasoning.
267
 In fact, Ms. Chapman loses the case, mostly as a result of the large 
margin of appreciation left to States when it comes to the implementation of planning policies, in 
this case, environmental regulations. Notwithstanding this, Chapman’s articulation of 
vulnerability already puts in place the elements that will shape the Court’s later formulations of 
‘vulnerable groups’: belonging to a group (in this case, the Roma minority) whose vulnerability 
is partly constructed by broader societal, political and institutional circumstances (in this case, 
power differentials and a planning framework unresponsive to the needs arising from a way of 
life different from that of the majority).  
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B. Group Vulnerability in the Post-Chapman Case Law 
 
(i) Characteristics of the Vulnerable-Group Concept: Relational, Particular and Harm-based 
 
In the years following Chapman, the Court has broadened and refined the concept’s content and 
scope. As we will discuss, the Court has not only reaffirmed the vulnerability of Roma in 
different contexts and for a mix of other reasons; it has also extended the list of ‘vulnerable 
groups’ to persons with mental disabilities, people living with HIV and asylum seekers. 
However, what exactly ties all these groups together is still not entirely clear, as the Court has not 
(yet) fully developed a coherent set of indicators to determine what renders a group vulnerable. 
To be sure, in all the cases, the Court draws on European or international human rights reports 
and resolutions to determine what it is that makes groups vulnerable.
268
 These references, 
however, serve to confirm rather than to establish group vulnerability.   
 Based on a close reading of the case law, our understanding is that the concept of group 
vulnerability, as used by the Court, has three characteristics: it is relational, particular, and harm-
based. The Court’s account of group vulnerability is first of all relational. As already transpired 
from Chapman, the Court locates vulnerability not in the individual alone but rather in her wider 
social circumstances. The Court’s notion of vulnerable groups is thus relational because it views 
the vulnerability of certain groups as shaped by social, historical and institutional forces. In other 
words, the Court links the individual applicant’s vulnerability to the social or institutional 
environment, which originates or sustains the vulnerability of the group she is (made) part of. 
The emphasis on context inherent in the relational character of the Court’s understanding of 
group vulnerability is in line with contemporary analyses that use vulnerability as a critical tool. 
As we have seen in Part I.B, they all insist on the need to explore the role of societal or 
institutional arrangements in originating and maintaining vulnerability.  
However, contrary to legal scholars’ efforts to theorize vulnerability in a universal way – 
most prominently, Fineman’s vulnerability thesis269 – the Court’s vulnerable subject is not the 
inherently vulnerable human being. Rather, the Court’s vulnerable subject is a particular group 
member. In our view, this understanding of vulnerability is not necessarily at odds with universal 
accounts of vulnerability. On the contrary, and as we have argued in Part I.B, this fits the 
concept’s paradoxical nature: vulnerability is at once universal and particular. In fact, the Court 
tends to talk of ‘particularly vulnerable groups’270 rather than just of ‘vulnerable groups.’ The 
inclusion of the term ‘particularly’ underlines the idea that people belonging to these groups are 
simply ‘more’ vulnerable than others. This points to the second characteristic of the Court’s 
account of vulnerability: it is particular. By ‘particular,’ we mean that the Court’s vulnerable 
subject is a group member whose vulnerability is shaped by specific group-based experiences. 
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A third characteristic of the Court’s formulation of group vulnerability in the post-
Chapman case law is its focus on harm. Indeed, all the indicators that the Court has employed to 
determine group vulnerability show that harm features centrally in the Court’s account of group 
vulnerability. This is far from surprising since, as we have indicated in Part I.A, harm is central 
to most basic accounts of vulnerability. Thus, one clear set of indicators that emerges from the 
Court’s case law is (historical) prejudice and stigmatization. These indicators point to the harm 
of misrecognition, which, according to Nancy Fraser, takes place when ‘institutionalized patterns 
of cultural value . . . constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply 
invisible—in other words, as less than full partners in social interaction . . .’ 271 As we will 
explain below, these indicators have played out in the Court’s group-vulnerability analysis, most 
notably in the context of discrimination. Most recently, the Court has started to delineate more 
complex indicators linked to social disadvantage and material deprivation in the context of 
Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. These indicators point to what Fraser calls maldistribution, which results 
‘when some actors lack the necessary resources to interact with others as peers.’272  
In what follows, we organize our analysis of the vulnerable-group case law in two parts, 
depending on which of the two kinds of harm plays out more prominently in determining group 
vulnerability. This bifurcation of our examination of the Court’s case law does not mean that 
there are no connections between the two types of harm. What it means is that, though elements 
of misrecognition and maldistribution underlie all the cases, the Court’s assessment of group 
vulnerability tends to focus more on one than on the other, often leaving the links between the 
two unexplored..  
 
(ii) Prejudice and Stigmatization: Misrecognition Cases  
 
The first set of indicators that has crucially informed the Court’s assessment of group 
vulnerability are prejudice and stigma. In the post-Chapman years, the Court has preserved the 
original designation of the Roma minority as ‘vulnerable’ but with different connotations. 
Indeed, in cases concerning the discrimination of Roma students in education (Article 14 ECHR 
together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention), the Court acknowledges the 
vulnerability of Roma against a different background: prejudices. These are the well-known 
school segregation cases: D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (2007), Sampanis and Others v. 
Greece (2008), and Oršuš and Others v. Croatia (2010).273 In all these cases, the Court found 
that the Roma children were discriminated against in the enjoyment of the right to education. The 
Grand Chamber held in D.H.:  
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[A]s a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a 
specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority.
274
  
 
The extensive reference in these judgments to Council of Europe documents reporting prejudices 
against Roma pupils in several parts of Europe indicates that such prejudices have informed the 
Court’s understanding of Roma’s vulnerability.275 Moreover, the factual background of some of 
these cases shows non-Roma parents’ negative and hostile attitudes towards Roma children.276 
Most recently, the Court has recognized prejudice more explicitly as a source of group 
vulnerability in Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, a case concerning the placement of Roma children 
in special schools following the systematic misdiagnosis of mental disability.
277
 The Court notes 
that many students were misdiagnosed because of their socio-economic disadvantage or cultural 
differences and acknowledges the ‘bias in past placement procedures.’278 
           The Court has also viewed negative social attitudes as the main source of vulnerability of 
Roma in V.C. v. Slovakia (2011), a case concerning the forced sterilization of a Roma woman.
279
 
The Court recognizes that forced sterilization has affected vulnerable individuals of different 
ethnic origins but admits that Roma are at particular risk ‘due, inter alia, to the widespread 
negative attitudes towards the relatively high birth rate among the Roma compared to other parts 
of the population, often expressed as worries of an increased proportion of the population living 
on social benefits.’280 The Court condemned Slovakia for not ensuring the applicant’s free and 
informed consent to sterilization, finding violations of both Article 3 ECHR (degrading 
treatment) and Article 8 ECHR (respect for private and family life). However, and somewhat 
puzzlingly, despite linking the harmful practices it condemned to the widespread prejudice 
against Roma, the Court did not examine the applicant’s discrimination complaint (Article 14 
ECHR) separately. 
The Court has similarly grounded its vulnerability assessment on (historical) prejudice – 
and, additionally, on the resulting social exclusion – in cases concerning other non-dominant 
groups. One example is Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (2010).
281
 The case deals with the blanket 
disenfranchisement of people with mental disabilities in Hungary. The Court found a violation of 
the applicant’s right to vote (Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the Convention). The Court’s view of 
people with mental disabilities as a ‘particularly vulnerable group’ rests on the considerable 
discrimination they have experienced in the past.
282
 The group, the Court affirms, was 
                                                          
274
 ECtHR (GC), D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 13 November 2007 § 182 (references omitted). See also, 
ECtHR (GC), Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, 16 March 2010 § 147.  
275
 See, e.g., ECtHR (GC), D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 13 November 2007 §§ 54-80; and ECtHR (GC), 
Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, 16 March 2010 §§ 65-86.  
276
 See, e.g., ECtHR (GC), Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, 16 March 2010 §§ 154 and 204 (2010); and ECtHR, 
Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 5 June 2008 §§18 and 19.    
277
 ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 29 January 2013. 
278
 Ibid. §116.  
279
 ECtHR, V.C. v. Slovakia, 8 November 2011 §146.  
280
 Ibid.  
281
 ECtHR, Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, 20 May 2010.  
282
 Ibid. § 42.  
60 
 
‘historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion.’283 
With this approach the Court takes the first steps towards embracing a ‘social model’ of 
disability: this way of framing disability recognizes the built environment and society’s negative 
attitude towards people with impairment as the main factor disabling and excluding people.
284
 
Contrary to the ‘medical model’ of disability, the hallmark of a social approach to disability 
emphasizes social prejudices and stereotypes, rather than individual impairments.
285
 
 The Court has continued along these lines with Kiyutin v. Russia (2011), another case 
concerning the indiscriminate exclusion of a group historically subject to prejudice.
286
 This time, 
the group in question is people living with HIV and the exclusion at issue the refusal of residence 
permit. The applicant, a man from Uzbekistan married to a Russian national with whom he had a 
daughter, was denied residence permit on the ground that he was HIV-positive. The Court found 
that the applicant was discriminated against in the enjoyment of his private and family life 
(Article 14 ECHR together with Article 8 ECHR). In the Kiyutin judgment, the Strasbourg Court 
refers to Alajos Kiss and explains in considerable detail how it came about that people living 
with HIV have suffered from widespread stigma and exclusion from the 1980s till the present. 
The Court therefore holds that ‘people living with HIV are a vulnerable group with a history of 
prejudice and stigmatization.’287 The Court realizes that the basis for excluding HIV-positive 
non-nationals from obtaining residence permits was the general assumption that they would 
engage in unsafe behavior.
288
 For the Court, such a generalization was not founded in facts and 
failed ‘to take into account the individual situation, such as that of the applicant’.289 
 
(iii) Social Disadvantage and Material Deprivation: Maldistribution Cases 
 
Two indicators of group vulnerability that are less clearly but not less importantly emerging in 
the Court’s case law are social disadvantage and material deprivation. In the cases that we will 
discuss now, what the Court ultimately addresses is the harm of maldistribution. The first case in 
point is Yordanova v. Bulgaria (2012), which concerned a planned mass eviction of Roma 
inhabitants from their decades-old settlement.
290
 The applicants had built their homes on State 
land in Sofia without authorization. The government, however, de facto tolerated the unlawful 
settlement for decades. It did not take any action until the matter became ‘urgent,’ following 
neighbours complaints ‘about the Roma families’ behaviour.’291 Indeed, neighbours had 
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requested that the Roma inhabitants be removed and ‘returned to their native places,’ holding 
them responsible for littering, stealing, drug abuse and aggressive behaviour.
292
  
The Court found a violation of the applicants’ right to respect for home, private and 
family life (Article 8 ECHR). In stopping the eviction that would have rendered the applicants 
homeless, the Court held that the Bulgarian State failed to recognize ‘the applicants’ situation as 
an outcast community and one of the socially disadvantaged groups.’293 Yordanova differs from 
the other Roma cases previously discussed – school segregation and forced sterilization – in that 
the focus of the Court’s group vulnerability lies on poverty rather than on prejudice and 
discrimination. The Court holds for example that the authorities should have taken into account 
the disadvantaged position of the group to which the applicants belonged in assisting them with 
the eligibility for social housing.
294
 Surprisingly, the Court does not explore the links between the 
group’s disadvantaged status (maldistribution) and the social prejudices against them 
(misrecognition), even though the facts of the case clearly show that prejudices played a role.
295
 
The Court dismisses the applicants’ complaint of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).296 Like in 
V.C, and given the particular context of anti-Roma sentiment in which the removal was ordered, 
the Court should have at least acknowledged the role played by negative social views against 
Roma. 
The case that has significantly broadened the Court’s notion of group vulnerability is 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011).
297
 The applicant, an Afghan asylum seeker, was returned 
by Belgium to Greece under the ‘Dublin II Regulation’ of the EU.298 One of the main questions 
was whether the detention and living conditions of M.S.S in Greece amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR. In analyzing the applicant’s conditions of detention – 
more precisely, in examining the Greek government’s argument that the duration of his detention 
was insignificant – the Court observes:  
 
In the present case the Court must take into account that the applicant, being an asylum 
seeker, was particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his 
migration and the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously.
299
  
 
At first sight, this wording points to the specific experiences of the applicant. Thus, one might 
easily be under the impression that those individual experiences are paramount in the Court’s 
vulnerability decision. In the next paragraph, however, the Court states the particular 
vulnerability of asylum seekers in a much more sweeping manner, as though it were an inherent 
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attribute of the entire class. The Court holds: ‘[T]he applicant's distress was accentuated by the 
vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asylum seeker.’300  
The Court’s analysis of the applicant’s living conditions is also marked by references to 
different aspects of asylum seekers’ vulnerability. In this part of the reasoning, the Court states 
yet more sweepingly:  
 
The Court attaches considerable importance to the applicant's status as an asylum seeker 
and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group 
in need of special protection.
301
 
 
In this passage, the Court refers to Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, a case that, as we have seen 
above, concerned the vulnerability of Roma in the context of school segregation. This may 
explain Judge Sajó’s reaction in his separate opinion, arguing that, unlike other ‘particularly 
vulnerable groups’ in the Court’s case law, asylum seekers ‘are not a group historically subject to 
prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion.’302 For him, the concept 
of vulnerable groups has a ‘specific meaning in the jurisprudence of the Court’ and asylum 
seekers simply do not fit the concept.
303
  
Leaving aside that it is debatable whether asylum seekers have not suffered historically 
from prejudice, Judge Sajó’s concern clearly points to the problem of the open-endedness of the 
vulnerable-group concept.
304
 Indeed, while Judge Sajó attempts to keep the vulnerable-group 
formulation limited to a narrowly defined set of factors,
305
 the majority opens up the meaning of 
the concept by relying on a series of other indicators. 
For example, the majority finds M.S.S. particularly vulnerable because he was ‘wholly 
dependent on State support . . . unable to cater for his most basic needs.’306 The dependency 
argument rings familiar: it is taken from other Article 3 ECHR cases, concerning prisoners and 
detainees, although in this part of the M.S.S. judgment the Court reasons outside the context of 
detention or imprisonment.
307
 Moreover, the majority realizes that the applicant’s situation exists 
on a large scale due to a series of institutional shortcomings inherent in the Greek asylum 
system.
308
 These shortcomings included the lack of sufficient reception centers to accommodate 
asylum seekers; the administrative obstacles impeding their access to the job market; and the 
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lengthy procedures to examine their asylum requests.
309
 By unveiling all these deficiencies in the 
Greek asylum system, the Court is ultimately pointing to the institutional production of 
vulnerability of asylum seekers in Greece.  
In sum, M.S.S. seems to show that the Court has deemed asylum seekers vulnerable on a 
series of interacting grounds, including: (i) the daily reality for asylum seekers in Greece; a 
reality that is characterized by material and psychological want; (ii) asylum seekers’ complete 
dependence on the State; (iii) an inherent vulnerability of asylum seekers due to everything they 
have been through during the process of migration and the trauma that often accompanies such 
migration; and (iv) the systemic deficiencies of the Greek asylum system. As a result, it is not 
quite clear whether all asylum seekers are to be considered vulnerable, or just the ones who 
arrive in Greece. What is clear, however, is that the Court’s analysis in M.S.S. challenges 
simplistic conceptions of group vulnerability, making room for more textured and complex 
formulations. 
 
(iv) Blanks on the Map 
 
In examining the Court’s use of the term ‘vulnerable groups,’ we have closely followed the 
Court’s own terminology. This focus on the Court’s terminology has led us to discuss Roma, 
people with impaired health or abilities and asylum seekers, but not other groups who could 
reasonably be considered particularly vulnerable. Indeed, an examination of the Court’s wider 
case law reveals some blanks or inconsistencies in the application of the notion of vulnerable 
groups.  
Using prejudice and stigmatization, dependency on the State, and social exclusion and 
disadvantage as indicators of vulnerability, there are more groups that – according to 
international human rights reports and scholarly literature – could have fallen within the notion 
of vulnerable groups.
310
 Examples include national minorities,
311
 religious minorities
312
 and 
LGBT people.
313
  
More puzzlingly, sometimes the Court has been silent on group vulnerability in its case law 
concerning Roma applicants, notably in cases where the harm of misrecognition towards them is 
manifested in its most brutal form – namely in physical violence. In these cases, the Court 
overlooks the broader context of prejudice and discrimination within which vulnerability to 
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violence originates.
314
 Aksu v. Turkey, concerning the stereotyping of Roma in government-
sponsored publications, is another example of the Court’s failure to incorporate a vulnerable-
group approach in its reasoning.
315
 The Court’s Grand Chamber refers to the vulnerability of 
Roma, but this seems more a matter of lip service, as it carries no real weight in the Court’s 
analysis of the case.
316
 What makes the Court’s omission particularly puzzling is that at the heart 
of the case was precisely stereotyping and stigmatization of a particularly vulnerable group.  
 
C. The Risks Inherent in the Concept of Vulnerable Groups 
 
These blanks on the map do not represent the only concern we have with regards to the Court’s 
increasing reliance on the vulnerable-group concept. The Court’s account of group vulnerability 
also has more fundamental drawbacks. In what follows, we will show that the Court’s reasoning 
risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by essentializing, stigmatizing, victimizing 
and paternalizing them. 
 
(i) Essentialism 
 
In the first place, the Court’s vulnerable-group reasoning is sometimes guilty of essentialism. 
Briefly put, essentializing means to reify one experience as paradigmatic, at the expense of other 
experiences.
317
 In fact, the Court runs a double-essentializing risk.  First, there is essentialism of 
the so-called vulnerable groups and the people belonging to these groups, i.e. Roma, asylum-
seekers, and people with a disability. Essentializing vulnerable groups is harmful to the people 
from these groups. This occurs, for example, when ‘significant differences of location and 
concern’ within one sub-group are obscured.318 The lesson to be learned here is that, with its 
group-based approach, the Court should not overlook ‘the different kinds of vulnerabilities that 
individuals of the same subgroup may be susceptible to.’319 There have been cases wherein the 
Court did not seem to realize that it relied on a conception of a unitary vulnerable group. The 
Roma caravan cases come to mind. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour notes that the applicants in both 
Buckley and Chapman were women who were the principle caretakers of some of their family 
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members.
320
 Dembour points out that the Court failed to consider this in the respective majority 
judgments. The ways in which Roma mothers might be differently vulnerable are left unexplored 
and unrecognized in these judgments. 
 Essentialism of vulnerable groups also occurs when the Court ‘polices’ the boundaries of 
a group.
321
 A case in point is the little-known admissibility decision of Horie v. the United 
Kingdom (2011).
322
 We have not discussed Horie so far because the Court forecloses actual 
group-vulnerability reasoning in the admissibility phase. And that is precisely the point. Horie 
concerns a New Traveller who had been pursuing a nomadic lifestyle for almost three decades. 
The Court observes that, unlike ‘Romani gypsies’ and ‘Irish travelers,’ ‘New Travellers live a 
nomadic lifestyle through personal choice and not on account of being born into any ethnic or 
cultural group.’323 The Court implies that only those who are gypsies by birth, and not by choice, 
can be considered as belonging to a vulnerable group. In other words, the Court applies the 
immutability-criterion to police the boundaries of the (vulnerable) group of ‘gypsies’.324 Ms. 
Horie’s experiences end up getting no recognition.  
The second type of essentialism is essentialism of the heuristic device itself: this kind 
concerns the question what is and is not allowed to fall under the vulnerable-group concept. 
Essentializing the heuristic device itself is harmful because it unduly limits the application of 
group-vulnerability reasoning. The clearest example of this kind of essentialism is found in the 
separate opinion of Judge Sajó in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. As we noted in Part II.B, Judge 
Sajó’s attempts to keep the vulnerable-group formulation limited to a narrowly defined set of 
factors. This sort of essentialism threatens to create a competition among groups for recognition 
of their vulnerability.
325
 Sure enough, we see this competition between groups reflected in Judge 
Sajó’s separate opinion: 
 
In terms of vulnerability, dependence, and so on, the mentally disabled (and other 
vulnerable groups, whose members are subject to social prejudice) are in a more 
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difficult situation than asylum seekers, who are not a homogeneous group subject to 
social categorisation and related discrimination.
326
 (Emphasis added) 
 
(ii) Stigmatization  
 
In Kiyutin v. Russia, the stigmatization of people living with HIV is central to the Court’s finding 
that they constitute a vulnerable group.
327
 Paradoxically, however, the Court itself risks 
stigmatizing vulnerable groups, by applying the very term ‘vulnerable,’ which – as was 
discussed in Part I – for many people carries solely negative associations such as harm and 
injury.  The Court should be weary of stigmatization, especially as it is possible that vulnerability 
can take on a ‘master status.’ This occurs when ‘the defining attribute eclipses all other aspects 
of stigmatized persons, their talents and abilities.’328 When vulnerability overshadows all other 
aspects of an applicant’s identity in the Court’s reasoning, it has taken on a master status.329 
 
(iii) Paternalism: Denying Agency and Imposing Protection  
 
Lastly, the Court on occasion engages in misplaced paternalism with its group-vulnerability 
reasoning. In D.H., in response to the government’s objection that the Roma children would not 
have been placed in special schools had their parents not consented to it, the majority of the 
Grand Chamber held:  
 
In the circumstances of the present case, the Court is not satisfied that the parents of the 
Roma children, who were members of a disadvantaged community and often poorly 
educated, were capable of weighing up all the aspects of the situation and the 
consequences of giving their consent.
330
  
 
In a passionate dissent, Judge Borrego Borrego denounced this denial of the ability of Roma 
parents to make informed decisions regarding the education of their children.
331
 By denying the 
Roma parents’ capacity to make an informed decision about placing their children in special 
schools, the Court seems to reinforce their powerlessness. The Court should have confined itself 
to noting that meaningful consent is problematic in the specific context of the case. 
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The Court does much better in assessing the particular circumstances of the case in V.C. v. 
Slovakia, concerning the forced sterilization of a Roma woman. The Court even roundly 
condemns the paternalistic behaviour of the hospital staff in performing the sterilization-
procedure on V.C., without first obtaining her informed consent.
332
 The Court notes that ‘in 
similar situations informed consent was required, promoting autonomy of moral choice for 
patients,’333 and it emphasizes the need to respect a person’s dignity and integrity.334 This kind of 
language is much more empowering than the language used by the majority in D.H. 
 
(iv) Ways of Lessening these Risks 
 
In our opinion it is not problematic that the Court pays increased attention to group vulnerability, 
provided that the Court ensures that (i) it is specific about why it considers that group particularly 
vulnerable and (ii) it demonstrates why that makes the particular applicant more prone to certain 
types of harm or why the applicant should be considered and treated as a vulnerable member of 
that group in the instant case. The test should therefore entail two interrelated levels of inquiry: 
collective and individual. Otherwise, the Court may end up essentializing vulnerable groups and 
stereotyping the individuals from these groups; thereby reinforcing their vulnerability rather than 
lessening it. Besides, our suggestion has the advantage that the Court does not lay itself open to 
the charge that it delivers judgments on the situation of particular groups in general, rather than 
on the facts of the case.
335
 
Moreover, in order to prevent group-vulnerability reasoning from reducing applicants to 
pure victims and from stigmatizing their vulnerability, the Court should, firstly, always make 
sure that it does not apply vulnerability as simply a ‘label’ (a label easily turns into a stigma), but 
as a ‘layered’ concept.336 The focus should be on the various circumstances that render certain 
groups vulnerable, not on which groups are vulnerable.
337
 The Court should insist on and 
strengthen its contextual inquiry to determine whether a group may be deemed vulnerable or not. 
This approach will help avoiding a reified conception of group vulnerability, as the focus is 
expanded towards the social and historical forces that originate, maintain, or reinforce the 
vulnerability of a group.
 338
  
All of this is to say that the Court should beware of the temptation to turn group-
vulnerability into an easy and straightforward narrative: people are rendered particularly 
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vulnerable due to a complex set of causes (ranging from economic disempowerment, to social 
attitudes, and physical limitations). Moreover, people always possess sources of resilience in the 
face of their vulnerabilities.
339
 The Court should not trivialize the abilities of persons who belong 
to an otherwise vulnerable group. So for example, in his separate opinion in M.S.S., Judge Sajó 
points out that the applicant ‘had money and speaks English.’340 In our view Judge Sajó is right 
to point out these sources of resilience of the applicant (even if we do not agree with all he says 
in his separate opinion). Portraying applicants as purely vulnerable will disempower them. 
 
III. The Effect of the Vulnerable-Group Concept in the Court’s Case Law: 
Substantive Equality  
  
In spite of the perils that group vulnerability may carry in practice, we still believe that the 
emergence of the concept has had positive implications in the Court’s case law. Our overall 
judgment, therefore, is that emphasis on group vulnerability is a welcome development. In 
particular, its insertion represents a crucial step towards an enhanced antidiscrimination case law 
and a more robust idea of equality.
341
 The Court’s use of the term ‘vulnerable groups’ is therefore 
not mere rhetorical flourish. The term does something: it addresses and redresses different 
aspects of inequality in a more substantive manner.  
Using Sandra Fredman’s multi-dimensional characterization of substantive equality, we 
argue that the Court’s insertion of the notion of vulnerable groups has addressed substantive 
equality’s four chief aims: participation, transformation, redistribution, and recognition.342 The 
participative dimension of substantive equality, Fredman argues, requires compensating for the 
‘absence of political voice’ and opening up ‘channels for greater participation in the future.’343 
Participation, as she explains, is a ‘multi-layered concept,’ which entails not only political 
participation but also ‘taking part in decisions in a wide range of situations affecting individuals 
or groups, including at the workplace, in education, in health care, and in community 
organization.’344 The transformative dimension seeks to accommodate group differences; the 
point is to remove ‘the detriment which is attached to difference,’ rather than difference itself.345 
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The redistributive aspect of substantive equality, in turn, aims at ‘breaking the cycle of 
disadvantage,’ which encompasses, among other things, ‘the maldistribution of resources.’346 
Last, substantive equality’s recognition facet seeks to ‘promote respect for dignity and worth, 
thereby redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of membership of an 
identity group.’347  
The capacity of the vulnerable-group concept to address the multiple dimensions of 
substantive equality lies primarily in its particular nature.
348
 The Court’s particularized 
understanding of vulnerability explained in Part II.B – that is, of vulnerability as shaped by 
specific group-based experiences of prejudice, stigma and social disadvantage – introduces an 
asymmetrical approach in the analysis of equality. The notion of asymmetry, essential to 
substantive equality, implies that not all differentiations are problematic but only those that affect 
groups suffering disadvantage, prejudice and stereotyping.
349
 Thus, as Sandra Fredman notes, 
‘instead of aiming to treat everyone alike, regardless of status, substantive equality focuses on 
the group which has suffered disadvantage.’350 In practice, this means that substantive equality 
focuses on women rather than men, ethnic minorities rather than ethnic majorities, sexual 
minorities rather than heterosexuals.
351
  
In the next pages, we discuss three different ways in which the asymmetry implicit in the 
Court’s vulnerable-group approach has manifested itself: (i) the positive obligations resting on 
the State become more pronounced under Article 2 of Protocol 1 (in conjunction with Article 14 
ECHR), Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR; (ii) the harm inflicted on the applicant weighs 
more heavily in Article 3 ECHR scope analysis and in Article 8 ECHR proportionality analysis; 
and (iii) the margin of appreciation in Article 14 ECHR direct discrimination cases is narrowed.  
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A. Special Positive Obligations: Article 3 ECHR, Article 8 ECHR, and Article 2 of Protocol 
1 (in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR) 
 
Substantive equality does not confine itself to a duty to refrain from discrimination.
352
 
Substantive equality involves more than that; it requires the State to take a proactive role and to 
adopt positive steps to promote equality.
353
 The case law examined below shows that the Court 
has embraced several aspects of substantive equality by establishing positive obligations towards 
vulnerable groups in both the context of Article 14 ECHR and of freestanding Convention rights 
(e.g., Articles 8 and 3 ECHR), which may not associate themselves with equality-based 
reasoning as easily as Article 14 ECHR.  
Moreover, the Court’s recognition of positive obligations towards members of 
particularly vulnerable groups has often involved ‘special consideration to’ or ‘special protection 
of’ their ‘specificities’ and ‘needs.’354 This kind of reasoning reflects the asymmetry that 
characterizes substantive equality: when it comes to the most vulnerable, States are obliged to 
provide a level of protection that is more responsive or tailored to their particular needs and 
concerns. Though group vulnerability has played an instrumental role in deriving these positive 
obligations, it would not do to overstate the weight the Court attaches to it. The vulnerability of 
the group in question is always one of a constellation of factors that the Court takes into account 
in its decisions to establish positive obligations. 
The Court has, first of all, furthered the participative dimension of substantive equality. 
This has taken place in the context of Article 8 ECHR. Starting with the so-called caravan-cases, 
the Court has held that because Roma are vulnerable, States are to a certain extent under the 
obligation to facilitate their lifestyle.
355
 The positive obligation to facilitate a Roma lifestyle in 
Chapman and its sister cases
356
 does not require enabling (Roma) minority members to live 
according to their culture, which in these cases would have meant making available sufficient 
caravan sites.
357
 The positive obligation is procedural; it requires that State authorities show they 
have taken into account the Roma’s cultural situation both in policy-making and judicial 
interpretation.
358
 This kind of positive duty offers redress for the vulnerability of minorities 
whose concerns are most likely to be ignored in legislative, policy and administrative decision-
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making processes. In addition, Chapman and its sister cases take a significant step in the 
direction of transformative substantive equality (accommodation of differences) by recognizing a 
‘positive obligation . . . to facilitate the Gypsy way of life.’359 To be sure, the judgments in these 
cases ultimately fall short of achieving transformative equality because the Court did not actually 
require the United Kingdom to accommodate traveling people, but the potential is there. 
 In V.C., though the positive duty derived from Article 8 ECHR takes a different form and 
character than in Chapman, the Court similarly furthers the participative aspect of equality. This 
time, the aim is to secure the applicant’s involvement in a procedure that concerns her 
reproductive health. Indeed, the Court realizes that this process did not involve the applicant ‘to a 
degree permitting her interests to be effectively protected.’360 As a result, the Court demands that 
the State put in place ‘safeguards to protect the reproductive health of, in particular, women of 
Roma origin,’ enabling the applicant, ‘as a member of the vulnerable Roma community, to 
effectively enjoy her right to respect for her private and family life.’361 The safeguards the Court 
has in mind are those aimed at ensuring Roma women’s full and informed consent in procedures 
that concern their reproductive health.  
The Court has also furthered the redistributive aspect of substantive equality in the 
contexts of Articles 8 and 3 ECHR as a result of the socio-economic nature of the positive duty 
imposed on the State. The examples are Yordanova and M.S.S. Though decided against different 
backdrops, both cases raise issues of homelessness. In Yordanova – the case concerning an 
attempt to remove a Roma community from unlawfully occupied State land – the applicants 
would have become homeless as a result of the State’s action. In M.S.S., on the other hand, the 
applicant asylum seeker was actually rendered homeless as a result of the State’s inaction.  
The Court reaffirms in both cases that neither Article 3 ECHR nor Article 8 ECHR can be 
interpreted as giving rise to a duty to provide housing.
362
 In M.S.S., moreover, the Court says that 
Article 3 ECHR does not entail an obligation to give refugees financial assistance.
363
 
Notwithstanding the Court’s caveats, the obligations affirmed in the two cases contain socio-
economic elements. The Court states in Yordanova: ‘[A]n obligation to secure shelter to 
particularly vulnerable individuals may flow from Article 8 in exceptional cases.’364 What 
exactly the Court means by ‘exceptional cases’ is not clear from the judgment. In the context of 
Yordanova, the scope of the positive obligation to provide shelter seems to be tied to the negative 
obligation not to arbitrarily remove vulnerable individuals from their homes. So, if States plan to 
evict members of a vulnerable group from their unlawful settlement, they should first consider 
whether the eviction would render them homeless. In fact, the Court makes clear that the risk of 
rendering the applicants homeless was not ‘irrelevant,’ as the government had claimed.365  
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M.S.S., on the other side, is the first case in which the Court has found a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR on the grounds of extreme material poverty for which it held a State 
responsible.
366
 The majority held: 
[T]he Court considers that the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the 
applicant's vulnerability as an asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because of 
their inaction, for the situation in which he has found himself for several months, living 
in the street, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of 
providing for his essential needs.
367 
This reasoning establishes that it is not only in a context of imprisonment
368
 that an applicant’s 
vulnerability can be an argument for deriving positive obligations in the social and economic 
sphere from the civil and political right encapsulated in Article 3 ECHR. Though the applicant’s 
status as a member of a particularly vulnerable group carries ‘considerable importance’ in the 
Court’s decision to derive such positive obligations,369 this is not the only factor the Court relies 
on. Another factor that carries much weight is the existence of the EU Reception Directive 
incorporated into Greek domestic law,
370
 which lays down minimal rules as to the material 
conditions to which asylum seekers are entitled.
371
  
Last, the Court has advanced the recognition and redistribution aspects of substantive 
equality in the context of education of Roma children (Article 2 of Protocol 1, in conjunction 
with Article 14 ECHR). It has furthered recognition by imposing on the State positive obligations 
‘to avoid the perpetuation of past discrimination.’372 It has fostered redistribution by requiring 
the State to put in place safeguards guaranteeing that Roma children do not end up in a system of 
inferior education.
373
 In D.H. and Oršuš, the positive obligation that the Court demanded from 
the States was in essence procedural. For example, in Oršuš the Court speaks of the obligation to 
put in place ‘safeguards that would ensure that . . . the State had sufficient regard to [Roma 
children’s] special needs as members of a disadvantaged group’. 374 However, in Horváth and 
Kiss, the Court seems to go a step further by demanding from the State a more substantive and 
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far-reaching positive obligation: ‘to undo a history of racial segregation in special schools.’375 
Moreover, in Horváth and Kiss, the Court addresses the redistributive concerns by 
acknowledging that, as a result of their misplacement in special schools, Roma children are 
‘unlikely to break out of [the] system of inferior education, resulting in their lower educational 
achievement and poorer prospects of employment.’376 
 
B. Increased Weight of Harm in the Scope and Proportionality Analyses: Articles 3 and 8 
ECHR  
 
Group vulnerability has introduced an asymmetrical approach in the Court’s Article 3 ECHR 
scope analysis and Article 8 ECHR proportionality.
377
 This approach entails that the ill treatment 
inflicted on the applicant may take a greater dimension if she or he belongs to a particularly 
vulnerable group. This is illustrated in M.S.S. In this case, the vulnerability of the applicant as an 
asylum seeker plays a role in the Court’s decision of whether his conditions of detention reached 
the ‘minimum level of severity’ to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. Indeed, in 
determining whether the duration of the applicant’s detention was significant – the Greek 
government had argued that it was brief – the Court says: 
 
[The Court] does not regard the duration of the two periods of detention imposed on the 
applicant – four days in June 2009 and a week in August 2009 – as being insignificant. In 
the present case, the Court must take into account that the applicant, being an asylum 
seeker, was particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his 
migration and the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously.
378
 
 
So here, because of the applicant’s vulnerable status as an asylum seeker, the effects of his 
detention take a dimension that they would have not taken if the case had concerned a less 
vulnerable applicant. As Judge Sajó rightly puts it in his separate opinion: ‘For the Court the 
duration of the detention in the present case is comparable in its effects to much longer stays in 
detention because of the assumed vulnerability of the applicant.’379 Group vulnerability therefore 
acts as a magnifying glass: the ill treatment caused to the applicant looks bigger through the 
vulnerability lens.  
Yordonava, on the other side, is an example of the role group vulnerability may play in 
Article 8 ECHR proportionality analysis. The Court states: 
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In the context of Article 8, in cases such as the present one, the applicants’ specificity as a 
social group and their needs must be one of the relevant factors in the proportionality 
assessment that the national authorities are under a duty to undertake.
380
 
 
The Court does not indicate the precise weight that national authorities should attach to the 
applicants’ disadvantaged status. However, it makes clear that when governments do not show 
that they have considered the specificities and needs of particularly vulnerable groups, they will 
not be able to pass the ECHR proportionality analysis. In other words, attention to vulnerability 
takes the form of a procedural requirement.
381
 As we have pointed out in Part II.A, the Court did 
not follow this approach in Chapman, since vulnerability played no real role in the 
proportionality analysis in that case.  
It goes without saying that the inclusion of group vulnerability in the proportionality does 
not guarantee a favorable outcome to the vulnerable applicant; vulnerability enters the balance 
along with a host of other factors. Its inclusion may nonetheless increase the applicant’s chances 
of obtaining protection. The idea underlying this argument is that the Court should give the 
interests of vulnerable individuals and groups more weight in the proportionality because they 
are likely to experience harm more acutely.
 
Ultimately, by thus giving weight to group 
vulnerability in the proportionality analysis, the Court furthers substantive equality. Fredman has 
argued that ‘substantive equality focuses on the group which has suffered disadvantage’ with the 
aim of breaking that cycle of disadvantage.
382
 In our view, the Court takes the first step towards 
breaking the cycle of disadvantage by recognizing disadvantage (in the form of historically 
developed vulnerabilities) as a relevant factor in the proportionality analysis.  
 
C. Narrowed Margin of Appreciation: Article 14 ECHR   
 
The last way in which the concept of vulnerable groups has introduced an asymmetrical 
interpretation of the Convention, is by narrowing the margin of appreciation in Article 14 cases. 
A few times now, the Court has applied strict scrutiny in cases that concerned discrimination of 
vulnerable groups. This approach is of recent date; the two seminal cases are Alajos Kiss (2010) 
and Kiyutin (2011). Both cases, as we have seen in Part II.B, concern the direct and outright 
exclusion of an entire class of individuals from the enjoyment of a right. 
In Kiyutin, the case concerning an indiscriminate refusal of residence permit to those 
living with HIV, the Court observes: 
 
If a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society 
that has suffered considerable discrimination in the past, then the State’s margin of 
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appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the 
restrictions in question. The reason for this approach, which questions certain 
classifications per se, is that such groups were historically subject to prejudice with 
lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice could entail 
legislative stereotyping which prohibited the individualised evaluation of their capacities 
and needs.
383
 (Emphasis added) 
 
This line of reasoning was in fact first used in Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, which actually concerns 
the right to vote (Article 3 Protocol 1), not Article 14 ECHR.
384
 Despite the fact that the Court 
does not explicitly examine Article 14, however, its analysis in Alajos Kiss is really about 
discrimination. The Court states: 
 
The Court further considers that the treatment as a single class of those with intellectual 
or mental disabilities is a questionable classification, and the curtailment of their rights 
must be subject to strict scrutiny.
385
 (Emphasis added)  
 
Thus, in both Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin, the Court indicates that it will scrutinize national 
authorities’ decisions strictly when they limit the rights of members of particularly vulnerable 
groups. As a result, States have to put forward ‘very weighty reasons’ for the Court to accept the 
justification as objective and reasonable. Since neither Russia nor Hungary gave such reasons, 
the Court concluded that they ‘overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to 
them.’386  
 This approach is noteworthy for a number of reasons. In the first place, it marks a 
willingness of the Court to explain why certain classifications are particularly problematic. In the 
past, the Court has seldom taken the trouble to explain why certain grounds of distinction are 
problematic, except to note a consensus on the topic.
387
 Distinctions on the ground of sex, for 
example, require very weighty reasons because ‘the advancement of the equality of the sexes is 
today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe.’388 With the type of reasoning 
issued in Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin, on the other hand, the Court takes exceptional care to 
acknowledge the wrongs of discrimination and clarify the rationale for a narrowed margin of 
appreciation.
389
  
Secondly, this reasoning provides a highly principled approach to justifications, since 
certain classifications are deemed suspect ‘per se.’ Distinctions are inherently suspect when they 
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concern groups of people that have been historically discriminated against; such distinctions run 
a high risk of being based on stereotypes rather than on ‘rational’ grounds.390 The Court 
acknowledges that past discrimination reverberates in the present and contaminates actions and 
decisions. This highly context-sensitive approach – which is an expression of the relational 
character of the Court’s vulnerable-group concept – heralds a substantive (rather than purely 
formal) conception of equality. Moreover, by narrowing the margin of appreciation, the Court 
more carefully scrutinizes the possible misrecognition harms of prejudice, stigma and 
stereotyping, therein advancing the recognition aspect of substantive equality. 
However, neither in Alajos Kiss nor in Kiyutin does group vulnerability in and of itself 
narrow the margin of appreciation. As we have noted above, both cases concern direct exclusions 
of entire groups from the enjoyment of a right. The particular nature of the restrictions in 
question – direct and absolute – may further explain the Court’s willingness to reduce States’ 
margin of appreciation. Indeed, the Court states in Alajos Kiss: ‘The Court cannot accept, 
however, that an absolute bar on voting by any person under partial guardianship, irrespective of 
his or her actual faculties, falls within an acceptable margin of appreciation.’391 In Kiyutin, 
moreover, the Court additionally relies on the consensus to narrow the State’s margin of 
appreciation.
392
 
As regards the other cases that we have examined in this Chapter, there the relationship 
between the margin of appreciation and group vulnerability is less clear. In fact, in the other 
cases, the role of the margin of appreciation principle is not very prominent. In M.S.S., first of 
all, the principle is obviously absent (it has no role in Article 3 ECHR cases given the absolute 
character of this provision). In V.C. the principle is not explicitly mentioned at all; and in D.H., 
Oršuš, and Yordanova the Court is ultimately not clear on the width of the margin of 
appreciation. Chapman is the exception. In that judgment the Court kept the margin deliberately 
wide, because the case concerned an area in which, in principle, States have a wide margin of 
appreciation: implementation of planning policies.
393
  
Chapman shows that the Court does not automatically narrow the margin of appreciation 
when there are countervailing reasons to leave it wide (e.g., implementation of planning policies, 
considerations of economic and social policy). More recently, however, the Court has established 
a significant precedent with Alajos Kiss: group vulnerability may decisively narrow the margin 
of appreciation, even though the case concerns an area in which States are usually granted a wide 
margin (in this case determination of justified restrictions on the right to vote.)
394
 Future cases 
will have to tell how decisive group vulnerability exactly is within the set of factors that 
determine the margin of appreciation. In the next and final Part, we will turn to a topic that is 
closely associated with this one: the institutional position of the Court. 
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IV. The Concept of Vulnerable Groups and the Court’s Legitimacy 
    
The Court has recently been under fire from politicians,
395
 judges
396
 and scholars
397
 for what is 
perceived as its usurpation of power from the Contracting States and its neglect to take seriously 
its subsidiary role.
398
 Obviously, these are new variations of an old theme: courts – and 
supranational courts in particular – should be wary of judicial activism. In light of this type of 
critique, we finish by examining the institutional concerns associated with the Court’s use of 
group vulnerability. Two related aspects of the Court’s vulnerable-group reasoning, in particular, 
could raise concern that the Court is overstepping its proper role. The first is the Court’s 
recognition of special positive obligations towards members of vulnerable groups,
399
 and the 
second is the Court’s decision to narrow the margin of appreciation in Article 14 ECHR cases.400 
 The first type of concern has been powerfully voiced by Judge Sajó in M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece. Judge Sajó raises the specter of unlimited human rights, transforming civil and 
political rights into social rights: ‘There seems to be only a small step between the Court's 
present position and that of a general and unconditional positive obligation of the State to 
provide shelter and other material services to satisfy the basic needs of the ‘vulnerable.’’401 This 
kind of reasoning, he claims, would be more appropriate for a ‘constitutional court adjudicating 
on the basis of a national constitution that has constitutionalised the social welfare state.’402 The 
President of the Belgian Constitutional Court, Marc Bossuyt, agrees with Sajó and claims that 
the Court has fallen through ‘thin ice.’403  
In our view, those who worry that there is a general tendency on the Court’s part to read 
too many positive obligations into the text of the Convention – thereby putting too great of a 
burden on the Convention States – should not necessarily see group vulnerability reasoning as a 
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threat. We are of the opinion that vulnerability might actually be a useful guiding principle: in 
the prioritization of scarce resources, States give preference to those whose needs they consider 
most pressing. When reviewing States’ actions on the basis of an individual complaint, the Court 
should have the same priority. Vulnerability can thus be viewed as a limiting rather than a 
limitless principle.
404
  
 The second institutional issue with the vulnerable-group concept relates to the margin of 
appreciation. Often, the Court’s preferred tactic for guarding against accusations that it is 
overstepping its subsidiary role consists in applying the margin of appreciation principle.
405
 In 
the words of Judge Spielmann: in applying the margin of appreciation ‘the Court imposes self-
restraint on its power of review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a 
dispute.’406 So what if the Court were to take the line of Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin further,407 and 
narrow the margin of appreciation in all cases that concern vulnerable groups (not just the cases 
that concern blanket exclusions of these groups)? We emphasize that the Court is not there yet: 
though it is now established case law that vulnerable groups require special protection,
408
 the 
vulnerable-group concept has by no means turned into a principle that automatically narrows the 
margin. We do, however, think that the Court is increasingly attaching weight to group 
vulnerability in determining the proper margin of appreciation. But does that erode the Court’s 
legitimacy? What should help calm down legitimacy concerns – both with regards to positive 
obligations and the margin of appreciation – is the fact that the Court never uses group 
vulnerability as an automatic trigger. As we have discussed in Part III, the vulnerable-group 
concept is always one among a set of factors, depending on the facts of the case, which 
determine the proper extent of positive obligations and the width of the margin of appreciation. 
Nevertheless, the concerns about the Court’s supra-national institutional position are real, 
and they are compounded by the open-endedness of the vulnerable-group concept. One way in 
which the Court can navigate this problem is by taking the human rights corpus as its reference 
point for determining group vulnerability: when the activities of international organizations and 
human rights reports confirm that there is a structural failure to protect the human rights of a 
particular group, this should be the Court’s cue. The advantage of this suggestion is that it allows 
the vulnerable-group concept to remain flexible: if the Court continues to base its judgments on 
recent international human rights reports and other authoritative materials, it can carefully follow 
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developments on the ground.
409
 A group’s vulnerability will thus not be set in stone, but re-
evaluated case by case. At the same time, in this way the concept does not need to be stretched 
so thin as to lose all power, nor does it need to become so vague as to risk legal uncertainty.
410
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Be it an asylum seeker struggling against deprivation, Roma children seeking to share classes 
with other children, or persons with mental disabilities wishing to exercise the right to vote, the 
fact is that all these cases reveal that vulnerability to human rights violations is often experienced 
more routinely and acutely by some than by others. Human rights law, however, has not always 
responded adequately to these particular vulnerabilities given the import of the liberal legal 
subject into its structure and the exclusion of those who do not fit the liberal archetype. We have 
argued that it is in response to these exclusions of human rights law that the Court has been 
forced to attend to the constructed disadvantage of certain groups. In so doing, the Court has 
deployed the concept of group vulnerability. In this light, we see the Court’s reasoning as a way 
of opening up the human rights universal, as a step towards a more inclusive universal human 
rights subject. In our opinion, the Court thus enhances rather than undermines its own credibility. 
Accordingly, we perceive the Court’s increasing use of group vulnerability reasoning as a 
welcome development. It allows the Court to address several aspects of substantive equality. Yet 
group vulnerability reasoning carries pitfalls with it, most notably essentialism, stigmatization 
and paternalism. If the Court is not careful to avoid these pitfalls, it risks sustaining the 
problematic idea that these groups are the only, ‘true’ and quintessential vulnerable subjects in 
human rights law, thus leaving in place the notion that the ‘normal’ subject of human rights law 
is fully autonomous and independent.
411
 In other words, the concept of vulnerable groups is a 
double-edged tool, which should be handled with care. As Martha Minow put it in another 
context, the concept raises ‘questions of complexity’ rather than ‘justifications for passivity, 
because failing to notice another's pain is an act with significance.’412 
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CHAPTER II 
THE (IN)VULNERABLE RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL SUBJECT 
 
 
People in power view their way of life not as culture but, 
rather, as the way things are just supposed to be. 
 
-- Dorothy E. Roberts
413
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
If one were to apply the group vulnerability indicators employed in Strasbourg over the past 
decade, by now there would probably be various religious, language and cultural groups 
considered particularly vulnerable. The vulnerable group member, however, is largely absent in 
the context of religion and language claims and has hardly ever appeared in meaningful ways in 
the context of cultural lifestyle claims.  
My intention in this Chapter is not however to offer a list of the religious, language or 
cultural groups that the Court should count (or should have counted) as particularly 
vulnerable.
414
 Rather, the purpose of this Chapter is to explore the potential of group 
vulnerability to advance a more substantive idea of equality in the context of religious and 
cultural claims. I will show that the focus of the Court’s analysis has been, for the most part, 
unduly placed on the invulnerable religious and cultural applicant. I will then argue that group 
vulnerability holds out potential to turn the Court’s gaze elsewhere, namely the societal 
arrangements that heighten the vulnerability of some group members while lessening the 
vulnerability of others.   
The Chapter is structured as follows. After offering an overview of the state of affairs of 
the Court’s cultural lifestyle and freedom of religion case law (the language case law is 
examined separately in Chapter III), I explore the capacity of the relational aspect of group 
vulnerability
415
 to shift the Court’s focus towards (i) the heightened vulnerability of some and (ii) 
the lessened vulnerability of others.  
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I. State of Affairs  
 
A. Cultural Lifestyle Claims  
 
Back in the early eighties, the European Commission of Human Rights already paved the way 
for recognizing the way of life of a group as part of the right to respect for private and family life 
under Article 8 ECHR.
416
 The case in question was G. and E. v. Norway and the Commissions’ 
recognition referred to the Sami applicants’ customs of hunting, fishing and reindeer breeding.417 
The Commission considered that the consequences arising from the construction of a 
hydroelectric plant amounted to ‘interference with their private life, as members of a minority, 
who move their herds and deer around over a considerable distance.’418 The interference, 
however, was deemed justified and the case declared inadmissible.
419
 Nearly two decades later, 
the Court followed a similar line of reasoning in a case concerning the transfer of members of the 
Sorbian minority, following the expansion of mining activities on their land.
420
 The interference 
was also considered justified and the case declared inadmissible: the transfer ‘to a town 
approximately twenty kilometres away that is within the original Sorbian settlement area’ was 
not a disproportionate measure.
421
  
It was not until 2001 that the Court effectively confirmed the links between the right to 
respect for private and family life and respect for minority lifestyles, in particular, between these 
limbs of Article 8 ECHR and a Roma applicant’s occupation of her caravan.422 The Court’s 
Grand Chamber held in Chapman v. the United Kingdom:  
 
The Court considers that the applicant's occupation of her caravan is an integral part of her ethnic 
identity as a Gypsy, reflecting the long tradition of that minority of following a travelling lifestyle. 
… Measures affecting the applicant's stationing of her caravans therefore have an impact going 
beyond the right to respect for her home. They also affect her ability to maintain her identity as a 
Gypsy and to lead her private and family life in accordance with that tradition.
423
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The insertion of a specific right to respect for minority members’ lifestyles under Article 8 
ECHR is no doubt a major opening towards a more inclusive cultural human rights subject, 
especially if one considers the individualist orientation of the ECHR.
424
 This groundbreaking 
expansion of the scope of Article 8 ECHR has however remained largely theoretical; it has 
hardly ever translated into effective protection for the applicants.
425
 In fact, legal commentators 
seem to agree on the existence of a gap between the theoretical opening towards recognizing 
(minority) applicants’ lifestyles and the actual opening in the particular cases.426 This gap is 
certainly apparent in many of the so-called ‘caravan’ cases.427 For instance, the application of 
‘the special consideration standard’428 derived from the vulnerability of the Roma minority in 
Chapman has not yet been fully realized. As discussed in Chapter I, the scope of the ensuing 
positive obligations remains limited.
429
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Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee rights that are peculiar to minorities and that the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Convention are, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, secured to “everyone” within the 
jurisdiction of the High Contracting Parties’. ECtHR. Noack and Others v. Germany, 25 May 2000, p. 10.  
425
 Buckley (29 September 1996) as well as Chapman and its sister cases (18 January 2001) are not the only 
examples of negative outcome for the Roma applicants. See also, pre-Chapman cases: ECmmHR, P. v. the United 
Kingdom, 12 December 1990 (inadmissible) and Smith v. the United Kingdom, 4 September 1991 (inadmissible) and 
post-Chapman cases: ECtHR, Eatson v. the United Kingdom, 30 January 2001 (inadmissible); Harrison v. the 
United Kingdom, 3 May 2001 (inadmissible); Clark and Others v. the United Kingdom, 22 May 2001 
(inadmissible); Codona v. the United Kingdom, 7 February 2006 (inadmissible); Stenegry and Adam v. France, 22 
May 2007 (inadmissible). One of the few exceptions remains ECtHR, Connors v. the United Kingdom, 27 May 2004 
(violation of Article 8 ECHR).   
426
 See, e.g., Henrard, Kristin, ‘The Added Value of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (II): The Two Pillars of An Adequate System of Minority Protection Revisited in Verstichel, Aneelies et 
al. (eds.) THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES: A USEFUL PAN-
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENT? (Intersentia, 2008) at 116 (claiming that the de facto protection offered by the Court is 
‘limited’ when it comes to minority lifestyle claims); Farget, Doris, ‘Le Droit au Respect des Modes de Vie 
Minoritaires et Autochtones dans les Contentieux Internationaux des Droits de l’Homme’, Ph.D. Thesis, Université 
de Montréal, 2010 at 228 (arguing that the Court ‘reconnaît par principe la protection du mode de vie rom, mais ne 
l’applique pas nécessairement au cas d’espèce, invoquant la situation d’illégalité des requérants ou la vaste marge 
nationale d’appréciation’); and Ringelheim, Julie ‘Chapman Redux: The European Court of Human Rights and 
Roma Traditional Lifestyle’ in Eva Brems (ed.), DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING 
JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 426-427 (arguing that the Chapman Court in the 
end limited the practical impact of [the recognized emerging international norms on minority protection] and [that] 
when reviewing the concrete facts at stake, it paid only lip service to the notion and goals of minority protection’).  
427
 For an illuminating analysis of this contrast in Chapman, see Ringelheim, Julie ‘Chapman Redux: The European 
Court of Human Rights and Roma Traditional Lifestyle’ in Eva Brems (ed.), DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 426-444.  
428
 Morawa, Alexander H.E., ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Minority Rights: The “Special 
Consideration” Standard in Light of Gypsy Council’, 10 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2004) 
at 109.   
429
 See also, Farget, Doris, ‘Le Droit au Respect des Modes de Vie Minoritaires et Autochtones dans les Contentieux 
Internationaux des Droits de l’Homme’, Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Montréal, 2010 at 336: ‘la nature de la norme 
qui se donne à voir comme une obligation de moyens dont le contenu est imprécis et dont l’application au cas 
d’espèce par la Cour elle-même est restrictive’.  
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Moreover, many of these cases have been examined primarily in the context of Article 8 
ECHR alone, even though they clearly brought up issues under Article 14 ECHR as well.
430
 
Indeed, large part of these cases concerns the unequal impact of seemingly neutral regulations or 
practices on members of certain groups.
431
 The Court’s reluctance to assess these cases under 
Article 14 ECHR is probably part of its broader practice to avoid discrimination analysis
432
 and 
might be based on reasons of procedural economy.
433
 Yet, at a deeper level, this reluctance may 
signal a formalistic view of equality; an incapacity to recognize that applicants may be 
differentially or disproportionately burdened by rules that appear neutral on their face.
434
 In 
Chapman, for example, the Court first signals that it will not judge the applicant as everyone 
else. Moreover, it recognizes that measures interfering with the stationing of her caravan affect 
her ability to maintain her identity as a Gypsy. It also recognizes that the vulnerable position of 
Gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and 
lifestyle. Yet the Court ends up judging Ms. Chapman as if living in her caravan was not 
essential to her identity and as if she did not belong to a vulnerable group. At the end of the day, 
the actual assessment in Chapman relies on a formalistic view of equality as sameness-of-
treatment: ‘to accord to a Gypsy who has unlawfully stationed a caravan site at a particular place 
different treatment from that accorded to non-Gypsies who have established a caravan site at that 
place or from that accorded to any individual who has established a house in that particular place 
would raise substantial problems under Article 14 of the Convention’.435   
                                                          
430
 In Chapman, for example, having found the interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 ECHR 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of environment preservation, the Court quickly dismissed her Article 14 
complaint. ECtHR (GC), Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 2001 §§ 129-130. In Connors, it simply 
found it unnecessary to further consider the applicant’s Article 14 complaint. ECtHR, Connors v. the United 
Kingdom, 27 May 2004 § 97.  
431
 See e.g., ECtHR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 29 September 1996; and ECtHR (GC) Beard v. the United 
Kingdom, 29 September 1996. Some of the ‘caravan’ cases, however, concern direct discrimination. For example, in 
the case of Connors v. the United Kingdom decided on 27 May 2004, the rule not allowing Gypsies occupying State-
run sites to benefit from the procedural guarantees against evictions available to tenants of other municipal forms of 
housing or private gypsy sites amounted to differential treatment. See Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET 
DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS PAR LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 
(Bruylant, 2006) at 346. 
432
 For critiques of this reluctance, see, e.g., Loucaides, Loukis G., ‘The limitations of Human Institutions’, available 
at <http://www.errc.org/en-research-and-advocacy-roma-details.php?page=8&article_id=3613> accessed 2 February 
2014 and Rorive, Isabelle, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’, 30 Cardozo 
Law Review (2009) 2669-2697.   
433
 The approach, however, may in some cases be ‘unduly restrictive’, offering only a partial picture of the situation 
and of its implications for the applicants. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Keller in ECtHR, Şükran Aydın and 
Others v. Turkey, 22 January 2013.   
434
 This claim may be further confirmed by the fact that the very few times the Court has found an ECHR violation 
in cases involving cultural claims concerned instances of direct interference on the applicant’s Article 8 ECHR right 
(see, e.g., ECtHR, Connors v. the United Kingdom, 27 May 2004) or formal differentiation (direct discrimination) of 
groups of people in analogous situations in the access to survivor’s pension (see, e.g., ECtHR, Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, 
8 December 2009). 
435
 ECtHR (GC), Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 2001, § 95. In a similar vein, see Ringelheim, Julie 
‘Chapman Redux: The European Court of Human Rights and Roma Traditional Lifestyle’ in Eva Brems (ed.), 
DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) at 433-434. See also, Morawa, Alexander H.E., ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Minority Rights; 
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B. Religious Claims  
 
A similar formalistic approach prevails in the context of religious (discrimination) claims.
436
 
Legal scholars appear to agree that one of the problems in the Strasbourg religious 
(discrimination) case law lies in the Court’s inability to recognize the detrimental impact of 
supposedly neutral rules of general application on religious practitioners’ rights.437 These are 
rules that, albeit conceived in general terms, ‘in fact tend to affect only a particular group, or to 
affect it more than others’.438 Traditionally, the Court has indeed failed to recognize that facially 
neutral rules, criteria or practices (i) may indirectly encroach on the capacity of some to enjoy 
their rights effectively or (ii) to the extent that this encroachment may affect some and not others, 
may also be discriminatory, absent sufficient justification.
439
 This failure, as the summary that 
follows attempts to illustrate, manifests itself in three principal ways: (i) in not finding 
interference with applicants’ rights in the assessment under Article 9(1) ECHR; (ii) in 
overlooking the consequences that facially neutral rules have for applicants in the proportionality 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The ‘“Special Consideration” Standard in Light of Gypsy Council’, 10 International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights (2004) at 104 and 105 (critiquing the Court’s formalistic reading of equality in the case The Gypsy Council et 
al. v. the United Kingdom).  
436
 I bracket ‘discrimination’ to signal that, even though in many of these cases one significant inquiry is arguably 
that of discrimination and even though several of these applicants make a discrimination claim, the Court 
nonetheless either examines the cases under Article 9 ECHR alone or quickly dismisses the discrimination 
complaint. See, e.g., ECmmHR, Konttinen v. Finland, 3 December 1996 (no appearance of violation); ECtHR, 
Dahlab v Switzerland, 15 February 2001 (manifestly ill-founded); ECtHR (GC), Leyla Şahin v Turkey, 10 
November 2005 (no violation); ECtHR, Köse and 93 Others v. Turkey, 24 January 2006 (inadmissible); ECtHR, 
Mann Singh v. France 13 November 2008 (no appearance of violation); ECtHR, Aktas v. France, Ghazal v. France, 
Ranjit Singh v. France and Jasvir Singh v. France, all of 30 June 2009 (manifestly ill founded) and ECtHR, 
Francesco Sessa v. Italy, 3 April 2012 (manifestly ill founded).  
437
 See, e.g., Martinez Torron, Javier, ‘The (Un)Protection of Individual Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case 
Law’, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2012) 1-25; Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET DROITS DE 
L’HOMME : LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS PAR LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Bruylant, 
2006) 321-339; Evans, Carolyn, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 168-199; Henrard, Kristin, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to 
Religion and the European Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the 
Freedom of Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’ 5(1) Erasmus Law Review (2012) 59-77; and Danchin, 
Peter G. and Forman, Lisa, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection 
of Religious Minorities’ in Peter Danchin and Elizabeth Cole (eds.), PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS 
MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Columbia University Press, 2002) at 193. 
438
 Evans, Carolyn, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 187 (footnote omitted). For the purposes of this Chapter, I follow Carolyn Evans in the 
understanding of seemingly neutral of general application (although she terms them ‘neutral and generally 
applicable laws’). Ibid. at 168. In fact, she adopts Stephanos Stavros’ definition: ‘those laws which, in the process of 
advancing a legitimate secular public interest, have some incidental effects on some persons’ religious beliefs’. 
Stavros, Stephanos, ‘Freedom of Religion and Claims for Exemption from Generally Applicable Neutral Laws’, 6 
European Human Rights Law Review (1997) at 611. 
439
 Julie Ringelheim nicely frames the problem this way. Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET DROITS DE 
L’HOMME : LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS PAR LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Bruylant, 
2006) at 430. 
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analysis under Article 9(2) ECHR; and (iii) in missing distinctions that operate beyond formal 
differentiations under Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. 
 
(i) Non-interference  
 
In a number of cases, the Court has not found interference with religious applicants’ rights, as a 
result of a restrictive interpretation of interference prevailing in its freedom of religion 
jurisprudence. Indeed, up until recently, the rule has been that ‘if a person is able to take steps to 
circumvent a limitation placed on his or her freedom to manifest religion or belief, there is no 
interference’.440  
Some of the best examples illustrating this restrictive interpretation involve applicants’ 
manifestations of religion in the workplace, in particular, those claiming conflicts between 
supposedly neutral rules (e.g., work schedules) and their religious duties. Many of these claims 
have been declared inadmissible.
441
 The major reasons for rejecting these claims used to be that 
applicants voluntarily waived their religious freedom by choosing to submit to employment rules 
and that applicants ultimately remained free to resign from their jobs.
442
 This line of reasoning, 
initiated in the Commission era, led some scholars to note: ‘[I]t seems fairly clear that work-
related difficulties will not constitute an interference with the right to religious freedom.’443 The 
rejection of interference when applicants could have escaped the restriction has been applied 
even in recent years. Francesco Sessa v. Italy (2012) is a good case in point.
444
 The case was 
brought by a Jewish lawyer complaining of the scheduling of a court hearing on Yom Kippur. In 
a divided ruling, the Court found no interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion.445 The 
argument was that he could have found a replacement and still been able to celebrate his holy 
day.
446
   
A similar rationale for not finding interference can be found in other contexts, such as the 
university and the military. For example, in Karaduman v. Turkey – concerning a university 
Muslim student not allowed to get her degree certificate for refusing to appear on its picture 
without her headscarf – the Commission held that by choosing to pursue her higher education in 
                                                          
440
 In 2013, the Court rejected this rationale long upheld in its Article 9 ECHR case law. See ECtHR (GC), Eweida 
and Others v. the United Kingdom, 15 January 2013 § 83.  
441
 See, e.g., ECmmHR, Stedman v. the United Kingdom, 9 April 19 and ECmmHR, Konttinen v. Finland, 3 
December 1996.   
442
 For insightful critiques of this approach, see Ouald Chaib, Saila, ‘Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: 
Improving the Legal Reasoning of the ECtHR’ in Alidadi, Katayoun, Foblets, Marie-Claire and Vrielink, Jogchum 
(eds.) A TEST OF FAITH?  RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND ACCOMMODATION IN THE EUROPEAN WORKPLACE (Ashgate, 
2012) 33-58 and Vickers, Lucy, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE (Hart 
Publishing, 2008) at 45-52.  
443
 Vickers, Lucy, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
at 88.  
444
 ECtHR, Francesco Sessa v. Italy, 3 April 2012. 
445
 Ibid. Three Judges (Tulkens, Popović and Keller) dissented.  
446
 Ibid. § 37. Moreover, the Court rejected his discrimination complaint as manifestly ill founded because he did not 
demonstrate that he had been treated differently from others in a comparable situation. Ibid. § 42. 
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a secular university, students submit to those rules.
447
 Another example is the case of Yanasik v. 
Turkey, concerning a Muslim cadet expelled from the Ankara Military Academy for breaching 
military discipline by participating in an alleged Muslim fundamentalist movement.
448
 The 
Commission held: ‘Training at the Military Academy, with the existing restrictions, does not 
therefore, as such, constitute an interference with the freedom of religion and conscience, given 
that the applicant freely chose to pursue his military career within that system’.449  
Another kind of restrictive interpretation of interference has also been applied in the 
context of conscientious behaviour.
450
 For example, in C. v. the United Kingdom, concerning a 
Quaker’s refusal to pay taxes without assurance that they would not be used for military 
expenditure, the Commission found no interference with his freedom of religion.
451
 It held that 
‘the obligation to pay taxes is a general one which has no specific conscientious implications in 
itself’.452 Moreover, the Commission appears to take for granted that minorities can obtain 
support in the political process without much difficulty: ‘[i]f the applicant considers the 
obligation to contribute through taxation to arms procurement an outrage to his conscience he 
may advertise his attitude and thereby try to obtain support for it through the democratic 
process’.453  
Examples of a restrictive approach to interference can also be found in the school 
context, based on a yet different kind of rationale. For instance, in the cases of Efstratiou v. 
Greece and Valsamis v. Greece, the Court did not see how the requirement to attend a national 
commemoration parade could interfere with two Jehovah’s Witness students’ pacifist religious 
convictions. The argument was that the event served pacifist purposes, even though military 
representatives were in attendance.
454
 The Court additionally referred to the Commission’s 
findings that Article 9 ECHR does not ‘confer a right to exemption from disciplinary rules which 
applied generally and in a neutral manner’.455  
                                                          
447
 ECmmHR, Karaduman v. Turkey, 3 May 1993. The Commission states: ‘The fact that a secular university has 
regulations on students’ dress and that its administrative services are subject to compliance with those regulations 
does not constitute an interference with the right to freedom of religion and belief’.  
448
 ECmmHR Yanasik v. Turkey, 6 January 1993 at p. 27. 
449
 Ibid. Emphasis added. See also, ECtHR, Kalaç v. Turkey, 1 July 1997. The case concerned the compulsory 
retirement of a Muslim judge working for the air force for breaching military discipline and infringing the principle 
of secularism.  
450
 See, e.g., ECmmHR, C. v. the United Kingdom, 15 December 1983; and ECmmHR, H.B. v. the United Kingdom, 
18 July 1986. See also, ECtHR, Pichon and Sajous v. France, 2 October 2001, p. 4. The case concerned two 
pharmacists convicted for refusing to sell contraceptive pills on conscientious grounds. The Court concluded that the 
applicants’ conviction for refusal to sell contraceptives did not interfere with the exercise of their freedom of 
religion because they could manifest their religious beliefs outside their professional sphere.  
451
ECmmHR, C. v. the United Kingdom, 15 December 1983. See also, H.B. v the United Kingdom, 18 July 1986.  
452
 ECmmHR, C. v. the United Kingdom, 15 December 1983 at 147. 
453
 Ibid. 
454
 ECtHR, Efstratiou v. Greece, 18 December 1996 and Valsamis v. Greece, 18 December 1996. The Court has 
been criticized for making its own assessment on the validity and importance of the applicants’ religious beliefs. 
Evans, Carolyn, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) at 120-121.  
455
 ECtHR, Efstratiou v. Greece, 18 December 1996 and Valsamis v. Greece, 18 December 1996 § 37. 
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In summary, and as Kristin Henrard put it, ‘[i]n relation to demands to be exempted from 
laws of general application (including laws on taxation, pension schemes, compulsory 
vaccination, rules about the way in which animals should be slaughtered etc) which have a 
disproportionate impact on the adherents of a particular religion, the Court and the Commission 
seemed reluctant to even identify an interference with the freedom of religion’.456 Danchin and 
Forman have also critiqued the Court’s approach in the following terms: ‘The fact that the Court 
has fashioned and approach whereby “neutral” laws will automatically prevail, and whereby the 
state is under no obligation to justify that its refusal to grant exemptions from the application of 
such laws is a measure “necessary in a democratic society”, constitutes a significant risk for the 
rights of minorities’.457 
 
(ii) Failure to Consider Implications in the Proportionality and Formalistic Understanding of 
Equality 
 
The Court’s tendency to bypass the potentially detrimental and discriminatory effects of 
seemingly neutral rules has manifested itself in two other ways: (i) failure to consider the 
implications for applicants in the proportionality analysis and (ii) application of a formal notion 
of equality.  
Thus, under Article 9(2) ECHR,
458
 the Court has dismissed a number of complaints by 
Sikh and Muslim students against expulsions, following their refusal to comply with secular 
dress codes in French State schools.
459
 In most of these cases, the Court found that the sanctions 
were necessary to protect secularism without much consideration of the impact of the rule in 
question on the students.
460
 What is more, in rejecting some of these applicants’ additional 
discrimination claims, the Court held that the French law prohibiting conspicuous religious 
symbols in schools applied to all ostensible religious symbols.’461 The Court’s reason for 
declaring this sort of discrimination claims manifestly ill founded clearly shows a concern for 
identical treatment rather than for the unequal effects of the norm. Indeed, the Court 
                                                          
456
 Henrard, Kristin, ‘Minority Specific Rights: A Protection of Religious Minorities Going Beyond the Freedom of 
Religion?’ European Yearbook on Minority Issues (2009) at 36. 
457
 Danchin, Peter G. and Forman, Lisa, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Protection of Religious Minorities’, in Peter Danchin and Elizabeth Cole (eds.), PROTECTING THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Columbia University Press, 2002) at 212. Their basis for 
questioning the Court’s approach is the following: ‘Neutral laws of general application will usually conform to the 
dominant ethical values in a given society at a given point of time. Thus, they will not often conflict with majority 
religious values and morality. They will, however, cause conflicts with minority religious values and practices that 
are socially atypical’. Ibid.  
458
 In these cases, the Court does not dismiss the cases for lack of interference but because the restrictions at issue 
are justified, that is, they are ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
459
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Aktas v. France, Gamaleddyn v. France, Ghazal v. France, Bayrak v. France, Ranjit Singh v. 
France and Jasvir Singh v. France all from 30 June 2009. See also, ECtHR, Dogru v. France, and Kervanci v. 
France, both from 4 December 2008.   
460
 See analysis in Chapter IV, II.B. 
461
 See, e.g., ECtHR, Aktas v. France, Ghazal v France, Ranjit Singh v. France and Jasvir Singh v. France, all of 30 
June 2009. Emphasis added. All these cases refer to the rationale in ECtHR, Köse and 93 Others v. Turkey, 24 
January 2006. 
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simplistically looks at whether the law applies the same to all conspicuous symbols but remains 
oblivious to its differential or disproportionate impact on some group members (i.e., the Court 
misses the fact that the law has no effect on those religious students wearing less noticeable 
religious symbols).  
The Court has also held inadmissible a freedom of religion claim by a Muslim teacher 
dismissed from a Swiss State school for refusing to take off her headscarf in compliance with the 
neutrality principle.
462
 Again, virtually no consideration was given to any possible harmful 
implications of the principle for the applicant in the proportionality analysis.
463
 The Court 
furthermore rejected her discrimination complaint on the basis of sex. The reason given by the 
Court for this rejection reveals a direct-discrimination like mindset: ‘The Court notes in the 
instant case that the measure by which the applicant was prohibited, purely in the context of her 
professional duties, from wearing an Islamic headscarf was not directed at her as a member of 
the female sex but pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the neutrality of the State primary-
education system’.464 The measure may not have been directed at the applicant as a woman.465 
Yet it indirectly impacted on her as a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf, an impact that 
Muslim men (and non-Muslim women) would have probably not experienced. As Maleiha Malik 
argues: ‘After all, Muslim women are the only targets of these prohibitions: it is they, and not 
Muslim men, who wear the headscarf’.466 In Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, a case concerning a Muslim 
student at a State university sanctioned for refusing to take off her headscarf,
 the Court’s Grand 
Chamber similarly dismissed her alleged violations of freedom of religion and right to education 
without any meaningful proportionality analysis.
467
 The Court found that the ban was justified on 
the need to protect secularism and gender equality in Turkey.
468
 Moreover, using the same 
reasoning as in Dahlab, the Court rejected Şahin’s discrimination claim as well.469  
Cases concerning complaints against requirements to remove religious clothing during 
security checks at airports/consulates or during motorcycle riding have been declared manifestly 
ill founded with a similar dismissive treatment of applicants’ interests in the proportionality.470 
For example, in Phull v. France and El Morsli v. France, the Court rejected the applicants’ 
Article 9 ECHR claims with the argument that the requirement to take off their religious clothing 
at security checks was necessary to guarantee public security.
471
 There was no attempt, however, 
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 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001. 
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 For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the case, see analysis in Chapter VI, II.B. 
464
 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001 at 14. Emphasis added.  
465
 This allows the Dahlab Court to conclude: ‘Such a measure could also be applied to a man who, in similar 
circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identified him as a member of a different faith’. Ibid.  
466
 Malik, Maleiha, ‘Complex Equality: Muslim Women and the “Headscarf”’, 68 Droit et Société (2008) (critiquing 
the Court’s single-axis approach to equality, marginalizing the gender aspect).  
467
 ECtHR (GC), Leyla Şahin v Turkey, 10 November 2005. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the case, 
see analysis in Chapter VI, II.B.  
468
 Ibid. § 115. 
469
 Ibid. § 165.   
470
 See, e.g., ECmmHR, X. v. the United Kingdom, 12 July 1978; ECtHR, Phull v. France, 11 January 2005 and 
ECtHR, El Morsli v. France, 4 March 2008. 
471
 ECtHR, Phull v. France, 11 January 2005 and ECtHR, El Morsli v. France, 4 March 2008. In fact, these two 
cases reproduce the brief reasoning in the old case of ECmmHR. X. v. the United Kingdom, 12 July 1978. 
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to weigh this State interest against any possible harm caused to the applicants’ freedom of 
religion.   
 
(iii) Recent Developments  
 
Most recently, the Court appears to have been growingly aware of the effects that general and 
apparently neutral rules or practices may have on religious applicants. For example, in the 2010 
case of Jakóbski v. Poland – which concerned a Buddhist male applicant denied a free-meat diet 
in prison – the Court found that it was not disproportionate for the prison administration to attend 
to his dietary requirements. According to the Court, the provision of a vegetarian diet would 
have not entailed ‘any disruption to the management of the prison or to any decline in the 
standards of meals served to other prisoners’.472    
Another example is the 2013 case of Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, which in 
fact covered four different cases brought by Christian applicants, complaining about restrictions 
on the manifestation of their religion at work.
473
 Three of these four applicants also made 
discrimination claims but the Court examined their cases primarily under Article 9 ECHR. In 
two of the four cases, the Court weighed heavily in the balance what was at stake for the 
applicants wishing to wear a cross visibly at work.
474
 Indeed, in the case of Ms. Eweida, a check-
in employee at British Airways, the Court considered that the balance should have tipped in 
favor of the applicant.
475
 In the case of Ms. Chaplin, a nurse working at a State hospital, the 
Court concluded that the protection of health and safety outweighed the applicant’s interests but 
not without acknowledging the importance of what was at stake for her.
476
   
Another Eweida applicant, Ms. Ladele, a registrar of births, deaths and marriages at the 
local authority of Islington, complained under Article 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with 
Article 9 ECHR, rather than under Article 9 ECHR alone. Ms. Ladele argued that, as an orthodox 
Christian who viewed marriage as the union of a man and a woman, she was dismissed for 
refusing to register same-sex civil partnerships. Her claim was that, in failing to treat her 
differently from those who did not have a conscientious objection to registering civil 
partnerships, the local authority indirectly discriminated against her on the grounds of religion. 
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 Jakóbski v. Poland, 7 December 2010 § 52. This sort of reasoning resembles the Canadian Supreme Court’s test 
of ‘undue burden’ in reasonable accommodation cases. For an analysis of this aspect of the judgment, see Ouald 
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 ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 15 January 2013.  
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 Ibid. §§ 94 and 99.  
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 For the Court, the company’s wish, while certainly legitimate, was just given too much weight. Several factors 
led the Court to this conclusion, most notably: (i) the cross was ‘discreet’ and could not have detracted from Ms. 
Eweida’s professional appearance; and (ii) employees were allowed to wear other religious symbols (e.g., turbans 
and hijabs) without evidence of any negative impact of the wearing of such symbols on the employer’s brand or 
image. Ibid. § 94. 
476
 Ibid. § 99.  
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Interestingly – and most relevantly for the purposes of this Chapter – the Court framed her case 
as one of indirect discrimination. It accepted that her designation to register same-sex civil 
partnerships ‘had a particularly detrimental impact on her because of her religious beliefs’.477 
The issue was therefore whether the local authority’s refusal to make an exception for the 
applicant and others in her situation amounted to indirect discrimination. Ladele ultimately lost 
the case, mostly as a result of the wide margin of appreciation applied by the Court.
478
 Yet, and 
regardless of the way in which the Court applied the margin of appreciation,
479
 the framing of 
Ladele as an indirect discrimination case represents a remarkable departure from its traditional 
reluctance to accept that neutral rules may negatively impact on some religious adherents.      
The same may be said of Bayatyan v. Armenia, a groundbreaking 2011 case, in which the 
Court recognizes conscientious objection to military service under Article 9 ECHR.
480
 What is 
most relevant for present purposes is that the Court’s Grand Chamber explicitly recognizes the 
serious impact of the rule mandating military service on conscientious objectors: ‘[T]he system 
existing at the material time imposed on citizens an obligation which had potentially serious 
implications for conscientious objectors while failing to allow any conscience-based exceptions 
and penalising those who, like the applicant, refused to perform military service’.481 Equally 
noteworthy is the Court’s rejection of the Respondent State’s request for an application of formal 
equality: ‘respect on the part of the State towards the beliefs of a minority religious group like 
the applicant’s by providing them with the opportunity to serve society as dictated by their 
conscience might, far from creating unjust inequalities or discrimination as claimed by the 
Government, rather ensure cohesive and stable pluralism and promote religious harmony and 
tolerance in society’.482  
While all these recent developments may take the Court in a new direction, it is still too 
soon to draw any general conclusions or determine whether they represent any definitive shifts in 
the freedom of religion case law. Save these and a few earlier notable exceptions,
483
 the 
prevailing approach still appears to be one of ‘manifest reluctance of the Court to accommodate 
minority religious practice,’484 a tendency that has recently led one leading law and religion 
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scholar to speak of ‘the (un)protection of individual religious identity in the Strasbourg case 
law’.485  
 
(iv) Towards Substantive Religious and Cultural Equality  
 
Aware of the burdensome effects that general and neutral rules may have on some religious 
people – or, as a matter of fact, on members of groups whose ways of life differ from those of 
dominant groups – legal scholars have proposed several alternative approaches. Suggestions in 
the ECHR context have ranged from greater emphasis on indirect discrimination,
486
 use of the 
discrimination principle in Article 9 ECHR cases as ‘a matter of routine,’487 and, more and more, 
the notion of reasonable accommodation.
488
 One argument made from a minority perspective 
more broadly is that minority protection can be effectively achieved as long as non-
discrimination opens up to substantive equality.
489
  
In the remainder of this Chapter, I wish to supplement these scholarly efforts towards 
substantive equality by exploring the potential of group vulnerability. In particular, I will explore 
its potential to reach and challenge the unequal structures responsible for the detrimental impact 
on some cultural and religious groups that the Court tends to miss. I am not seeking to provide a 
one-size-fits-all way of ‘solving’ seemingly disparate cases. To be sure, a school is not the 
military. Moreover, counteracting the negative implications of a dress code for religious 
practitioners in a discrete environment (e.g., the workplace) may raise fewer difficulties than 
counteracting the same kind of implications of general tax laws. Evidently, introducing group 
vulnerability in the analysis will not lead to the same outcome across such an array of cases, for 
there are a host of other factors that enter the equation in the examination of these cases and a 
variety of roles for the margin of appreciation.
490
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However, introducing group vulnerability in the reasoning may change the way in which 
the Court ‘sees’ these cases. In particular, it will help the Court turn its gaze outward in two 
ways: (i) by considering how societal contexts and arrangements render some religious/cultural 
groups more vulnerable to discrimination and other human rights violations and (ii) by unveiling 
the perspectives implicitly privileged in such contexts and arrangements rendering other 
religious/cultural groups less vulnerable to discrimination and other human rights violations. I 
now turn to each of these potentials.   
 
II. The Potential of Group Vulnerability’s Relational Character: The ‘More 
Vulnerable’ Side  
 
In Chapter I, the focus of the discussion was primarily the particular nature of group 
vulnerability, as this is the aspect of the concept that has brought more concrete doctrinal 
implications in the Court’s case law. Indeed, as explained in Chapter I, the asymmetry 
introduced by the particular character of the concept has carried increased State positive 
obligations; increased weight of the harm in the scope and the proportionality analyses; and a 
narrower margin of appreciation.  
In this part, I want to focus on another aspect of the Court’s notion of group vulnerability 
– the relational aspect. In particular, I will explore its potential to advance substantive equality in 
the context of cultural and religious claims under Articles 8 and 9 ECHR, alone and in 
conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. As emphasized in Chapter I,
491
 the relational aspect of group 
vulnerability has enabled the Court to inquire into the broader societal and institutional contexts 
that create or reinforce certain groups’ vulnerabilities.492 Understood relationally, therefore, 
group vulnerability has already opened the Strasbourg door to more contextual forms of inquiry 
into why and how it is that some groups are more vulnerable than others. This relational 
understanding of group vulnerability is in line with one fundamental premise of substantive 
equality: discrimination and inequalities are not the exclusive fault of individual perpetrators but 
the result of societal and institutional structures more broadly.
493
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A. Invulnerable Subject Traces  
  
As stated earlier, the vulnerable group member is largely absent in the context of religious claims 
and has hardly ever made a meaningful appearance in the context of cultural claims. In fact, 
traces of an invulnerable subject appear to haunt the Court’s case law in these two areas. By 
‘invulnerable subject’, I mean the ‘socially de-contextualized, hyper-rational, wilful individual’ 
that Anna Grear and others have identified as imported into human rights law.
494
 Traces of this 
subject surface the Court’s legal reasoning in two ways (i) applicants are sometimes viewed as 
self-directing, atomistic agents who fall into disadvantage as a result of their choice or individual 
preferences rather than as a result of societal/institutional arrangements; and (ii) applicants are 
sometimes construed as the ‘opposite’ of the invulnerable subject, that is, as oppressed by their 
religions or cultures, powerless, and therefore in need of paternalistic protection.  
 
(i) Invulnerable Logic I 
 
In the first version of the invulnerable logic, the Court views applicants as purely rationalistic 
and wholly autonomous individuals who should take responsibility for their ‘choices’. This 
rationale is particularly at work in the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning the manifestation of 
religion in the workplace, in particular, in the ideas that applicants freely accept employment 
rules and ultimately remain free to resign in case of conflicts between their religious and work 
duties. The Court’s (or, more accurately, the Commission’s) approach in these cases has been 
amply criticized for obscuring the role of ‘structural constraints’ on people’s choices495 and the 
role of the State in creating the conflict with religious duties in the first place.
496
 Commenting on 
this line of case law, Malcolm Evans for instance argues that ‘this approach has an enduring 
attraction, since it casts the applicants . . . as the author of their own misfortune, and sees the 
remedy as lying in their own hands’.497 The reality, however, is that ‘most employees are 
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financially dependent on having a job, and the option of resigning is not experienced practically 
as a form of freedom’.498  
A recent example illustrating the workings of the first version of the invulnerable logic is 
Francesco Sessa v. Italy – the case concerning a Jewish lawyer denied the rescheduling of a 
court hearing originally set on Yom Kippur. In finding no interference with the applicant’s 
freedom of religion, the Court reasoned that the applicant should have found a replacement and, 
in that way, still been able to observe his holy day. So, instead of asking why the apparently 
neutral calendar of holidays gave rise to the conflict for the applicant in the first place, the Court 
simply assumed that the responsibility and therefore the solution lied entirely with Mr. Sessa. A 
group vulnerability approach in this case would have encouraged the Court to pinpoint the kind 
of vulnerabilities spotted in Chapman: power differentials and the subsequent inability to include 
the concerns of the group members in question in the rule (in the Sessa case, in an official 
judicial calendar). Martha Fineman argues that ‘[a] vulnerability inquiry proposes a more 
thorough and penetrating equality analysis – one that considers structural and institutional 
arrangements in assessing the state's response to situations of vulnerability before indicting the 
individual’.499 This is precisely what happens in Francesco Sessa: the individual was 
immediately indicted without even interrogating the institutional arrangements that provoke the 
schedule conflict.
500
  
A similar logic underlies the Court’s legal reasoning – albeit admittedly to a lesser 
extent
501
 – in cases concerning applicants’ expulsion from schools for refusing to take off items 
of religious clothing. In several of these cases, the Court easily assumed that the applicants could 
ultimately move to a private school or take classes by correspondence.
502
 At no point was there 
an attempt to consider what it was that was forcing some students to move to another school in 
the first place. Nor was an attempt to consider the possible negative implications of having to 
transfer to a private school (e.g., disruption of the applicants’ studies, financial burdens). Again, 
a group vulnerability approach in these cases would have invited the Court to more thoroughly 
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investigate the arrangements at the root of the problem before expecting the individuals to simply 
deal with the consequences of such arrangements.  
Another example of the first version of invulnerability is, ironically, Chapman itself – the 
case that gave origin to the notion of group vulnerability. The Grand Chamber’s judgment is 
plagued by ambivalence. On the one hand, the Court recognizes the vulnerability of the Roma 
minority.
503
 On the other hand, when the time comes to examine the justification of the 
interference of the planning regulations with her minority lifestyle, the Court extracts the 
applicant from her group identity/context and turns her into an individual who simply wished to 
settle.
504
 As a result, she is no longer considered a ‘proper’ Gypsy (and, therefore a ‘proper’ 
vulnerable group member). Her case thus becomes one of simple choice or individual preference 
rather than one of vulnerability reinforced by disadvantageous norms.
505
 I analyze this aspect of 
the Chapman judgment at greater length in Chapter VI. For now, all I want to point out is that 
the invulnerable logic is also present in Chapman. Applied consistently, a group vulnerability 
analysis would have inquired into the rule that was putting Ms. Chapman at a disadvantage, 
especially under Article 14 ECHR analysis. Group vulnerability may not have ultimately 
changed the outcome – as the Court appeared clearly unwilling to go all the way in finding a 
violation.
506
 Still, a group vulnerability approach may have made for a more coherent legal 
reasoning. It would have at least closed the gap between the group-vulnerability-based principles 
and their actual application in the case. In practice, this would have meant a more thorough 
appraisal of the harm caused to Ms. Chapman – i.e., the disadvantageous effects of the planning 
norms on her lifestyle – even when her interests may have ultimately been outweighed by those 
of the State.
507
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Admittedly, one of the main manifestations of the first version of the invulnerable logic – 
the one prevailing in cases concerning the manifestation of religion at work – has recently been 
called into question by the Court itself. In the case of Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
the Court held that ‘where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion in the 
workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any interference 
with the right, the better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when 
considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate’.508 This is no doubt a significant 
step towards erasing one of the most problematic ‘invulnerable subject’ traces. For now, 
however, it remains to be seen whether the approach will be confirmed in further case law.  
 
(ii) Invulnerable Logic II 
 
The second version of the invulnerable logic is illustrated in the Court’s reasoning in some of the 
so-called ‘headscarf’ cases. In these instances, the Court constructs applicants as the binary 
opposite (or ‘other’) of the invulnerable subject: the applicants are not wholly autonomous and 
self-directing – as liberal thought archetypically conceives of the subject. Instead, the applicants 
are viewed as lacking the capacity to make choices and as being determined or ‘oppressed’ by 
their religion. The two examples have been introduced earlier: Dahlab v. Switzerland and Leyla 
Şahin v. Turkey: both of them concern Muslim women seeking to wear the headscarf.509  
There are many aspects to the Court’s reasoning in these cases. For present purposes, 
however, what interests me is the way in which the Court accepts the gender equality 
justification invoked by the States in support of the bans. In Dahlab, for example, the Court 
endorses the State’s argument and characterizes ‘the’ headscarf as apparently ‘imposed on 
women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran’ and as therefore ‘hard to square with the 
principle of gender equality’.510 Implicit in the Court’s characterization of ‘the headscarf’ is the 
negative stereotype that Muslims are oppressed.
511
 This stereotype is by now well-established in 
the Court’s case law, following its incorporation into the general principles of the Grand 
Chamber judgment in Leyla Şahin.512 In fact, the stereotype was part of the actual assessment of 
the facts in Leyla Şahin and instrumental in finding that the ban was justified under Article 9(2) 
ECHR in the name of gender equality.
513
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I examine the Court’s use of negative stereotypes and the harmful implications in these 
cases in Chapter VI. For the moment, however, I wish to highlight that this depiction of Muslim 
women serves to re-affirm the invulnerable subject as the standard.
514
 Indeed, based on implicit 
dichotomies – agency/victimization515 and reason/culture516 – that value one side and devalue the 
other, the Court implicitly imbricates Muslim women with the devalued side 
(victimization/culture), thereby assigning them a subordinate status. The implicit construction of 
Muslim women as oppressed thus functions as the ‘other’ (culturally determined, victimized) 
necessary to re-affirm the ‘normalcy’ (autonomous/rational agent) of the invulnerable subject.517 
The move has profound dehumanizing effects. As Leti Volpp notes, ‘[b]ecause the Western 
definition of what makes one human depends on the notion of agency and the ability to make 
rational choices, to thrust some communities into a world where their actions are determined 
only by culture is deeply dehumanizing’.518  
A group vulnerability approach in this area of the Court’s case law could serve to spot 
and bring to closer scrutiny any prejudices and negative stereotypes underlying States’ reasons to 
justify restrictions on applicants’ religious practices.519 Thus, once it is established that the 
applicants belong to a particularly vulnerable group traditionally subject to prejudice and 
stereotyping,
520
 the Court may become more skeptical – and, as a result, more searching in its 
scrutiny – of justifications based on such prejudices or stereotypes. As argued in Chapter I, this is 
a consequence of the asymmetry introduced by the particular character of group vulnerability: 
heightened scrutiny or narrowed margin of appreciation when the rule or practice in question 
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affects stereotyped or stigmatized groups.
521
 A group vulnerability approach may come 
particularly handy in cases where the neutrality of the norm is in fact misleading – that is, when 
in reality it is either conceived with the idea of restricting certain groups’ religious practices522 or 
applied in a discriminatory fashion while remaining neutral on its face.
523
   
Crucially, and as argued in Chapter I, group-vulnerability analysis should be applied with 
particular care if it does not want to end up reinforcing the very discriminatory attitudes and 
misplaced paternalism it seeks to remedy. Thus, if the concept is to retain its ability to remedy 
such wrongs, it is first of all crucial to avoid conceiving of vulnerability as inherently located in 
the group rather in the social context. As suggested in Chapter I, this means that the concept 
should not be employed as a label that fixes a group trait (e.g., vulnerable). Moreover, the 
analysis should make sure to go hand in hand with an analysis of the individual applicant’s actual 
circumstances and abilities. Otherwise, group vulnerability analysis risks overshadowing the 
agency of the applicants concerned and justifying misplaced paternalistic interventions rather 
than tackling social prejudice and hostility towards them. 
 
B. Towards Unmasking Heightened Vulnerability 
 
The basic yet fundamental suggestion arising from this part is that the Court should routinely 
ask: Does this particular applicant belong to a particularly vulnerable group as established in 
international and domestic documents? This simple question will diminish the likelihood of 
examining the case within a ‘miniature frame’, which writes off the contextual circumstances 
that give meaning to applicants’ claims and excludes a thorough appreciation of any harm from 
the picture.
524
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Here, there is a role to be played by third-party interveners. One of the lessons that James 
Goldston draws from the experience of Roma rights litigation is ‘the importance of documenting 
the widespread, often systemic nature of the violations at issue, even in a legal context that does 
not formally recognize class actions or group remedies’.525 Referring to the Roma cases decided 
in Strasbourg he observes: ‘By the time the case of D.H. v. Czech Republic reached the Grand 
Chamber in 2007, the Court had been saturated for the better part of a decade with 
documentation of anti-Roma prejudice and discrimination’.526 Information of the sort Goldston 
points out may thus facilitate the Court’s assessment of whether certain religious or cultural 
groups either in the region or in certain Council of Europe Member States are particularly 
vulnerable. The vulnerability of these groups would thus be established on an ad hoc basis, 
influenced by specific contexts.   
Alternatively, the Court could rule in a more general and principled fashion that religious 
and cultural minorities are by definition particularly vulnerable. One of the arguments 
traditionally made in favor of this kind of approach is that, while majorities are likely to have 
their concerns addressed in general rules, minorities are likely to have theirs ignored as a result 
of power differentials in the political process. In the ECHR context, Carolyn Evans for example 
argues that ‘the groups that tend to be the most vulnerable to being overlooked in the legislative 
drafting process are small communities with little political influence, possibly living somewhat 
marginalized from the wider society’.527 In fact, this seems to be rationale underlying the Court’s 
group vulnerability reasoning in Chapman, as noted in Chapter I.
528
  
This sort of recognition, of course, does not necessarily mean that minorities will always 
be entitled to exemptions.
529
 Indeed, the concerns of vulnerable group members might be 
defeated by public interests under Articles 8(2) or 9(2) ECHR. States may sometimes find it 
difficult to adapt their laws to the myriad ways in which they may interfere with different 
people’s cultural and religious beliefs or practices. Moreover, the Court can always rely on the 
margin of appreciation as regards the appropriate means of achieving recognition of the 
vulnerable group members’ rights. Indeed, exceptions to general rules are not the only way in 
which States may make sure that their norms do not restrict applicants’ cultural and religious 
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practices disproportionately. Other means may include group consultation with vulnerable 
minority groups, more restrictive drafting of norms
530
 and other strategies that allow discretion to 
States in how to fulfill this responsibility.  
 
 
III. The Potential of Group Vulnerability’s Relational Character: The ‘Less Vulnerable’ 
Side 
 
In explaining the rationale of her vulnerability thesis – which, as noted earlier, is understood as a 
shared human condition rather than as a condition of certain groups – Martha Fineman argues:  
 
Of course, we must continue to consider how some individuals and groups are uniquely 
disadvantaged, rendered unequally and oppressively vulnerable, by the structures and ideological 
predispositions of our system. However, the inquiry cannot stop there. We must also explore why 
and how some, often only a few, but also frequently a majority, are and have been advantaged and 
privileged by that system. The question, then, is not only who is harmed, but also who benefits by 
the organization of society and the structure of our institutions, including the state.
531
 
 
In fact, anti-discrimination scholars have sometimes been criticized for putting too much 
emphasis on only ‘one portion of the power system’ (subordination) while obfuscating the other 
(domination).
532
 Inspired by the concerns raised by Fineman and other critics of traditional ways 
of looking at inequality and discrimination, the question I ask in this part is therefore: Can – and 
should – a group vulnerability approach serve the larger purpose of addressing the advantage    
(re-)produced in societal and institutional arrangements? This is one of the crucial challenges for 
the Court’s group-based vulnerability approach: to bring the privileged or advantaged – and not 
just a defined vulnerable group – within its gaze. In this regard, I want to put forward the 
following argument: group vulnerability – provided that it is applied with the dynamism of the 
Court’s post-Chapman line of case law and with the caution advocated in Chapter I – has the 
potential to reach the privilege side Fineman and others are concerned with.  
The group-vulnerability concept in its relational dimension already switches attention 
from the individual to the environment that puts her at a disadvantage. I agree with Fineman that 
the inquiry need not – and should not – stop here. In this regard, I do not see why the concept 
could not go further and also ask how the same environment that is disadvantaging some is 
simultaneously privileging others. Or, to use vulnerability language, group vulnerability can 
investigate not only what is making some more vulnerable but also what is making others less 
vulnerable. In fact, as shown in Chapter I, the Court tends to refer to certain groups as 
                                                          
530
 Ibid. at 206.  
531
 Fineman, Martha Albertson, ‘Equality Still Elusive After All These Years’ in Linda C. McClain and Joanna L. 
Grossman (eds.) GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Cambridge University Press, 
2009) at 263.  
532
 Wildman, Stephanie M., ‘Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible’, 35(3) Santa Clara Law 
Review (1995) at 895 (arguing that many members affiliated with the dominant side gain much from it). Ibid. at 891. 
101 
 
‘particularly vulnerable’ rather than as just ‘vulnerable’. The term ‘particularly’ emphasizes a 
difference of degree. Framed this way, the concept implicitly acknowledges the possibility of not 
just heightened (more vulnerable groups) but also lessened vulnerability (less vulnerable groups).  
 
A. Unmasking Privilege  
 
The claim that law ‘knows no culture and recognizes no identity’ – a hallmark of the formal 
approach to equality – has been challenged in different bodies of legal scholarship.533 Thus, 
while critical race scholars have long exposed the ‘whiteness’ embedded in the law, feminist 
scholars have famously revealed its ‘maleness’. For example, Catharine MacKinnon observes: 
‘[T]he male standpoint dominates civil society in the form of the objective standard – that 
standpoint which, because it dominates in the world, does not appear to function as a standpoint 
at all’.534 Similarly, in advocating an intersectional analysis based on sex and race to account for 
the experience of discrimination of African American women, Kimberle Crenshaw argues: ‘Race 
and sex . . .  become significant only when they operate to explicitly disadvantage the victims, 
because the privileging of whiteness or maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived at 
all’.535 
What both groups of scholars ultimately share is the claim that ‘blindness masks a 
posture that is, in fact, gendered and raced’.536 They both point to the familiar concern about the 
fact that the universal is actually not the universal but the particular.
537
 Approaches such as this 
‘seek to expose the cultural bias hidden in law not to search for a “truly” objective or neutral 
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position, from which to make legal decisions but, rather, to hold law accountable’.538 The 
problem, however, is that these particular perspectives are often so entrenched in societal and 
legal norms that people, especially those whose perspectives are therein embraced, do not get to 
notice them. In the context of culture, Dorothy E. Roberts for example shows the ways in which 
the dominant culture is embedded in the law and still not viewed as ‘culture’ but as the way 
things just naturally happen to be.
539
 Becoming aware of the points of reference submerged in 
‘natural’ arrangements therefore facilitates recognizing those who are included in, and therefore 
advantaged by, the norm.
540
 
In fact, more and more, courts ruling on diversity claims as well as legal scholars writing 
on these issues are becoming aware of the presence of these submerged perspectives in facially 
neutral rules. Julie Ringelheim, for example, argues that, given that institutions and norms are – 
for social and historical reasons – imbued with the majority’s traditions, only non-dominant 
cultural expressions are rendered visible and problematic while the dominant ones remain 
invisible.
541
 Ringelheim’s concerns echoes what Barbara Flagg calls the ‘transparency 
phenomenon’, albeit in the context of race: the dominant view is so pervasive that it remains 
invisible or transparent.
542
 Other scholars have gotten more specific and unmasked the particular 
(Christian) perspective implicit in certain constructs, most notably European secularism. Foblets 
and Alidadi, for instance, argue: ‘the “secular norm” seems to be very coloured Christian 
normalcy that is being challenged by mainly newcomers whose integration in various respects is 
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considered problematic. As a consequence, “demands” or “requests” are frequently met with 
defensive attitudes, affirming the abnormal condition of the minorities’.543  
Another example, this time from the Court’s peer in South Africa, comes from the 
decision in Kwazulu-Natal and Others v. Pillay.
544
 The case concerned a Hindu female student 
not allowed to express her religion/culture by wearing a nose stud in a public school. The student 
successfully challenged the school dress code. The South African Court framed the case as one 
of discrimination (on the grounds of culture/religion) and acknowledged the privilege embedded 
in an apparently neutral norm in the following terms:   
 
The norm embodied by the Code is not neutral, but enforces mainstream and historically 
privileged forms of adornment, such as ear studs which also involve the piercing of a body part, at 
the expense of minority and historically excluded forms. It thus places a burden on learners who are 
unable to express themselves fully and must attend school in an environment that does not 
completely accept them.
545
  
 
Group vulnerability can serve as a door to a broader inquiry into possible privileged views that 
come to define ‘neutral’ norms in exclusionary ways. At a minimum, this should require not 
accepting neutrality at face value
546
 and, instead, scrutinizing the reasons offered by States in 
favor of privileging certain groups. This, of course, does not mean that privilege will be 
unjustifiable. As Fineman states: ‘[a] vulnerability approach . . . means that if the state confers 
privilege or advantage, there is an affirmative obligation for it to either justify the disparate 
circumstances or remedy them’.547 Once privileges are unveiled, an argument from non-
discrimination should be relatively straightforward: since the rule already favors the practices of 
certain groups, it should be difficult for States to reject demands for equal inclusion without an 
objective and reasonable justification.
548
 I agree with authors like Van den Brink that there is a 
crucial role here for Article 14 ECHR.
549
 In fact, Article 14 ECHR is probably the most natural 
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context for conducting the inquiry into the privileges embedded in the norms, practices or 
criteria.
550
  
 
B. Avoiding ‘Difference’  
 
One assumption usually following from taking for granted arrangements that appear ‘natural’ is 
that those who do not fit tend to be deemed ‘different’ or ‘deviant’.551 Difference theorists have 
magnificently exposed this and other unstated assumptions usually underlying the legal analysis 
of what has been aptly called the ‘dilemma of difference’. Martha Minow, arguably its main 
exponent, explains:  
 
The dilemma of difference grows from the ways in which this society assigns individuals to 
categories and, on that basis, determines whom to include in and whom to exclude from political, 
social, and economic activities. Because the activities are designed, in turn, with only the included 
participants in mind, the excluded seem not to fit because of something in their own nature’.552  
 
‘Difference’, therefore, becomes salient not ‘because of a trait intrinsic to the person but because 
the dominant institutional arrangements were designed without that trait [but with other traits] in 
mind’.553 Thus, a key insight from theorists of difference is that it is crucial to eschew locating 
the problem ‘in the identity group rather than in the social relations that produce identity 
groupings’.554 Group vulnerability, as we have seen, does already take a crucial step in that 
direction by focusing the gaze outward, that is, by stating that some group members are 
particularly vulnerable in society as a result of historical prejudice, stigma, stereotypes and 
institutional arrangements rather than as something (‘wrong’) inherent in their nature.  
Now, fully tackling the problem further requires that group vulnerability go further and 
scrutinize any particular perspective implicitly privileged in the law that may be rendering a 
broad array of others ‘visible’, ‘different’ or ‘deviant’. Focusing attention on the (cultural or 
religious) specificities of certain groups without seeing the (cultural or religious) specificities of 
those already accommodated in the norm leaves in place a hierarchical relationship between the 
two: only the former are viewed as ‘different’, and therefore, as having ‘specific’, ‘particular’ or 
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‘special’ needs.555 As a result, only the former may be perceived as ‘accommodated’ while the 
latter may be viewed as ‘accommodators’.556 In short, accommodating some on the basis of their 
specificities without regard to the specificities of those already included in the norm may 
paradoxically leave in place the hierarchies at the root of the exclusion.
557
 It is therefore crucial 
to stay away from formulations that never quite disturb the exclusionary character of the rule and 
that never quite reach equality.
558
   
One suggestion emerging from this part of the analysis is therefore that the Court should 
keep emphasizing the idea that some group members are more vulnerable than others (while 
being aware that there are others less vulnerable).
559
 The Court should thus make sure to keep 
using the term ‘particularly’ when referring to vulnerable groups or, perhaps even better, ‘groups 
with heightened vulnerabilities’.560 In fact, it is the increased character of vulnerability and not 
just their vulnerability that triggers stronger protection. In alluding to the possibility of different 
degrees of vulnerability or varying vulnerabilities across groups, formulations of this sort avoid 
positing some of these groups as the only, quintessential vulnerable subjects. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, I have made the case for extending group vulnerability analysis to religious and 
cultural claims. Introducing group vulnerability reasoning in cases where the Court finds it 
established that it is dealing with a member of a particularly vulnerable group is likely to take the 
Court out of the ‘miniature frame’ within which it tends to examine claims of freedom of 
religion, religious discrimination and respect for cultural ways life. Moreover, the Court should 
take the opportunity to expand the focus of group vulnerability and scrutinize any potential 
privilege or advantage embedded in the rule, as this may facilitate equality analysis and reduce 
the risks of reinstating hierarchical relations that stand on the way to meaningful equality. In the 
next Chapter, and since I have not examined language claims yet, I show what group 
vulnerability analysis may look like in practice by rewriting a Court’s judgment in the context of 
a language-related claim.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE (COURT)ROOM: A VULNERABLE GROUP

 
 
Introduction    
As an instrument of civil and political rights protection, the ECHR does not guarantee language 
rights as such. Save a few exceptions inherent in the protection against arbitrary detention and 
the right to a fair trial provided by Articles 5 § 2
561
 and 6 § 3 (a) and (e),
562
 the ECHR ‘does not 
per se guarantee the right to use a particular language in communications with public authorities 
or the right to receive information in a language of one’s choice’.563 The only other explicit 
reference to language in the ECHR is the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of language 
(Article 14 ECHR). What is more, the margin of appreciation granted to States in this sphere is 
‘particularly wide’, as Contracting States’ language policies are influenced by a multitude of 
historical and cultural factors that make it difficult for the Court to find a common 
denominator.
564
   
Yet, and despite the Court’s caution in this domain, a State language policy can be the 
object of supervision insofar as it conflicts with an ECHR right.
565
 Notwithstanding the lack of 
recognition of language rights in the ECHR, the Court has progressively recognized the language 
components of some rights and established that language measures may interfere with the 
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exercise of other ECHR rights.
566
 This has most frequently occurred in the context of Article 8 
ECHR (respect for family life, private life and correspondence) and Article 10 ECHR (freedom 
of expression) as well as in the context of Article 2 of Protocol 1 (the right to education) and 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 (the right to free elections).  
Article 10 ECHR, for example, does not guarantee the right to use the language of one’s 
choice in administrative matters.
567
 However, the provision ‘encompasses the freedom to receive 
and impart information and ideas in any language that allows persons to participate in the public 
exchange of all varieties of cultural, political and social information and ideas’.568 The Court has 
said that in such contexts ‘language as a medium of expression undoubtedly deserves protection 
under Article 10’.569 Likewise, although Article 2 of Protocol 1 ‘does not specify the language in 
which education must be conducted, the right to education would be meaningless if it did not 
imply in favour of its beneficiaries, the right to be educated in the national language or in one of 
the national languages, as the case may be’.570 Moreover, ‘requiring a candidate for election to 
the national parliament to have sufficient knowledge of the official language pursues a legitimate 
aim’ but the removal of her name from the list of candidates for lack of language proficiency 
may be disproportionate if the procedure offers no guarantee of objectivity, procedural fairness 
and legal certainty.
571
 In the context of Article 8 ECHR, the Court has examined language 
concerns arising from interferences with prisoners’ correspondence, including decisions to 
withhold letters written in certain languages.
572
 The Court has also examined language concerns 
in its Article 8 ECHR name case law; in particular, complaints against requirements to adapt 
names to official language policies (the object of discussion of this Chapter).   
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In general, the Court has been ‘reluctant to deduce meaningful language rights from other 
provisions’.573 Most recently, however, it has shown greater concern for the needs of linguistic 
minorities, especially in the sphere of public education.
574
 Indeed, in Catan and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia, concerning a complaint by children and parents from the Moldovan 
community in Transdniestria against banning the use of Latin script in schools and requiring that 
Moldovan be written in the Cyrillic script, the Court’s Grand Chamber found a violation of 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 in respect of the Russian Federation.
575
 The Court’s conclusion was that 
‘the “MRT”’s language policy, as applied to these schools, was intended to enforce the 
Russification of the language and culture of the Moldovan community living in 
Transdniestria’.576 
Earlier in 2001, in Cyprus v. Turkey, concerning the children of Greek-Cypriot parents in 
northern Cyprus wishing to pursue a secondary education in Greek, the Court held: ‘Having 
assumed responsibility for the provision of Greek-language primary schooling, the failure of the 
“TRNC” authorities to make continuing provision for it at the secondary-school level must be 
considered in effect to be a denial of the substance of the right at issue’.577 Moreover, unlike in 
many other cases, where language is taken into account in an instrumental way – that is, as a way 
to guarantee the effectiveness or meaningfulness of the right in question – in Cyprus v. Turkey 
the Court appears to take into account the applicants’ language wishes as such.578 The Court says 
for example: ‘The authorities must no doubt be aware that it is the wish of Greek-Cypriot parents 
that the schooling of their children be completed through the medium of the Greek language’.579  
The picture is however less bright when it comes to language-related claims under Article 
8 ECHR, alone or in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. These claims have most frequently 
come from minority applicants wishing to preserve the linguistic integrity of their names. 
Usually, the Court has dismissed this kind of claims without regard to the language aspect 
involved in the protection of names under Article 8 ECHR. Moreover, as regards the Article 14 
ECHR part of these claims, the Court has tended to apply a formal equality rationale: it has been 
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concerned with whether the rule or practice in question is applied identically to all rather than 
with its actual impact on members of certain linguistic groups.
580
  
One case in which the Court misses the language and equality aspects of Article 8 
ECHR/Article 14 ECHR claims is Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey.581 Kemal Taşkın 
concerned the refusal to register the applicants’ Kurdish names on the basis that the letters ‘q’, 
‘w’ and ‘x’ do not exist in the Turkish alphabet. In this Chapter, I wish to explore what group-
vulnerability reasoning can add to this type of cases. To this end, I engage in a rewriting exercise 
of the Kemal Taşkın judgment, showing how both the reasoning and the outcome of the case 
would have been different, had the Court incorporated vulnerable-group analysis.   
At first glance, the case is just about names and letters. A thorough examination reveals 
nonetheless the great complexity and substance that may lie behind symbols. Three characters 
and eight names can embody power and culture. This contention is far from being a novelty. Yet 
it is remarkable to see some of the fundamental challenges of diversity all at once in three letters. 
Private-public intersection and equality are only some of these challenges. It is hard to think of 
any other name case where the Strasbourg Court could have integrated a group-vulnerability-
sensitive perspective more naturally into its legal reasoning. Instead, the Court turned away from 
the real issues at stake and missed the chance to break new ground in its name case law.  
If I had to capture my argument in one sentence, I would say this Chapter seeks to make a 
case against the illegitimate and unjustified suppression of differences. The argument requires 
making visible what is ultimately at stake for members of language minorities. It further requires 
meaningfully scrutinizing States’ purposes behind name-related policies in search of any 
‘assimiliationist bias’.582 Albeit different, both routes cut in the same direction: they seek to 
protect what applicants regard as a symbol of their cultural background. One route entails 
recognizing the importance of applicants’ cultural symbols. The other involves unveiling 
unjustified attempts to suppress them.  
My full argument will come into view through five proposals. I suggest introducing two 
of them in the analysis under Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for private and family life) and 
the other two in the assessment under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), together 
with Article 8 ECHR. The last and fifth proposal cuts across both sets of analysis. My first 
suggestion seeks to bring the cultural dimension of language minorities’ names to the foreground 
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of Article 8 ECHR analysis.
583
 My second proposal, drawing on Kenji Yoshino’s work, 
emphasizes the need to reject attempts to turn the claim that a group can change a certain trait 
into the claim that it should do so without further investigating why.
584
 The third and fourth 
proposals aim to expose the possible discriminatory implications of official language policies for 
members of vulnerable linguistic groups in plurilingual societies. These proposals attempt to 
draw attention to a common misconception underlying governments’ arguments: the neutral and 
innocuous character of such policies. My last and crosscutting proposal highlights the need to 
pay greater attention to context and to the group vulnerability arising from past and continuing 
disadvantageous practices. I apply group vulnerability analysis to (i) bring to the fore the 
applicants’ historical disadvantage and (ii) to unmask and challenge the language privilege 
embedded in the law. 
In the following pages, I introduce and explain each of these elements and indicate why 
and how the Court should have integrated them into its analysis. First, I present the facts of the 
case, outline the Court’s judgment and situate the decision in the wider name case law. Then, I 
examine what a cultural inquiry in minority name cases may look like. I underscore the relevance 
of historical context in assessing the significance that name changes may have for members of 
non-dominant groups and in evaluating the reasons lying beneath States’ name policies. I next 
turn to the backdrop against which Kemal Taşkın should have been examined and, drawing on 
the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on ‘vulnerable groups’, argue for introducing 
group-vulnerability analysis into the case. I subsequently underline the impossibility of neutrality 
of State language choices and their disadvantageous effects on non-dominant linguistic groups. 
Finally, after offering some brief conclusions, I attempt to show through the redrafted judgment 
how my proposals may unfold in practice.  
 
I. Eight Applicants in Search of a Kurdish Name: The Arguments, the Judgment and 
the Case Law  
A. The Parties’ Arguments 
Following the lifting of legal naming restrictions in Turkey in 2003,
585
 eight Turkish nationals of 
Kurdish origin applied for registration of their Kurdish names containing the letters ‘q’, ‘w’ and 
‘x’. The applicants were known by these names in their inner circles but were officially 
registered under other names due to restrictions in force at the time of their birth. The 
applications were rejected on the ground that the letters in the names they requested did not exist 
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in the Turkish alphabet.
586
 Law 1353, adopted on 1 November 1928, requires the use of the 
Turkish alphabet in official documents. All applicants’ requests were therefore denied on this 
basis except for one of them, which was partly admitted. In this one case, domestic courts 
ordered the registration of the applicant’s name as ‘Baver’ instead of ‘Bawer’, as originally 
written in Kurdish. The Kurdish ‘w’ was thus replaced by what the Turkish authorities 
considered its closest phonetic equivalent in Turkish. Following the registration refusals, the 
applicants turned to the European Court alleging a violation of their right to respect for private 
life (Article 8 ECHR) and of the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of their affiliation to 
an ethnic minority (Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR). They argued that, 
whereas non-nationals and dual-nationals were able to register their names with characters 
inexistent in the Turkish alphabet, they, as nationals of Kurdish origin, were denied such a 
possibility. The applicants further claimed that the letters ‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘x’ were also used in 
commercial products.  
The Turkish government justified the restrictions on the applicants’ right to respect for 
private life on the grounds of order and defense of the rights of others through the establishment 
of an official language. According to the government, the obligation to transpose the names 
following the rules of the national alphabet did not constitute a failure to respect the applicants’ 
right to private life. In the government’s view, the inconvenience suffered by the applicants was 
not of sufficient importance, as they could have simply transposed their names using the letters 
of the national alphabet – i.e., ‘k’, ‘ks’ and ‘v’ – which, when pronounced, produce the same 
sounds as the letters ‘q’, ‘x’, and ‘w’, respectively. As for the alleged discrimination, the Turkish 
government said that the rule requiring names to be registered with the letters of the Turkish 
alphabet was applied to all citizens without distinction. All other signs foreign to Turkish, the 
government claimed, were similarly rejected.  
 
B. The Court’s Judgment 
 
The Court did not find a violation of Article 8 ECHR. The main reason was that, at the relevant 
time, the applicants did have the possibility of registering their Kurdish names provided that they 
did so in accordance with the Turkish alphabet. The Strasbourg Court pointed out that, thanks to 
the phonetic transcription, it was possible within the Turkish system to register names with 
letters whose exact written matches did not exist in the Turkish alphabet. Moreover, the Court 
remarked that there was no indication that the applicants’ names, if spelled with Turkish letters, 
would acquire a vulgar or ridiculous meaning, likely to cause them inconvenience in their social 
life or create any obstacle to their personal identification.  
The Court also rejected the alleged violation of Article 14 ECHR, coupled with Article 8 
ECHR. For the Court, nothing suggested that the Turkish authorities would have reached a 
different decision if the request to spell a name with letters non-existent in the Turkish alphabet 
came from non-Kurds. As for the inclusion in the civil registry of names of persons with civil 
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status documents issued by other States with characters absent in the Turkish alphabet, the Court 
held that this practice was based on an international convention aimed at introducing uniformity 
in the matter, which in itself could not be considered an unreasonable aim. Moreover, the Court 
was not sure whether the applicants, as individuals wishing to change their names, were in a 
situation analogous to that of those with civil documents issued by other States under their own 
rules.  
 
C. The Court’s (Minority) Name Case Law 
Disputes over names, the Court has time and again affirmed, fall within the scope of Article 8 
ECHR in relation to both ‘private life’ and ‘family life’.587 Not surprisingly, the applicability of 
this provision was not contested in Kemal Taşkın. The Court reaffirmed the principle that names, 
as means of personal identification and links to a family, concern private and family life.
588
 
Kemal Taşkın was however particularly challenging in that, like in other cases concerning the 
adaptation of names according to official language rules, name changes could not be dissociated 
from State language policies.
589
 In this respect, the Court’s established principle is that each 
Contracting Party is ‘at liberty to impose and regulate the use of its official language or 
languages in identity papers and other official documents’ on condition that the Convention 
rights are respected.
590
 Moreover, the margin of appreciation given to States in the area of 
recognition and regulation of names is particularly wide, as a range of historical, linguistic, 
religious and cultural factors in each of these countries influence the use of names.
591
  
II. A Rewriter in Search of the Real Issues and Reasons: Cultural Symbols and 
Assimilationist Bias (Article 8 ECHR)  
 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
The outcome in Kemal Taşkın does not come as a surprise. It is determined, in large part, by the 
wide margin of appreciation granted to States in the area. Even though Turkey has not signed the 
FCNM, one could still go as far as arguing that the European consensus on minority protection is 
substantial enough to call for narrowing States’ margin of appreciation. The Court has accepted 
in its wider case law the existence of an emerging international consensus amongst the Council 
of Europe’s Member States recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation to 
protect their security, identity and lifestyle.
592
 Reducing States’ discretion as a result of the 
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growing European consensus may sound desirable. However, the actual application of this line 
of reasoning remains unrealistic.
593
 What is more, although in the past the Court has referred to 
the FCNM in its minority-name case law even when respondent States have not signed or ratified 
it, the reference has been merely formal.
594
 The FCNM has become relevant in the Court’s actual 
legal reasoning when it has been ratified by the Respondent State.
595
 Where ratification has not 
taken place, the FCNM has tended to remain background information.
596
  
For these reasons, I do not challenge the margin of appreciation standard in the Court’s 
Article 8 ECHR name case law based on the consensus argument. My main disagreements in this 
first part lie with the Court’s application in Kemal Taşkın of an instrumentalist approach to 
names (names as means of personal identification)
597
 and with its disregard for 
historical/contextual elements in the proportionality analysis. Once the former is abandoned and 
the latter is embraced, it becomes clear that the implications for historically vulnerable minorities 
may be serious enough to amount to disproportionate interference with their private and family 
lives. Kemal Taşkın is not the first minority name case decided by the European Court.598 It is, 
however, one of the cases that has most clearly offered strong contextual elements to push for 
reconsideration of the Court’s approach toward ethno-linguistic minorities in its name case law. 
The judgment itself offers enough background information attesting to the historical 
vulnerability of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and casting doubts on the motivations underlying 
the restriction. For the same reasons, Kemal Taşkın made a strong case for broadening the 
analytical scheme applied in the name case law so as to expressly include cultural concerns 
alongside others like personal identity and practical ones.  
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B. What’s at Stake in a Minority Member’s Name?    
At the heart of the applicants’ complaints lies an attempt to maintain what they see as a symbol 
of their cultural background. The linguistic and cultural attachment to their names is clear from 
both the applicants’ arguments and the historical context of the case. All of the applicants were 
originally registered under other names due to restrictions in force at the time of their birth. All 
of them requested the registration of their Kurdish names as soon as such restrictions were lifted. 
One of them, Doğan Genç, claimed that keeping his Kurdish name ‘Ciwan’ as originally spelled 
would enable him to better affirm himself. The Court, however, fails to see that the impact of the 
restrictive measures goes beyond any practical difficulties, ridicule, or personal identification 
problems. Indeed, for the Court, the applicants did not demonstrate that their Kurdish names, if 
spelled according to the Turkish alphabet, would take a vulgar or ridiculous meaning likely to 
cause them inconveniences in their social life or to create personal identification obstacles. By 
focusing on questions that are simply not relevant in Kemal Taşkın, the Court turns away from 
what is fundamentally at stake in the case.   
Kemal Taşkın seems to pose what Yofi Tirosh calls ‘legal challenges to the functionalist 
approach to names’.599 In a study of the European Court’s name case law, Tirosh explains how 
applicants’ more complex narratives are forced to fit into ‘the available categories of legal 
reasoning’.600 The author argues that, when ‘the narrative does not fit, the Applicant loses’.601 
My sense is that this is exactly what happened in Kemal Taşkın. The framework applied by the 
Court in this case did not recognize the applicants’ cultural attachment to their Kurdish-spelled 
names. The Court’s fault thus lies with the application of an inadequate analytical scheme – that 
is to say, of an instrumentalist approach – to a more complex reality.602 Perhaps, had the Court 
realized what was really at stake for the applicants, it would have searched for alternative 
frameworks capable of addressing the core of the problem more adequately. Various cases in the 
Court’s wider name jurisprudence show that a more complex framework is possible. In some 
instances, the Court has assessed applicants’ personal attachment to a name.603 In others, it has 
even shown itself sensitive to the name’s affective dimension.604 Minorities’ linguistic or cultural 
attachment to their names remains however, for the most part, unaddressed in the Court’s case 
law.
605
 At times, the Court simply overlooks the fact that applicants belong to a minority even 
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though their claims are explicitly framed in those terms.
606
 At others, the Court acknowledges 
this factor without however attaching any weight to it.
607
  
Kemal Taşkın should thus serve to show that, where names are viewed by the applicants 
as indicators of their links with a certain ethno-linguistic community or as symbols of their 
cultural background, the focus of the analysis should shift from names as mere means of personal 
identification to names as symbols of one’s ties to a linguistic/cultural community or as carriers 
of cultural meaning.
608
 The crucial questions should revolve around whether the disputed 
measures impair or diminish applicants’ ability to maintain what they claim to be an aspect of 
their culture and to lead their private and family lives in accordance with that cultural 
tradition.
609
 From this perspective, and especially in view of disadvantageous circumstances like 
the ones faced by the Kurdish applicants in the past, the symbolic value of respecting the original 
spelling of ethnic minorities’ names may take particular significance.  
The redrafted judgment intends to address this first concern by acknowledging the 
importance of what was truly at stake for the applicants, by bringing the cultural dimension of 
the name to the fore of Article 8 ECHR analysis,
610
 and by weighing it heavily in the balance in 
view of the historical disadvantage suffered by the Kurdish minority in Turkey (see paragraphs 
71.1, 71.2, 72 and 73 of the redraft). I try to show that spelling changes in applicants’ names – 
even though the modifications are minimal and even though the names retain their original 
pronunciation – may still be of such significance so as to affect cultural aspects of members of 
non-dominant groups. Keeping the original spelling may have a strong symbolic value for 
members of groups showing historical vulnerability, as I attempt to show in greater detail in the 
second part of this Chapter.  
 
C. What’s behind the Demand to Fit? 
 
In Kemal Taşkın, the Court does not only overlook what is really at stake for the applicants. It 
also stops short of inquiring into the government’s reasons for demanding the changes in their 
Kurdish names. True, except for two of the applicants, the rest did not react to the Turkish 
government’s argument that the obligation to transpose their names according to the rules of the 
national alphabet would not constitute an inconvenience of sufficient importance, as certain 
letters of the Turkish alphabet produce the same sounds as the Kurdish letters ‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘x’. At 
first glance, one may be under the impression that this was the reason behind the Court’s 
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reluctance to conduct any further inquiry: most applicants did not dispute the government’s 
argument explicitly.  
A closer look at the Court’s judgment reveals, nonetheless, that this first impression may 
not be completely right. First, two of the applicants did explain why they did not want to pursue 
the path suggested by the government. The first of them alleged that the new version of his name 
would take the meaning of ‘appointment’ or ‘assembly’. The other applicant argued that his 
name, if spelled according to the Turkish alphabet, would be meaningless in Kurdish. Both of 
them mentioned the difficulties that the change would represent in their relations with other 
members of their group. In my view, the arguments of these two applicants gave the Court 
enough elements to engage in a more serious or substantive inquiry into the government’s 
motives to demand the changes in the written versions of the applicants’ names.  
Second, and applicants’ arguments aside, what ultimately seemed to stop the Court from 
going any further was the implicit confirmation of an idea embedded in the government’s 
argument: the fact that applicants can change their names may suffice to justify the demand for 
change. American scholar, Kenji Yoshino, has identified different kinds of what he calls 
‘assimilationist bias’ in the ‘immutability’ and ‘visibility’ factors in US equal protection 
jurisprudence.
611
 One of these biases, he claims, is ‘converting’, which in essence means asking 
members of a group to change defining traits.
612
 ‘The immutability and visibility factors’, 
Yoshino explains, ‘presume that legislation is less problematic if it burdens groups that can 
assimilate into mainstream society...’613 As a result, courts are ‘more likely to withhold 
heightened scrutiny from groups that can change or conceal their defining trait’.614 Yoshino 
argues that groups’ ability to assimilate should not stop courts from exploring the reasons behind 
demands to assimilate.
615
 His main concern thus seems to be with ‘state-sponsored assimilation 
that fails adequately to question whether the assimilation in question is appropriate’.616 Although 
the possible ‘assimilationist bias’ in Kemal Taşkın may take a form different from the ones 
identified by Yoshino in the US equal protection context, it embeds a similar idea: those who can 
change may be required to do so without further questioning why they should do it. In order to 
avoid turning the ‘descriptive claim’ that applicants can assimilate into the ‘normative claim’ 
that they must do so, the Court should insist on asking why change is demanded.
617
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What is more, the historical context of Kemal Taşkın should have been enough to alert 
the Court of the need to take its inquiry further. A contextual analysis would have soon brought 
out a series of elements calling into question the credibility and relevance of the justification put 
forward by the government. In some cases, a contextual evaluation of the reasons given by a 
State to support its demand to conform may prove crucial to unveil any undue assimilationist 
attempt implicit in State naming policies affecting cultural or linguistic minorities. As various 
authors show, assimilation or repression of minority groups’ cultural identity may sometimes 
underlie State name practices in multi-ethnic societies.
618
 Teresa Scassa, for example, maintains: 
‘Because names can reflect ethnic identity, governments reacting to ethnic minorities within their 
territory have often struck at names as a means of either heightening the stigma attached to the 
ethnic group or as a means of assimilation’.619 In turn, in a study of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ name case law, Aeyal Gross shows how names regarded by the State as 
‘divergent’ may be common among members of ethnic or linguistic minority groups.620  Barring 
these names, he argues, ‘may be a tool for the repression of cultural identity or reflect an attempt 
to maintain the hegemony of a certain culture in the face of the changing ethnic composition of a 
society’.621  
In the rewritten judgment, I attempt to address this second concern by paying attention to 
context and by meaningfully inquiring into the government’s reasons for its restriction (see 
paragraph 72 of the redraft). Thus, in the justification analysis, I look at the context within which 
the challenged measure was applied, weighing up a mix of elements taken from the background 
information offered by the judgment itself, from the applicants’ submissions not disputed by the 
government and from documents prepared by international organizations.  
 
III. A Rewriter in Exploration of Crosscutting Paths: Context and Group Vulnerability  
Kemal Taşkın begs for the examination of a crucial contextual factor: historical vulnerability 
affecting a particular group. The judgment itself contains sufficient elements to undertake a 
contextual approach and get a fuller understanding of the impact of the disputed measure on the 
applicants as nationals of Kurdish origin. For example, under ‘Relevant Domestic Law and 
Practice’, the Court includes legal background information, which clearly shows the restrictive 
character of the government’s practices toward Kurdish names in the past.622 Nevertheless, the 
Court does not attach any consequences to this contextual factor in the analysis of the merits.
623
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The long ban on Kurdish names is a key contextual element, which shows that the restriction in 
question touches upon an area in which nationals of Kurdish origin have suffered significant 
disadvantage in the past as a consequence of the government’s restrictive laws and practices. 
A look at international organizations’ resolutions and reports, including those issued by 
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly,
624
 the European Commission
625
 and the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,
626
 clearly point to the vulnerable position 
of the Kurds as a result of historically disadvantageous laws and practices aimed at suppressing 
the expression of aspects of their culture. International non-governmental organizations have 
raised similar concerns.
627
  
Based on these reports and on the background information included in the Court’s 
judgment, I therefore suggest to (1) take into account the broader context of disadvantage 
affecting the Kurds in Turkey; (2) explore the links between their historical disadvantage and 
their present vulnerability; and (3) underscore the particularly harmful effects that the disputed 
restriction may have on the applicants given their vulnerable status. My analysis draws on the 
European Court of Human Rights’ case law on ‘vulnerable groups’, which, I must admit, has 
taken clearer shape in the months following the Kemal Taşkın judgment.  
All the factors arising from the background of Kemal Taşkın point to the harm of 
misrecognition: the Kurds in Turkey have historically been rendered ‘inferior, excluded, wholly 
other, or simply invisible’, to borrow Nancy Fraser’s language.628 Indeed, the international 
documents referred to above show that the group has been historically harmed by both 
stereotyping and repeated suppression of aspects of their linguistic and cultural traditions. More 
specifically at issue in the concrete case of Kemal Taşkın is the kind of group vulnerability 
present in Chapman: minority status and a framework designed only with the (in this case 
language) concerns of the dominant group in mind. In fact, as I will show in Part IV, Kemal 
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Taşkın concerns the type of discrimination that operates to assimilate the group in question into 
the dominant mold, thereby rendering it invisible.  
As shown in Chapter I, one of the fundamental consequences that group-vulnerability 
reasoning has carried in the Court’s case law is the narrowing of States’ margin of appreciation 
when it comes to restrictions or differentiations affecting vulnerable groups.
629
 The re-written 
judgment could thus call for a narrower margin of appreciation with the argument that the 
interference in question affects a particularly vulnerable group: the Kurds in Turkey. This 
approach would make particular sense in the discrimination analysis: the history of 
discrimination experienced by certain groups usually makes the differentiation in question 
suspect. Another approach – reflected in Yordanova v. Bulgaria and described in detail in Part 
III.B of Chapter I – consists in simply including group vulnerability as an element of 
considerable weight in the proportionality analysis. In the redraft, I opt for this second approach 
not because I do not find the first one (narrowing the margin of appreciation) sensible but 
because the second remains largely unexplored.
630
 I thus include context and group vulnerability 
in the proportionality assessment under Article 14 ECHR, in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR – 
more precisely in the examination of the particularly harmful implications the differential 
treatment may have on the applicants (see paragraph 86 of the redraft) and under Article 8 ECHR 
alone – particularly in the assessment of the symbolic value that preserving the original written 
name may have for the applicants (see paragraphs 71.1 and 71.2 of the redraft).   
 
IV. A Rewriter in Pursuit of Substantive Equality (Articles 14 and 8 ECHR) 
The choice of an official language, as several authors argue, is not a neutral choice.
631
 In contexts 
of linguistic plurality, such a decision may favor some and disfavor others.
632
  
As Fernand de Varennes points out: 
One of the most frequent misconceptions involving non-discrimination is the belief that a state 
measure imposing a single language for all signifies that everyone is treated the same and that 
therefore no differentiation is made between individuals.
633
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This misconception is implicit in the Turkish government’s argument in Kemal Taşkın. The 
government claimed that, in applying the rule requiring names to be spelled according to the 
Turkish alphabet to all citizens without distinction, it was treating everyone equally.
634
 In reality, 
however, the identical application of the rule forced only non-dominant linguistic groups (like 
those of Kurdish origin) to use in their names letters of an alphabet that is not theirs while 
allowing the Turkish majority to keep their names’ spelling in accordance with the letters of their 
own. This is not the first time a government claims to be applying its name-related policies to 
everyone equally when in effect it is not.
635
 In Kemal Taşkın, the Court responded to this sort of 
claim by noting that there was no indication that the Turkish authorities would have reached a 
different decision had the requests to spell names with letters absent in the Turkish alphabet 
come from non-Kurds.
636
 The Court, however, fails to ask why non-Kurds like the Turkish 
majority members would actually request to register names with letters that do not exist in 
Turkish. The fact that the Turkish majority will hardly suffer from this problem is a factor that 
illustrates how Turkey’s language policy privileges the majority’s concerns in the norm while 
disregarding those of the Kurds (see paragraph 82 of the redraft).  
A State’s choice of a particular language does, then, involve a distinction on the basis of 
language.
637
 The first stage is, therefore, confronting the fact that language choices inevitably 
involve favoring some over others in several respects.
638
 This, of course, does not mean that any 
language-based distinction is discriminatory.
639
 It will only be so if it is not objectively and 
reasonably justified. The next and closely interconnected stage is acknowledging the negative 
implications language policies may carry for linguistic minorities in practice. One central 
question that substantive equality asks is ‘whether the effect of the law is to perpetuate 
disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion, or oppression’.640 As highlighted in Chapter I, among 
the several dimensions of substantive equality, Sandra Fredman identifies one that emphasizes 
the need to remove the detrimental consequences attached to differences rather than differences 
themselves.
641
 Substantive equality, as she puts it, ‘does not therefore aim to treat all individuals 
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identically, but to affirm and accommodate differences’.642 The Court’s Grand Chamber has 
embraced this rationale in the case of Thlimmenos v. Greece by requiring that different situations 
be treated differently, unless there are objective and reasonable justifications for not doing so.
643
   
I attempt to introduce all these concerns in the redrafted judgment in the analysis under 
Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR (see paragraphs 81 through 87 of the 
redraft). In my view, one set of comparison arising from Kemal Taşkın – besides the one between 
nationals of Kurdish origin and non-nationals/dual nationals brought up by the applicants – 
concerns Turkish-speaking-majority nationals and Kurdish-speaking-minority nationals. In all 
fairness to the Court, I must make clear that the applicants did not complain of the difference in 
treatment with regard to the Turkish-speaking majority. In a sense, then, the Court cannot be 
blamed for not having addressed this concern. Still, I include such alternative reasoning in the 
redraft, driven largely by a need to address what seems to be a recurrent and misconceived 
argument of respondent governments, including Turkey in Kemal Taşkın. Most fundamentally, I 
include this alternative reasoning to show how group vulnerability may simultaneously serve to 
scrutinize both the disadvantage of some (Kurdish-speaking minority) and the advantage of 
others (Turkish-speaking minority) granted by the law. In this alternative reasoning in the 
redraft, I wish to flag this sort of argument and encourage the Court to confront it in its future 
case law. I leave out of my rewritten judgment the analysis of the alleged discrimination with 
respect to non-nationals/dual nationals, as this would have meant addressing a whole array of 
issues diverging from the primary concern and focus of this Chapter. The analysis would have 
most likely revolved around the interpretation of a convention of a technical nature
644
 and the 
subsequent comparability of the applicants’ situation with that of non-nationals and dual-
nationals. 
In my redraft, therefore, I first try to show that the government is in fact treating its 
nationals of Kurdish origin differently from its Turkish majority on the basis of language (see 
paragraphs 81 and 82 of the redraft). I then find the distinction unjustified (see paragraphs 84, 85 
and 86 of the redraft). For the reasons indicated in the previous part, I do not propose to narrow 
the margin of appreciation usually left to States in this area. This does not mean that I do not find 
this approach sensible. I believe that notwithstanding the Court’s considerable deference toward 
States’ language policy choices – in particular, toward those related to ‘official language’ 
designations
645
  – an argument can be made against this wide margin of appreciation in cases 
where vulnerable groups that have known historical disadvantage are particularly affected by a 
certain language policy. Name policies and official language choices may generally attract a 
wide margin of appreciation, but when a discrimination claim is at issue there may be additional 
elements justifying a narrowing of this margin, such as group vulnerability. Indeed, historical 
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disadvantage and discrimination explains why the Court should apply stricter scrutiny than what 
would be the case under a wide margin of appreciation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The concerns of vulnerable language minority applicants rarely surface the Court’s reasoning in 
its name case law. In this regard, the Kemal Taşkın judgment is no exception; the Court 
overlooks what is truly at issue for the Kurdish applicants and shows nearly complete disregard 
for their concerns when balancing the competing interests. In this Chapter, I have offered various 
proposals, including adding a group-vulnerability perspective to the Court’s analysis in its name 
jurisprudence. None of these proposals offers a drastic departure from fundamental principles of 
the Court’s case law. On the contrary, some of the suggested ways in which the Court could take 
vulnerable groups more seriously draw on its own jurisprudence. The Court’s case law already 
offers several analytical tools capable of ensuring that the concerns of members of these groups 
are taken into account more adequately. The rewritten judgment is an attempt to bring some of 
them together and put them into practice. The proportionality analysis – under both Article 8 
ECHR alone and Articles 14 and 8 ECHR together – is where most of my proposals play out.  
In addition, I have sought to expose and challenge the inadequate conceptual frameworks 
and problematic assumptions underwriting the Court’s reasoning in Kemal Taşkın and its 
minority name case law more broadly. Kemal Taşkın is possibly one of the best examples 
attesting to the inadequacy of a model to address the complexity posed by minority members’ 
name claims. The alternative model I have proposed seeks to add a cultural dimension of names 
to the existing framework. I believe that this expanded conceptual scheme, along with a greater 
commitment to substantive equality, holds potential to discern unjustified suppression of 
differences. Eliminating differences instead of the disadvantageous treatment attached to them is 
not what real equality is about.
646
 The rewritten judgment that follows is a call for not making 
conformity ‘a price for equal treatment’.647  
 
V. Rewriting Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey648 
 
Passages in regular black font: original judgment  
Passages in bold: redrafted judgment  
Passages in strike through: deleted from the original judgment  
 
(...) 
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ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 
(...) 
2. Did the interference pursue a ‘legitimate aim’? 
(...) 
 55. [Fragment deleted]. According to the government, considering the important role of the 
State’s official language, the impugned interference primarily pursued the legitimate aims of 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others and the protection of order. 
(...) 
 57. [Fragment deleted] The Court considers that the interest of each State in ensuring that its 
own institutional system functions normally is incontestably legitimate (Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 
46726/99, § 34, ECHR 2002-II). It has already held that most Contracting States have chosen to 
grant one or more languages the status of official language or State language and that they have 
recognized them as such in their constitutions (Mentzen, supra). The same holds for the choice of 
a national alphabet. This is a choice of the national legislature, linked to historical and political 
considerations that are particular to the State in question (Baylac-Ferrer and Suarez, decision 
cited above). 
 58. In the decision Mentzen or Mencena v. Latvia (no. 71074/01, 7 December 2004) the 
Court has held that a language ‘is not in any sense an abstract value. It cannot be divorced 
from the way it is actually used by its speakers. Consequently, by making a language its 
official language, the State undertakes in principle to guarantee its citizens the right to use 
that language both to impart and to receive information, without hindrance not only in 
their private lives, but also in their dealings with the public authorities. In the Court’s 
view, it is first and foremost from this perspective that measures intended to protect a given 
language must be considered’ (see also, Bulgakov v. Ukraine, no. 59894/00, 11 September 
2007, § 43 b). In other words, the Court considers that, implicit in the notion of an official 
language is the existence of certain subjective rights for the speakers of that language (see, 
Kuharec alias Kuhareca v. Latvia, no. 71557/01, 7 December 2004, p. 16). Thus, in the 
majority of cases, it may be accepted that a measure intended to protect and promote a 
national language corresponds to the protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’, 
within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (see, Bulgakov v. Ukraine, no. 
59894/00, 11 September 2007, § 43 b).  
 58. 59. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the interference in question had as objectives 
the defence of order and the protection of the rights of others.  
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3. Was the interference ‘necessary in a democratic society’?  
(...) 
 62. For the government, the obligation to transpose the names according to the rules of the 
national alphabet does not constitute a failure to respect the applicants' right to private life given 
that the inconvenience suffered by them would not be of sufficient importance. In addition, it 
argues that certain letters of the Turkish alphabet, i.e., ‘k’, ‘ks’ and ‘v’, when pronounced, 
produce the same sounds as the letters ‘q’, ‘x’ and ‘w’, respectively. In particular, citing the 
example of Mr Sünbül, who was able to register the name he asked to use – ‘Bawer’, spelled 
with a ‘v’ instead of a ‘w’, in accordance with the national alphabet – [the government] considers 
that the applicants could have transposed their names without any problem with the letters of the 
national alphabet. 
 63. The applicants Mr Taşkın, Mr Alpkaya and Mr Fırat did not submit observations on this 
point within due time. As for Mr Anğ, Mr Şimşek and Mr Sünbül, they submitted no argument 
about any inconvenience eventually suffered as a result of the refusal at issue (compare with 
Daniela Fornaciarini, Claudio Gianettoni and Francesco Fornaciarini v. Switzerland, n
o
 
22940/93, Commission’s Decision of 12 April 1996). 
 64. In what concerns Mr Genç and Mr Yöyler, they do not really contest the government's 
assertion that the Kurdish names can be written with the letters of the Turkish alphabet. 
However, they argue that this practice distorts the meaning of their names. For example, Mr 
Genç explains that the name ‘Ciwan’, which in Kurdish means ‘beautiful and young’, when 
transcribed into ‘Civan’ without using the ‘w’, takes the meaning of ‘appointment’ or ‘meeting’. 
Similarly, Mr. Yöyler argues that, when the name ‘Xweşbin’ (‘optimistic’ in Kurdish) is spelled 
with the letters of the Turkish alphabet as ‘Heşbin’, it becomes a term with no precise meaning in 
Kurdish.  
 65. Mr Genç also emphasizes that, as a human rights activist, he is in permanent contact with 
people of Kurdish origin, who would reproach him, as a result of his Turkish-like name, for not 
being a proper Kurd. Mr Yöyler presents similar arguments. According to him, the refusal to 
register his name in Kurdish is an unjustified interference with his cultural and ethnic identity. 
This restriction, which requires him to use a name of Arabic origin, ‘Celalettin’, would aim to 
create an obstacle in establishing relations with other Kurdish groups. He refers to the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the area of personal autonomy and affirms that the Kurdish language should 
benefit from increased protection.  
 66. Insofar as Mr Genç and Mr Yöyler allege that the refusal in question constitutes an 
unjustified interference with their ethnic identity, [fragment deleted] the Court cannot overlook 
the fact that the use of Kurdish names has long been banned in Turkey. In such 
circumstances, the identity concerns of people, whose right to respect for private life has 
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been restricted, are the more relevant and their sensitivities particularly important.
649
 In 
view of the historical context, the inconvenience caused by the refusal to use the Kurdish 
characters in the applicants’ names can be said to be real and relevant.650   
 67. [Fragment deleted] The Court observes that, as illustrated in the case of Mr Sünbül where 
the ‘w’ has been replaced by a ‘v’, in the Turkish system it is possible to proceed, thanks to the 
phonetic transcription, to the inscription in the civil registry of names containing sounds, whose 
exact match does not exist in the Turkish alphabet (for other examples, see paragraph 30 above). 
The applicants do not contest this thesis. The Court then accepts that the applicants’ 
Kurdish names, if spelled with the best matching script of the Turkish alphabet, will not 
lose their phonetic value. The Court notes however that the applicants did not want to 
pursue this route. One of them, Mr Sünbül, – whose name was registered as ‘Baver’ instead 
of ‘Bawer’ – appealed the decision. Two others, Mr Genç and Mr Yöyler, raised cultural 
concerns in an attempt to explain why they did not choose that path. The question is, 
therefore, whether the mere alteration to the original written version of the applicants’ 
names – which would apparently not alter the original oral form – is per se sufficient to 
cause them identification difficulties or acquire a meaning likely to cause them 
inconvenience in their social relations. 
(...) 
[Paragraph 69 deleted]  
69. The Court will first address Mr Genç’s complaint. According to the applicant, his name 
‘Ciwan’, which in Kurdish means ‘beautiful and young’, when transcribed into ‘Civan’ 
without using the ‘w’, takes the meaning of ‘appointment’ or ‘meeting’. The government 
did not dispute this. The Court then concludes that Mr Genç’s name, if spelled with the 
letters of the Turkish alphabet, would have a ridiculous meaning likely to cause him an 
inconvenience of sufficient importance in his social life. As for the other applicants, they 
have not demonstrated that the written modification of their names would represent either 
an obstacle to their personal identification or a basis for ridicule.  
(...)
651
 
 71.1. Nevertheless, names do not only have an instrumental character but also an 
affective and cultural dimension.
652
 They may reflect a person’s specific linguistic and 
ethnic background
653
 and may thus be essential to lead her private and family life in 
                                                          
649
 This part draws on Judge András Sajó’s concurring opinion in Kemal Taşkın, p. 21. 
650
 This part draws on ibid. p. 22.  
651
 Paragraph 70 and 71 are unchanged. 
652
 Ringelheim, Julie, DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME: LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS PAR LA 
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Bruylant, 2006) at 192. 
653
 Scassa, Teresa, ‘National Identity, Ethnic Surnames and the State’, 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 
(1996) at 167.   
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accordance with such background. Therefore, the additional question the Court faces in 
this particular case is whether the changes in the graphical representation of the bearers’ 
names may be said to be of such importance so as to affect what the applicants claim to be 
their ethnic and cultural identity. From this perspective, the Court cannot deny the strong 
symbolic value that keeping the original written version of a name may have for members 
of a non-dominant group willing to express their linguistic affiliation and maintain their 
cultural heritage, especially when, according to numerous international organizations’ 
resolutions and reports, such a group’s cultural expression has suffered from past 
disadvantage as a consequence of the government’s restrictive practices.  
 71.2. While the requirement to spell names in accordance with the Turkish alphabet 
enables people with a command of Turkish to pronounce the names concerned correctly 
and to include it effortlessly in phrases of everyday language, it inevitably entails an 
alteration to the names’ written form (see, Mentzen or Mencena v. Latvia, no. 71074/01, 7 
December 2004). On one side of the balance are then the rights of others – the majority of 
the population – to understand and use the official language correctly and without 
difficulties. This is reflected in the need to bring the written form of a name in line with its 
pronunciation in the official language. On the other side, are the rights of the applicants for 
whom, as members of a vulnerable group that have suffered considerable disadvantage in 
the past (see, mutatis mutandis, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, 
13 November 2007, § 182; Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, no. 38832/06, 20 May 2010, § 42 and 
Kiyutin v. Russia, no. 2700/10, 10 March 2011, § 63), keeping the original Kurdish spelling 
may be all the more relevant in the preservation of what they regard as symbols of their 
cultural and linguistic tradition. With this in mind, the Court will examine whether the 
official language and order considerations relied on by the government can be said to 
outweigh the cultural concerns claimed by members of a vulnerable group under Article 8 
of the Convention.  
[Paragraph 72 deleted]  
 72. The Court first notes that the main reason offered by the government for demanding 
the alteration of the applicants’ names is the possibility of changing their original spellings 
without major inconvenience. In this regard, the Court believes that the fact that 
applicants can easily change or adapt their names does not automatically mean that they 
should do so. The Court needs to further inquire into the motivation or rationale behind 
the government’s demand to change. The government has articulated none apart from the 
mere formal and general invocation of the protection of order and the rights of others 
through its official language. What is more, several contextual elements arising from both 
the facts of the case and international organizations’ resolutions/reports point to past and 
continuing discriminatory practices in the use of Kurdish names in Turkey. Unlike the 
Latvian government in Mentzen or Mencena and Kuharec alias Kuhareca, the Turkish 
government has not contended that spelling the applicants’ names with the Kurdish letters 
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would have any negative consequences in the preservation of the Turkish language. In 
addition, the Court attaches particular importance to the fact that the use of the letters ‘q’, 
‘w’ and ‘x’ cannot be regarded as exactly ‘new’ in Turkey (see, mutatis mutandis Johansson 
v. Finland, no. 10163/02, 6 September 2007, § 38). They are in fact used by the government 
itself (Ministries’ Websites), by commercial products (see paragraph 34 of original 
judgment) whose presence is more visible in everyday life and, lastly, by dual and non-
nationals who are allowed to keep their original written forms of their names even if they 
include unavailable letters. While it is true that the latter group is permitted such 
registration on different grounds based on an international convention, the example 
nonetheless serves, along with the others, to weaken the government’s thesis that accepting 
the Kurdish letters will undermine the official language. With respect to the protection of 
order, the examples further serve to show that there is de facto no practical unfeasibility 
likely to disrupt such order. Under these circumstances, any prejudice caused by the 
Kurdish letters in the applicants’ names to the Turkish language or order cannot be said of 
sufficient significance to outweigh the cultural concerns of members of a group whose 
names had been banned in the past and for whom keeping the original spelling may have a 
strong symbolic value. 
 73. In the Court's view, the official language and order considerations relied on by the 
government cannot outweigh the interests claimed by the applicants under Article 8 of the 
Convention. A fair balance has therefore not been struck. There has thus been a violation 
of Article 8.  
 
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION 
WITH ARTICLE 8  
 
 73. 74. The applicants also contend that the refusal violated Article 14 of the Convention, 
combined with Article 8. [Fragment deleted].  
 74. 75. The Government contests this thesis. The rule questioned by the applicants applies to 
all citizens without distinction. According to the Government, all other signs and written 
characters foreign to the Turkish language are similarly refused. 
(...)  
 78. [Fragments deleted] The Court recalls [fragment deleted] that, in its decision Baylac-
Ferrer and Suarez (cited above), it has regarded as objective and reasonable a justification based 
on the linguistic unity in the relations with the administration and public services.
 
 
(...)  
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 Nationals belonging to the Turkish-speaking majority and Nationals of Kurdish Origin 
1. Whether there was a difference in treatment  
 81. The Turkish government contends that the rule questioned by the applicants apply 
to all citizens without distinction. The Court observes, however, that the rule requiring all 
names to be registered according to the Turkish alphabet in practice affect a segment of the 
national population (in this case those of Kurdish origin) differently from the Turkish-
speaking majority. The latter is not forced to take letters of an alien alphabet but allowed 
to spell their names with the letters of their own, i.e., the Turkish alphabet. At the same 
time, and unlike the majority of their co-nationals, citizens of Kurdish origin – whose 
alphabet contains the letters ‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘x’ and whose names are more likely to include 
these letters as a consequence – are the ones forced to either have their names spelled with 
characters of an alphabet other than their own or choose from a narrower set options i.e., 
from a group of Kurdish names not containing the officially unavailable letters. The latter 
was not however an option to the applicants who have already been known in their inner 
circles by their Kurdish names containing those letters.  
 82. In sum, the disputed rule does not proscribe Kurdish names or letters. Nor does it 
stipulate, in itself, different consequences for the nationals of Kurdish origin. The 
differentiation lies in the failure to make a distinction for nationals of Kurdish origin. As 
for the Turkish government’s argument that all other signs and written characters foreign 
to the Turkish language are similarly refused, the Court would like to add that the chance 
that members of the dominant linguistic group (Turkish-speaking majority) will request 
the registration of names containing letters foreign to their own Turkish alphabet seems 
rather slim. Therefore, requests for registration of names with non-Turkish characters 
from members of the majority-speaking language are much less likely than requests from 
members of non-dominant linguistic groups whose names are more likely to contain letters 
inexistent in the Turkish alphabet.  
 83. The Court thus concludes that dissimilar treatment on the grounds of language exists 
in this case. But, since not all differentiations are necessarily discriminatory, the Court will 
now turn to the examination of whether the distinction at issue has in this case an objective 
and reasonable justification. 
2. Whether the difference in treatment had an objective and reasonable justification 
 84. The Court has said that the right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of 
the rights guaranteed under the Convention is not only violated when States treat 
differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable 
justification but also when States, without an objective and reasonable justification, fail to 
treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different (see, Thlimmenos v. 
Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, 6 April 2000, § 44). The Court will therefore examine whether 
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the failure to treat the applicants differently pursued a legitimate aim. If it did, the Court 
will have to examine whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.  
 85. The Court recalls that, in its decision Baylac-Ferrer and Suarez (cited above), it 
regarded a justification based on the linguistic unity in the relations with the 
administration and public services as reasonable and objective. In the present case, 
however, such a basis cannot provide similarly valid justification. On the one hand, 
evidence shows that non-Turkish letters are already used by the government itself 
(Ministries’ websites),654 by commercial products and by non-nationals who are allowed to 
register their names as originally spelled even if they include unavailable letters. The 
example of the latter – even though they may not be in a comparable situation – serves 
however to show, along with the other instances, that letters foreign to the Turkish 
alphabet are already available and used in the Turkish administration and public life. 
Furthermore, the examples serve to indicate that there is de facto no impediment to 
incorporate the applicants’ names’ letters.   
 86. On the other hand, the Court notes that the restriction may have particularly 
harmful effects on the applicants. In fact, although the case at issue concerns the individual 
situation of the applicants, the Court cannot ignore that they are members of a non-
dominant group who have become particularly vulnerable as a result of disadvantage and 
discrimination in the past (see, mutatis mutandis, D.H., Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin cited above). 
Numerous organizations and institutions, including the Council of Europe, the European 
Commission and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, have 
consistently reported past restrictive and discriminatory measures against the Kurdish 
population, as a consequence of which they have become a particularly vulnerable group in 
Turkey. Furthermore, the areas in which nationals of Kurdish origin have been historically 
disadvantaged include precisely those of concern in the present case. The bans on Kurdish 
names, which had been in place for decades in Turkey, is exactly one example of such 
disadvantageous practices (see, paragraphs 66 and 70 above). In view of this past 
disadvantage and of the group’s subsequent vulnerability to further discriminatory harms, 
it thus seems reasonable to assume that the differential treatment to which they have been 
subjected has had particularly severe impact on the applicants.  
 87. For the reasons given above, the Court finds that the failure to treat different 
situations differently was not reasonably justified in the circumstances of this case. There 
                                                          
654
 See also, Report of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the 
Council of Europe, 17 March 2004, para. 243. The report highlights that the ‘w’ must feature on the keyboards of 
Turkish computers to access the Internet and hopes the government will show some flexibility when registering 
names containing letters not available in Turkish.   
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has thus been a violation of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 8, with respect to the 
Turkish-speaking majority.  
 
*  *  *  
 
 
In the past decade, group vulnerability has emerged as a promising concept in the construction of 
a more inclusive human rights subject in Strasbourg. Yet the concept has largely bypassed 
religious and cultural groups. In this Part, I have argued that group vulnerability holds out the 
promise to push the Court away from the formal conception of equality it is still stuck with in 
some areas of its cultural and religious diversity case law towards a more substantive notion of 
equality. I have illustrated how this promise may be fulfilled in practice in the context of a 
minority language claim.  
The vulnerable-group concept, however, needs to be deployed reflectively if it is to retain 
its full potential. Thus, group vulnerability should not only investigate the disadvantage part 
(who has been rendered more vulnerable and why) but also the advantage part (who has been 
rendered less vulnerable and why). Moreover, and in order to avoid further stigmatization of 
members of particularly vulnerable groups, the concept should (i) recognize the heightened or 
particular character of vulnerability of certain groups while acknowledging the lessened and also 
particular character vulnerability of other groups and (ii) demonstrate why certain factors make 
the particular individual more vulnerable or why s/he should be considered and treated as a 
vulnerable member of that group in the particular case. The first part of this second inquiry seeks 
to avoid positing some groups as the archetypal and only vulnerable groups. The second part 
aims to avoid obscuring the agency of members of particularly vulnerable groups and their 
sources of resilience in the face of vulnerabilities. 
In closing Part I, I want to offer a scheme of what the overall group vulnerability inquiry 
may look like.  
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VULNERABILITY INQUIRY 
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PART II 
OPENING UP THE ECHR RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL SUBJECT 
 
 
Anyone who deviates from the official norm, whatever that is, 
anyone who fails to bear likeness to the Standard Product, is 
simply not viewed as fully human, and then becomes at best 
invisible, at worst a threat to the national security. 
-- Giles Gunn
655
 
In the previous part, I have focused on the exclusions within the abstract human rights subject. I 
have argued that, while the emergence of the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ represents a 
promising step towards a more inclusive ECHR subject, the concept has yet to be extended to 
cultural and religious groups. In this part, I focus on exclusions within the abstract religious and 
cultural human rights subject, that is, on exclusions across religious and cultural groups. 
Following a familiar form of critical analysis, I unveil the implicit points of reference embedded 
in the Court’s notions of religion and family life and then challenge their presumed neutrality.656 
I argue that the two constructs are founded on assumptions that inherently advantage certain 
religious and cultural groups over others.  
Thus, by positing interiority and disembodiment in what is known as the ‘forum 
internum’ as the primary characteristics of ‘religion’, the Court implicitly articulates a 
conception that is largely Protestant and that, as a result, is inherently exclusionary of a host of 
religious ‘others’ who do not conceive of religion this way. Similarly, by positing the nuclear 
family model as the standard form of family life, the Court articulates a conception of family life 
associated with a notion idealized in some parts of Western Europe. As a result, family life 
similarly produces and excludes a series of cultural ‘others’ for whom family life is not 
necessarily about the ‘core’ family. In both instances – religion and family life – the Court 
implicitly uses particular conceptions of religion or family as the basis for the ‘universal’: the 
two conceptions come laden with culturally and religiously specific elements. 
I do not challenge the inherent validity of these dominant conceptions. They, like other 
forms of family lifestyle and religiosity, deserve consideration. What I do challenge is their 
position of privilege or dominance. My goal is therefore not to replace these conceptions with 
others. Instead, my goal is to confront the naturalization or normalization of privileged 
conceptions that render a whole range of group members invisible, ‘deviant’, and ultimately, 
                                                          
655
 Gunn, Giles, THE INTERPRETATION OF OTHERNESS: LITERATURE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 
(Oxford University Press, 1979) at 177 quoted in Minow, Martha, ‘The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Justice 
Engendered’, 101 Harvard Law Review (1987) at 39.  
656
 Minow, Martha, ‘The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Justice Engendered’, 101 Harvard Law Review (1987) at 45 
(explaining this form of critique in these two steps). 
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unequal.
657
 As Stephanie Wildman puts it, ‘normalization of privilege means that members of 
society are judged, and succeed or fail, measured against the characteristics that are held by those 
privileged. The privileged characteristic comes to define the norm. Those who stand outside are 
the aberrant or “alternative”’.658 As discussed in Chapter II,659 assumptions of this sort are so 
powerfully embedded in these conceptions that they are hardly perceived – especially by those 
benefited by such assumptions
660
 – as particular but rather as natural and normal, and therefore, 
universal. Barbara Flagg calls this type of phenomenon, albeit in the context of race, ‘the 
transparency phenomenon’.661 The result is that only those who do not fit are frequently viewed 
as culturally or religiously distinctive.  
Thus, in the two Chapters that follow, I do not just look at the cultural/religious 
particularity of those marginalized by the ‘standard’ but, crucially, at the particularity of the 
beneficiaries submerged in the ‘standard’.662 My enterprise is one of exposing the real contours 
of notions that, on the surface, appear ‘general, empty of content, universally available to all’663 
but that, on closer inspection, turn out to be particular, full of content and only available to some.  
Methodology  
In Chapters IV and V, I use several devices apt to expose and challenge the Court’s assumptions 
underlying the constructions of family life and religion. These insights and methods allow me to 
be critical of usually taken-for-granted assumptions informing the Court’s reasoning.  
Feminist Method of Critique  
 
The analysis in the two following Chapters benefits from a form of critique traditionally – 
though not exclusively – applied in feminist legal scholarship. As briefly discussed in Chapter II, 
feminist scholars have long been suspicious of the unstated norms behind law’s language of 
objectivity and neutrality.
664
 They have shown that the ‘neutral norm’ against which women tend 
to be regarded as ‘different’ has often been the norm of the ‘white, able-bodied Christian 
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 I draw inspiration from an incisive form of feminist critique, which seeks to expose ‘the dominance of 
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 MacKinnon, Catharine A., ‘Points against Postmodernism’, 75 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2000) at 690.  
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 Bartlett, Katharine T., ‘Feminist Legal Methods’, 103 Harvard Law Review (1990) at 831.  
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man’.665 This is usually one aspect of what is known as the method of ‘Asking the Woman 
Question’: ‘looking beneath the surface of law to identify the gender implications of rules and 
the assumptions underlying them’.666 This ‘primary method of feminist critique’,667 in short, 
seeks to expose bias in the law. Katharine Bartlett explains: ‘In exposing the hidden effects of 
laws that do not explicitly discriminate on the basis of sex, the woman question helps to 
demonstrate how social structures embody norms that implicitly render women different and 
thereby subordinate’.668 The inquiry commonly involves a set of questions, in particular, ‘what 
assumptions are made by law (or practice or analysis) about those whom it affects? Whose point 
of view do these assumptions reflect? Whose interests are invisible or peripheral? How might 
excluded viewpoints be identified and taken into account?’669 
The method ultimately encourages deeper forms of inquiry: it calls for ‘rethinking 
everything’670 or questioning everything.671 It is fundamentally this critical stance towards the 
law that I take from this method. The use of this form of critique has been advocated in other 
contexts than gender, including religion, race, sexual orientation, and class.
672
   
Deconstruction and Religious Studies  
As it will become evident in this part, the assumptions underpinning the Court’s conceptions of 
religion and family life operate differently. In the family life case law, the bias is apparent to the 
naked eye, overt. It is explicitly articulated in the use of the notion of ‘core’ family as the 
standard to determine the existence of family life of non-nationals. In the freedom of religion 
case law, on the other hand, the Court’s conception of religion arises from a series of operating 
assumptions that distinguish the forum internum from the forum externum. These assumptions 
work more subtly or covertly. For this reason, I use additional tools of critical analysis and 
insights from another discipline to bring these assumptions into the open. Indeed, in addition to 
the insights from feminist legal scholarship, the examination in Chapter IV incorporates insights 
from Derrida’s practice of ‘deconstruction’673 and from religious studies. A combination of 
deconstruction and feminist-like legal analysis provides me with the critical tools necessary to 
recognize the underlying assumptions that privilege certain forms of religion while 
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deemphasizing others. Religious studies, in turn, provide me with the knowledge necessary to 
identify the emphasized or de-emphasized aspects of religion and the legally constructed 
religions that emerge as a result.  
In its most basic form, deconstruction challenges fixed binary constructions (e.g., 
rational/emotional, mind/action, subjective/objective) that create an oppositional and hierarchical 
relationship between the terms of the binary.
674
 One term is thereby considered dominant (e.g., 
primary, central) and the other subordinate (e.g., secondary, peripheral). A deconstructive 
exercise shows how, far from being opposites, the two terms are actually interdependent: the 
dominant term in fact depends on the subordinate just as much as the subordinate depends on the 
dominant. So, none of them is actually dominant or prior, as both depend on and derive their 
meaning from each other. Deconstruction thus involves a double process: ‘identification of 
hierarchical oppositions, followed by a temporary reversal of the hierarchy’.675 The point is not 
to reverse the hierarchies permanently but simply ‘to investigate what happens when the given, 
the “common sense” arrangement is reversed’.676  
What deconstructive techniques ultimately show is that apparently dichotomous terms are 
‘not natural but constructed oppositions, constructed for particular purposes in particular 
contexts’.677 The deconstructive critique enables us to avoid mistaking ‘the dominant or 
privileged vision of people and society for real “present” human nature’.678 Deconstruction is not 
foreign to legal analysis but particularly relevant to it: ‘[l]aw is full of conceptual oppositions 
because it is full of distinctions’.679 In fact, deconstructive arguments have been used in several 
areas of legal scholarship, especially in critical race theory, feminist scholarship and critical legal 
studies.
680
 The arguments have come in particularly handy in attempts to show how the 
ideologies underlying certain legal doctrines ‘marginalized or suppressed important features of 
human life’.681  
In the next pages, I organize my discussion as follows. In Chapter IV, I challenge the 
Court’s forum internum/forum externum dichotomy for privileging the former and, in the 
process, failing to attend to a variety of religious aspects and many applicants’ forms of 
religiosity. In Chapter V, I call into question the Court’s privileging of the nuclear family model 
when assessing the existence of migrant applicants’ family life. The two Chapters thus offer a 
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critique of the Court’s case law. Both of them suggest nonetheless strategies for rethinking 
prevailing constructions of religion and family life in order to more fully achieve equality and 
inclusiveness in the Court’s freedom of religion and family life case law.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DECONSTRUCTING ‘LEGAL’ RELIGION IN STRASBOURG 
 
[T]he future of the Muslim minority in Europe depends 
not so much on how the law might be expanded to 
accommodate its concerns but on a larger transformation 
of the cultural and ethical sensibilities of the majority 
Judeo-Christian population that undergird the law. 
-- Saba Mahmood
682
 
Introduction  
Though several human rights instruments guarantee religious freedom, none of them defines 
religion.
683
 Yet in determining what constitutes freedom of religion, courts can never wholly 
avoid establishing what ‘counts’ as religion for legal purposes or, in other words, what counts as 
‘legal’ religion.684 Thus, ‘any attempt to define the scope and content of the right to religious 
liberty will necessarily involve assumptions about the underlying nature of religion itself.’685 The 
danger is that, in the process, certain orthodoxies may be imposed while other dimensions of 
religion may be overlooked and denied legal protection.
686
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 This Chapter addresses this danger in the freedom of religion case law of the Strasbourg 
Court. Incorporating insights from religious studies and employing deconstructive analysis, I 
challenge the ‘legal’ religion that the Court has (re)produced in Strasbourg. To be sure, the Court 
has not attempted a formal and comprehensive definition of religion. Yet background 
assumptions about religion as primarily a matter of conscience or belief appear throughout its 
freedom of religion case law.
687
 The Court has construed freedom of religion in terms of a binary 
opposition between belief and practice
688
 – or between the forum internum and the forum 
externum, as it is known in Strasbourg jargon. 
 I argue against this dichotomous way of reasoning about freedom of religion. Part of my 
argument is that legally imagining belief and practice in binary terms gives rise to a sharp and 
fixed opposition and to hierarchical relations between the religious forms associated with one 
term or the other. Indeed, the Court valorizes disembodied, autonomous, and private forms of 
religiosity identified with mainstream Protestantism, while sidelining embodied, habitual, and 
public forms. The main reason for rejecting sharp dichotomization therefore lies in the 
inegalitarian risks it embeds. In order to counteract these risks, I propose that the relationship 
between the two sides be reconceived in more interconnected ways. My argument here is that, 
the more the Court considers belief and practice interrelatedly, the less likely it is to produce 
hierarchical and inegalitarian relations between religions – or, in other words, the more likely it 
is to produce a more inclusive account of ‘legal’ religion.  
The analysis in this Chapter may be located within growing broader discussions 
questioning the deeply ingrained assumptions underpinning the Court’s understandings of 
religion and freedom of religion. A significant part of this literature revolves around the 
meanings of State neutrality and secularism.
689
 Indeed, many of these critiques are directed at 
revealing the ways in which neutrality, as understood by the Court in certain lines of its case law, 
in fact reflects secularist ideals that view religion as private
690
 and therefore invisible in the 
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public sphere.
691
 Some of these critics point to the specific (Christian) contours underpinning this 
understanding of secularism and to its inability to ‘host’ religions outside mainstream 
Christianity. Peter Danchin, for example, argues that the Court has constructed ‘narratives of 
secularism’ that implicitly incorporate Christian norms into Article 9 ECHR, jeopardizing the 
freedom of religion claims of Muslim and other religious minorities.
692
  
In the process of addressing the ways in which the Court’s understanding of the secular 
corresponds to a certain understanding of the religious, these critiques offer a relevant insight: 
one that points to religion and religious subjectivity as largely private. Yet the entry point of 
these scholarly analyses remains secularism.
693
 As a result, most of these critiques take only 
tangential issue with the Court’s characterization of religion as primarily an issue of internal 
belief. Scholarly critique of ECHR freedom of religion jurisprudence appears to have paid only 
scant, indirect attention to secularism’s ‘twin’694 – that is to say, to religion as such.695 Some 
authors have offered the additional insight that the Court generally shows ‘much greater 
deference and respect’ to traditional than to non-traditional religions.696 However, these authors 
rarely explore the deeper assumptions along the Court’s different understandings of religion 
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apart from pointing to a possible Christian bias. In fact, the sharply dichotomized distinction 
between the forum internum and the forum externum – which, as I will show, lies at the heart of 
the Court’s problematic assumptions – is probably one of the most taken-for-granted features of 
freedom of religion.  
Over the past few years, however, some authors have problematized this distinction and 
the assumptions about religion and religious subjectivity that flow from it. One of the most 
notable efforts is Carolyn Evans’.697 Evans calls into question that the Court gives primacy to 
internal beliefs or conscience (forum internum) without specification of its content and 
justification for this primacy.
698
 She critiques the emphasis the Court thereby places on ‘the 
cerebral, the internal and theological’ at the expense of ‘the active, the symbolic and the moral 
dimensions’ of religion.699 Her argument is that this emphasis does not reflect the ways in which 
many religions view themselves or the religious diversity in the region.
700
 In a similar vein, 
Silvio Ferrari has argued most recently that the Court has difficulties understanding notions of 
religion that stress ‘identity and practice over those of a freely chosen belief’.701 Ferrari thus adds 
a crucial element to existing discussions on the Court’s implicit assumptions about religion: the 
dividing lines may not necessarily run between religions (e.g., Islam and Christianity) but 
between ‘two different ways of conceiving and experiencing religion, one more focused on the 
forum internum and the other on the forum externum’.702  
My analysis in this Chapter builds on and seeks to contribute to this ongoing critique. The 
Chapter is divided into four parts. In the first two parts, I unpack the aspects of religious life that 
the Court emphasizes or de-emphasizes in the process of privileging the belief side over the 
practice side of the dichotomy. In the following part, relying on religious studies, I challenge the 
assumptions underpinning the Court’s implicit account of religion for their inegalitarian 
implications. In the last part, applying deconstructive analysis, I recover the practice side by 
showing how the belief side depends on it. I conclude by arguing that the Strasbourg Court 
should embrace belief and practice more equally.   
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I. Belief as the Core of ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg   
 
The ‘internal sphere of personal thought, conscience, or belief’703 – as the forum internum has 
been usually defined – emerges as the primary locus of ‘legal’ religion in Strasbourg. This 
primacy is not just presupposed; it is represented overtly in a language that orders the 
belief/practice dualism hierarchically. Indeed, the Court has long established that ‘Article 9 of 
the Convention primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i.e. the area 
which is sometimes called “forum internum.”’704 Religious freedom, the Court has also held, ‘is 
primarily a matter of individual conscience.’705 Yet more clearly, the Court has affirmed: ‘[T]he 
main sphere protected by Article 9 is that of personal convictions and religious beliefs, in other 
words what are sometimes referred to as matters of individual conscience’.706 
 Moreover, the privileged status of belief or conscience is re-affirmed in the Court’s well-
known principle that the protection of the forum internum ‘is absolute and unqualified.’707 That 
is, contrary to the forum externum or right to manifest a religion or belief, the forum internum or 
right ‘to hold any religious belief and to change religion or belief’ is not subject to any 
limitation.
708
 Theoretically, at least, the Court thus excludes any considerations of proportionality 
when it comes to protecting the forum internum.
709
  
 In this first part, I examine cases concerning what several scholars would qualify as 
forum internum: compulsion to reveal (non-)religious beliefs and coercion to recant or to adhere 
to (non-)religious beliefs.
710
 Even though the rationale for the primacy of the forum internum has 
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remained largely opaque in Strasbourg,
711
 two main reasons can be implicitly discerned in the 
Court’s reasoning in these cases: privacy and autonomy. I take each in turn. 
 
A. Belief as Private  
Belief is at the heart of cases concerning compulsion to reveal one’s (non-)religious beliefs. At 
stake in this type of cases – the Court has said – ‘is the right not to disclose one’s religion or 
beliefs, which falls within the forum internum of each individual.’712 The Court goes on to frame 
this right as ‘the negative aspect’ of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.713 This aspect 
comprises the right ‘not to be obliged to disclose his or her religion or beliefs’ and the right ‘not 
to be obliged to act in such a way that it is possible to conclude that he or she holds – or does not 
hold – such beliefs.’714 Underlying the Court’s reasoning in this group of cases is a sense of 
discomfort with the idea of the State meddling in people’s inner and personal beliefs.715 States 
are not even allowed ‘to seek to discover’ such beliefs.716 
 What is remarkable about this group of cases is the Court’s clear willingness to protect 
applicants against the slightest possibility that may coerce them to reveal their (non-)religious 
beliefs. For example, in a series of cases against Greece, the Court has found a violation of 
Article 9 ECHR.
717
 Most of these applicants were summoned to appear in court as witnesses or 
complainants and, as such, required by Greek law to take a religious oath. Those who did not 
have a religion or whose religion did not allow them to take such an oath could make a solemn 
declaration instead. The applicants were allowed to make a solemn declaration but not without 
first having to reveal that they were not Orthodox Christians and, sometimes, that they were 
atheists or Jewish.
718
 The Court reasoned that the applicants were not just compelled to deny that 
they were adherents of the majority religion but also to give more detailed information about 
their beliefs.  
 Obliging people to act in a way from which their (non-)religious beliefs may be inferred 
is similarly unacceptable to the Court. In Sinan Işık v. Turkey, concerning a complaint by a 
member of the Alevi religious community against the mandatory indication of religion on 
identity cards, the Court concluded that the applicant’s right not to manifest his religion was 
violated.
719
 This was the case notwithstanding a legislative amendment entitling the applicant to 
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ask that information about his religion be deleted or that the religion box on his identity card be 
left blank.
720
 For the Court, even having to ask that no indication of religion be made raises an 
issue of disclosure of beliefs.
721
 What is more, and as the Folgerø case discussed below shows, 
the Court has offered protection against the ‘risk’ that applicants ‘might feel compelled to 
disclose’ their beliefs.722 In short, the Court has been highly protective of the ‘negative aspect’ of 
the right to manifest one’s religion.   
 The question now is: on what basis does the Court offer such a strong protection in these 
cases? The main rationale underpinning the Court’s reasoning in this group of cases is privacy. 
This is reflected, first of all, in the language that the Court uses to characterize applicants’ 
beliefs. For instance, in Sinan Işık v. Turkey, the Court refers to an individual’s ‘most deeply held 
beliefs’ as one of her ‘most intimate aspects.’723 This formulation resonates with the Article 8 
ECHR language underpinning sexual orientation cases, in which the Court has described 
applicants’ ‘sexual orientation’ as ‘a most intimate aspect of an individual’s private life.’724  
 The Court’s concern with privacy is spelled out in more detail in a case concerning 
parents’ right to have their children educated according to their convictions (Article 2 of Protocol 
1). In Folgerø and Others v Norway, for example, the Court explicitly says that ‘information 
about personal religious and philosophical conviction concerns some of the most intimate aspects 
of private life.’725 One of the issues that the Court addressed in this case was whether parents’ 
obligation to give ‘reasonable grounds’ when asking for their children to be exempted from the 
‘Christianity, religion and philosophy’ class could raise an issue of disclosure of their 
convictions. The Court found that ‘inherent in the condition to give reasonable grounds was a 
risk that the parents might feel compelled to disclose to the school authorities intimate aspects of 
their own religious and philosophical convictions.’726 It is telling that the Court interprets 
parents’ right to respect for their convictions not merely in the light of Article 9 ECHR but in the 
light of Article 8 ECHR as well.
727
 The conclusion was that the system of exemption was 
capable of subjecting parents ‘to a heavy burden with a risk of undue exposure of their private 
life.’728  
 The Court’s reasoning in these cases implicitly tells us that one way in which Strasbourg 
legally imagines (non-)religious beliefs is as essentially ‘private’ and ‘intimate.’ The Court is 
certainly keen on protecting (non-)religious beliefs from becoming public (known to others) 
without applicants’ consent. However, it does not really consider how such public disclosure 
may inhibit applicants from freely adopting or changing these beliefs. The real issue for the 
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Court is therefore one of compelled access to and exposure of the individual’s internal realm 
rather than one of coerced religion or belief.  
 
B. Belief as Autonomous  
Another group of cases reflecting the Court’s protection of religion as belief concerns coercion 
or pressure to recant or to adhere to (non-)religious beliefs. One example is Buscarini and Others 
v. San Marino, a case concerning two elected members of Parliament complaining that they were 
required to take a religious oath on pain of losing their Parliamentary seats.
729
 The applicants 
claimed that obliging them to swear on the Holy Gospels was an act of ‘coercion’ directed at 
their freedom of conscience and religion.
730
 The Court held that such an obligation was indeed 
equivalent to requiring allegiance or a declaration of commitment to a particular religion.
731
 
Another instance is Ivanova v. Bulgaria, a case concerning pressure to recant one’s religion.732 
The issue was whether the applicant – a school employee – was dismissed on account of her 
religious beliefs. The Court concluded that she was, given the particular sequence of the events 
leading to her dismissal. These events included media campaigns against the religious group the 
applicant was part of and inquiries of the Prosecution Office into the religious activities of the 
school staff.
733
 The Court found most telling that the applicant was pressured by Government 
officials to recant her religious beliefs in order to keep her job. It strongly condemned this 
pressure as a ‘flagrant violation of her right to freedom of religion.’734  
 In these two instances, the Court seems to protect the internal realm from external 
coercion (threats and sanctions such as losing Parliamentary seats or losing a job) in essentially 
two ways: (i) by making sure that external forces do not coerce people to adopt (religious) 
beliefs and (ii) by guaranteeing that external forces do not coerce people to recant their 
(religious) beliefs. As the Court holds in Ivanova, States cannot dictate what people believe or 
take coercive steps to make them change their beliefs.
735
  
 So, unlike the first group of cases in which the Court preserves the private character of 
applicants’ (non-)religious beliefs by protecting them against forced access and exposure, in 
Buscarini and Ivanova the Court protects the autonomous character of beliefs by preventing 
them from being coerced. The main basis for the Court’s protection of the forum internum in 
cases such as Buscarini and Ivanova thus seems to be autonomy, which is secured by ensuring 
absence of coercion in one’s adoption or change of a religion or belief. The autonomy rationale – 
implicit in the Court’s rejection of coerced beliefs – tells us that legally imagined (non-)religious 
beliefs in Strasbourg are those to which people freely assent.   
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 The Court has signaled the same autonomy rationale in cases concerning the forum 
internum indirectly.
736
 Indeed, in cases dealing with proselytism – which may be viewed as an 
instance of conflict between the proselytizer’s right to manifest her religion (forum externum) 
and the addressee’s right to have a religion (forum internum) – the Court has been careful to 
protect the autonomy of the addressees.
737
 One of these cases was brought by Greek military 
officers, members of the Pentecostal Church.
738
 They complained about their conviction for 
proselytism of lower-ranked officers and civilians. The Court found a violation of the 
proselytizers’ right to manifest their religion when the addressees were civilians but not when 
they were subordinate military officers. This was because the Court drew a distinction between 
the position of servicemen who found it difficult to withdraw from religious conversations 
initiated by the applicants, who had been their superiors, and that of civilians who were not 
subject to pressures and constraints of the same kind as military personnel.
739
 The Court viewed 
the former as the application of improper pressure and the latter as an innocuous exchange of 
ideas. Indeed, the argument for protecting the lower-ranked officers was that they ‘felt 
constrained and subject to a certain degree of pressure owing to the applicants’ status as 
officers.’740 The Court’s use of the terms ‘constrained’ and ‘pressure’ when assessing the impact 
of proselytism on the lower-ranked officers, ‘indicates that it considers them to be the victims of 
coercion on the part of the proselytisers.’741  
 To summarize, the Court’s reasons for protecting individuals’ beliefs in the two groups of 
cases examined in this part echo the liberal values of privacy and autonomy.
742
 Moreover, the 
privacy and autonomy rationales suggest that the Court imagines ‘legal’ religious beliefs in 
essentially two ways: as private and as voluntarily or freely adopted. These findings coincide 
with the way in which the forum internum has been understood in international human rights 
law: as ‘a private autonomous sphere of religion or belief’.743 The findings also confirm what 
religion scholars such as Talal Asad have argued: ‘although the insistence that beliefs cannot be 
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changed from outside appeared to be saying something empirical about “personal belief” (its 
singular, autonomous, and inaccessible-to-others location), it was really part of a political 
discourse about “privacy,” a claim to civil immunity with regard to religious faith that reinforced 
the idea of a secular state and a particular conception of religion.’744  
 
II. Practice as the Periphery of ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg 
 
The priority of the belief side of the dichotomy is not only apparent in the Court’s principles and 
the strong protection it has offered to the negative aspect of the right to manifest one’s religion. 
The primacy of belief over practice is most fully at work in the Court’s reasoning in cases 
concerning the ‘manifestation’ of applicants’ religious beliefs, in particular, the manifestation of 
such beliefs in ‘practice.’745  
 In this part, I locate and bring to the surface the aspects of applicants’ practices that the 
Court has most commonly relegated to the margin. I argue that the peripheral status of ‘practice’ 
is mostly reflected in the Court’s reluctance to recognize and protect the types of manifestations 
that fail to describe themselves in private, cognitive, and disembodied terms. The subordinate 
term in the duality – practice – thus stands mostly for the habitual, material and embodied 
dimensions of religion that defy sharp dichotomizations between the sacred and the profane.  
 The Court has gradually started to count these aspects of religion as ‘manifestations’ for 
the purposes of Article 9(1) ECHR,
746
 mostly by accepting practices that, though not necessarily 
required by a religion, are still motivated or inspired by it.
747
 Yet the distinction between 
religious ‘manifestation’ and religiously motivated conduct remains in place in the Court’s case 
law. A well-known example of the application of this distinction is Kosteski v. FYROM, a case 
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brought by a Muslim applicant complaining that he was fined for taking a day off to celebrate a 
Muslim holiday.
748
 Here, the Court ‘seems to have declined to accept that taking time off work to 
attend a religious festival amounted to a manifestation of the applicant’s Islamic faith for the 
purposes of Article 9, whilst fully accepting that it was motivated by it’.749 The distinction 
between manifestation and motivation is not only difficult to establish. It offers restrictive 
protection to those who manifest their religion in acts of ordinary life.
750
 This approach, Lucy 
Vickers for example argues, raises severe problems at work since it is mostly ‘religiously 
inspired behavior that is requested, not pure religious observance’.751 Recently, however, the 
Court has held that ‘there is no requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in 
fulfillment of a duty mandated by the religion in question’.752 Traditionally, though, the Court 
has tended to look for such a requirement, albeit not consistently.
753
   
In short, while the Court has recently eased some hurdles under Article 9(1) ECHR
754
 – 
by growingly counting as ‘manifestations’ cetain habitual, material and embodied forms of 
religion that are not necessarily theologically prescribed – it has often attached negligible weight 
to them in the analysis under Article 9(2) ECHR.  
 
A. Practice as Material  
One aspect of applicants’ practices often relegated to the margin is what religion scholars call 
‘material,’755 in particular, the type of materiality associated with objects. As these scholars 
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explain, ‘material objects could be central to a person's practice of . . . religion.’756 Gatis 
Kovaļkovs v. Latvia757 and Austrianu v. Romania758 are two cases in point. The cases involved 
prisoners not allowed to keep certain objects in their cells. Gatis Kovaļkovs complained that he 
could not perform the rituals of Vaishnavism (the Hare Krishna movement) as a result of the 
confiscation of his incense sticks. Austrianu, a Baptist applicant, claimed that he could not listen 
to his religious cassettes, following the confiscation of his cassette player. The two applicants’ 
practices counted as ‘manifestations’ of their religion under Article 9(1) ECHR.759   
 However, in assessing whether the confiscation of the applicants’ objects was justified 
under Article 9(2) ECHR, the Court downplays the importance of their religious practices. In 
Gatis Kovaļkovs, the Court dismisses the applicant’s complaint, holding that ‘restricting the list 
of items permitted for storage in prison cells by excluding items (such as incense sticks) which 
are not essential for manifesting a prisoner’s religion is a proportionate response to the necessity 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’760 Using a similar reasoning – that the confiscation 
of the applicant’s cassette player ‘was not such as to completely prevent him from manifesting 
his religion’ – the Court also rejects the applicant’s claim in Austrianu.761  
 Interestingly, the Austrianu conclusion that the confiscation did not fully prevent the 
applicant from manifesting his religion was based on two reasons: (i) the applicant could use the 
cassette player apparently available in the cultural/education facility of the prison and (ii) the 
applicant could still engage in other practices (e.g., attend religious seminars and read religious 
books in his cell).
762
 While the first reason is certainly sensible, the second is problematic. By 
taking into account the religious seminars and religious books as ‘mitigating’ factors in the 
balancing test, the Court makes implicit assumptions about the ‘non-essential’ nature of the 
applicant’s access to a cassette player. In other words, it downplays the importance of the 
cassette player by considering it replaceable by seemingly more ‘essential’ ways of manifesting a 
religion. If the Court truly considered access to a cassette player important, then it should have 
not mattered what other kinds of manifestation were allowed to the applicant.  
 Another case illustrating the Court’s failure to recognize more material aspects of 
practice is Jones v. the United Kingdom.
763
 The case was brought by a father banned from 
placing a memorial stone with a photograph on the grave of his daughter. His complaint was that 
the bar on photographs interfered with his religion, as the Church of Wales accepts photographs 
on graves. The material form of religiosity is represented in the applicant’s use of objects to 
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‘sacralize or personalize’764 the death of his daughter. The Court however held: ‘it cannot be 
argued that the applicant’s belief required a photograph on the memorial or that he could not 
properly pursue his religion and worship without permission for such a photograph being 
given.’765 The complaint was quickly dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae, even when 
most scholars of religion would agree that practices surrounding individuals’ death ‘are close to 
the heart of religion’.766 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, for example, emphasizes the importance that 
‘practices associated with a burial site’ can have for religious people.767 These practices may 
include ‘placing of material objects symbolic of the dead person’s life.’768  
 
B. Practice as Quotidian (and Public) 
Other aspects of applicants’ practices that the Court has tended to de-emphasize include those 
that cannot be neatly separated from daily actions or everyday life.
769
  This is the type of religion 
that manifests in people’s ‘daily task’ and in ‘all the spaces of their experience,’ such as streets 
and workplaces.
770
 As Julie Ringelheim notes, the Strasbourg case law strongly suggests that 
manifestations outside the domains of home, family and places of worship are of ‘secondary 
importance.’771 The Court’s discomfort with religion manifested outside such discrete spheres is 
most obvious in cases concerning applicants’ wearing of religious clothing.  
 The practice of wearing religious dress stands mostly for the habitual and embodied 
forms of religiosity,
772
 which may generally correspond to what T. Jeremy Gunn has called 
religion as ‘a way of life.’773 Cases dealing with these dimensions of religion concern Muslim 
and Sikh applicants seeking to wear the headscarf or the turban in school or in a variety of other 
ordinary situations (e.g., during security checks, while motorcycle riding). In many of these 
cases, the Court has readily accepted a range of justifications of restrictions as ‘necessary in a 
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democratic society’ without carrying any meaningful proportionality analysis.774 Reflecting on 
the headscarf cases, Carolyn Evans for instance argues: ‘there is no proper consideration of the 
importance of the right, the extent of its violation or the suffering caused to the applicants by its 
limitation. Rather, the Court's focus has been on the State and its claims of necessity.’775 Indeed, 
secularism,
776
 health,
777
 security,
778
 public order
779
 and the rights of others
780
 have all trumped 
applicants’ rights in cases concerning religious dress without much difficulty. The significance 
that applicants’ religious practices may have in their lives is given no consideration. Nor are the 
personal/educational/professional costs arising from the restrictions. In fact, a large number of 
these complaints have been rejected for being ‘manifestly ill-founded.’781 This reveals the 
insubstantial character that these applicants’ claims have in the eyes of the Court.  
 Take the example of Mann Singh v. France.
782
 The applicant, a practicing Sikh, 
complained that he was denied a copy of his driver’s license for refusing to take off his turban 
for the picture. Mann Singh – and what is at stake for him – is virtually absent in the Court’s 
analysis of whether the interference with his right was justified. The Court only looks at the 
State’s alleged justifications of public order and safety and concludes that the measure was 
necessary to identify the driver and to make sure that s/he had the right to drive the car.
783
 
Contrary to the approach in Sinan Işık – where the Court worries that the applicant will be 
compelled to reveal his religion every time he is asked to show his identity card – in Mann Singh 
the Court ignores that the applicant will be compelled to appear in violation of his religion 
(bareheaded) every time he is asked to show his driver’s license. In fact, the Court minimizes the 
restriction on Mann Singh’s freedom of religion by deeming the requirement to remove his 
turban a ‘one-time’ measure.784 This minimizing approach stands in sharp contrast with the 
approach adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee in a similar case. The Committee, on the 
contrary, acknowledges the continuing character of the interference: ‘even if the obligation to 
remove the turban for the identity photograph might be described as a one-time requirement, it 
would potentially interfere with the author’s freedom of religion on a continuing basis because 
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he would always appear without his religious head covering in the identity photograph and could 
therefore be compelled to remove his turban during identity checks’.785  
 Nowhere is the privileging of the belief/conscience side of the dichotomy – and the 
simultaneous disadvantaging of the practice side – more evidently at work than in cases 
concerning secularism. The Court has not only been extremely deferential towards the principle 
of secularism in its most vigorous forms
786
 in France and Turkey.
787
 It has endorsed it 
normatively by stating that attitudes that fail to respect these forms  ‘will not necessarily be 
accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy the 
protection of Article 9 of the Convention.’788 The Court’s readiness to judge these kinds of 
‘secular fundamentalism’789 as compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 
intersects nicely with the assumption of religion as inner belief or conscience pervading its case 
law more broadly.
790
  
 Indeed, the imagery lying behind the Court’s support for the strict private/public divide 
underpinning the endorsed versions of secularism is invisibility. As Talal Asad observes, ‘[a]ny 
view of religious life that requires the separation of what is observable from what is not 
observable fits comfortably with the modern liberal separation between the public spaces . . . and 
the private.’791 The workings of the invisibility imagery are apparent in the Court’s fixation with 
the dimensions of Muslim applicants’ religious symbols (‘powerful’ and ‘external’)792 and in the 
excessive reliance on the ‘ostentatious’793 character of such symbols rather than on the actual 
conduct of the applicants wearing them.
794
  
 Thus, the way in which the Court has imagined the secular in this group of cases is 
inseparable from the way in which it has imagined the religious: as invisible, given its location in 
the individual’s inner sphere. Indeed, as Peter Danchin has argued, one of the implicit 
assumptions shaping the Court’s private/public divide is the idea of religion as ‘primarily a 
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matter of belief or conscience whose proper place is in the private sphere.’795 This is certainly 
reflected in the Court’s endorsement of a secularist relegation of religion to the internal 
conscience, as evidenced in cases such as Leyla Şahin v. Turkey. This form of secularism, as the 
Turkish Constitutional Court states in this case, locates religion in ‘the conscience of each and 
everyone.’796  
 The Court’s notion of the secular and the religious in cases against France and Turkey797 
in fact seems to reflect broader historical understandings. Scholars of religion have shown that 
historically secularism has entailed ‘the regulation and reformation of religious beliefs, doctrines, 
and practices to yield a particular normative conception of religion (that is largely Protestant 
Christian in its contours).’798 Michael Warner, for instance, argues that modern secularity in the 
Euro-North American context ‘gets much of its meaning from the consolidation of “religion” as 
a special form of belief and experience.’799 This form came to privilege ‘what you believe’ and 
‘how strongly you believe it’ while sidelining other markers of religiosity such as ‘ritual practice, 
collective worship, or legal observance, where belief in the usual sense may not be at stake at 
all.’800  
 It is not that the Court has never recognized embodied or habitual – and therefore more 
visible – forms of religion. It has done so but rather rarely. Eweida and Others v. the United 
Kingdom is one of the few examples.
801
 In this case, the Court weighed heavily in the balance 
what was at stake for two Christian applicants wishing to wear a cross visibly at work.
802
 One of 
them – Ms. Eweida, a check-in employee at British Airways – won the case. Yet one of the main 
arguments the Court relied on was that her cross was ‘discreet’ and could not have detracted 
from her professional appearance.
803
 Even though the countervailing interest in Eweida was not 
secularism but a private company’s brand or image (an interest that de facto no longer existed at 
the time of the ruling, as a result of the amendment of the dress code by the airline),
804
 the 
(in)visibility imagery is still at work in the Court’s reasoning. Visibility is in fact a notion that 
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may take ‘many degrees and modulations.’805 Contrary to the ‘ostentatious’ character of the 
Islamic headscarf, the Court regards the cross as ‘discreet.’ The latter characterization suggests 
that Ms. Eweida’s cross is not officially ‘visible:’ it is ‘not really hidden but also not flaunted.’806  
 In conclusion, and cases like Eweida notwithstanding, the fact remains that practices 
emphasizing ‘embodiment, habit, and daily activity’807 have found it more difficult to get the 
Court’s solicitude. Several of the aspects the Court has sidelined in the cases examined in this 
part correspond to what religion scholars have called ‘lived religion’.808 Robert Orsi describes it 
in the following terms:   
 
Lived religion cannot be separated from other practices of everyday life, from the ways that 
humans do other necessary and important things, or from other cultural structures and discourses     
. . . Nor can sacred spaces be understood in isolation from the places where these things are done – 
workplaces, hospitals, law courts, homes, and streets.
809
  
 
Though lived religion pays greater attention to the embodied aspects of religion, it does not 
involve a rejection of the ‘opposite’ disembodied dimensions. In fact, it refuses to adopt an 
either/or approach: cognitive/textual/institutional versus embodied/material/individual forms of 
religion. As Orsi explains, lived religion ‘directs attention to institutions and persons, texts and 
rituals, practice and theology, things and ideas.’810  
 The Court’s principles, however, have set an explicit internal hierarchy among the forms 
of manifestations listed in Article 9 ECHR, giving worship ‘the highest status.’811 This hierarchy 
is apparent in the Court’s principle that ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal 
beliefs and religious creeds i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum internum. In 
addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes, such as acts of worship or 
devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognized 
form.’812 
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 So the Court has not just created an overall hierarchy that privileges belief over practice. 
It has also made a hierarchical move within the term ‘manifestation’ itself. It is therefore no 
surprise that the Court has often considered worship as ‘essential to religious life,’ while treating 
other manifestations such as wearing religious clothing as ‘less important.’813 Indeed, out of the 
twenty violations of freedom of religion in its individual dimension,
814
 only five of them concern 
acts outside of worship (e.g., religious symbols,
815
 observance of dietary requirements
816
 and 
proselytism
817
). The rest concerns worship
818
 or claims that do not deviate from the idea of 
religion as belief or conscience (e.g., non-manifestation of one’s religion,819 coercion to adhere 
to a religion,
820
 coercion to recant one’s religion821 and conscientious objection to military 
service on religious grounds
822
).  
  
III. ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg: Inegalitarian Implications  
In the two previous parts, I have sought to demonstrate that the Court’s belief/practice dichotomy 
has given rise to asymmetric relations among different religious forms. The dichotomy tends to 
valorize certain forms of religiosity (mostly disembodied, autonomous and private beliefs) while 
obscuring or neglecting others (mostly embodied, habitual and public practices). Martinez 
Torron sums up the Court’s ambivalence nicely: ‘[T]he Court . . . has been at times very careful 
to protect individuals’ right not to disclose, even indirectly, their religion or beliefs – an aspect of 
religious freedom which is implicit in Article 9 ECHR, but has not always shown the same zeal 
in protecting individuals’ right to express their religion or beliefs in practice’.823 In this part, I 
challenge the hierarchy between these understandings of religion by bringing to light two major 
inegalitarian implications: (i) ‘deviation’ and exclusion from protection and (ii) implicit 
legitimation of discrimination.  
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 Privileging belief over practice, as law and religion scholars have increasingly realized, 
rests on a conception of religion that has emerged out of a particular historical trajectory and 
that, as a result, is largely Protestant.
824
 Religion scholars have been particularly critical of the 
bias and limitations embedded in such a conception of religion. In a recent ‘historicist turn,’ 
these scholars have become more alert to the genealogy or ‘the history of the making of its 
terminology,’ beginning with the term ‘religion’ itself.825 One important conclusion arising out 
of these historical realizations has been that the modern emphasis on individual conscience or 
belief is largely the consequence of the Protestant Reformation’s challenge to medieval 
Catholicism’s focus on the body.826 Meredith McGuire, for example, observes: ‘[T]he 
Reformation era represented, in essence, a revolution in ritual theory: The old ritual had 
privileged practice, while the new ritual privileged cognition – such as hearing preaching, 
intellectually assenting to creeds, reading and thinking about passages of the Bible’.827 The 
overall effect of the Reformation was thus the ‘transfer of our religious life out of bodily forms 
of ritual, worship, practice, so that it comes more and more to reside “in the head.”’828 So, what 
some have called the ‘ideology of belief’ is ‘an assumption deriving from the history of 
Christianity that religion is above all an interior state of assent to certain truths.’829  
 Thus, if there is anything the Strasbourg Court can learn from scholars of religion, the 
lesson is that there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ in describing religion as fundamentally a 
matter of belief.
830
 Rather, it is the particular history of Christianity – the ‘interiorization of 
religion’831 following the Reformation832 – that has made belief the ‘measure of what religion is 
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understood to be’.833 Naturalizing – that is, making ‘natural’ what in fact is historically 
contingent or socially constructed – involves normalizing or ‘setting up a standard by which to 
judge deviation.’834 Feminists have convincingly shown how the ‘neutral norm’ against which 
women have been regarded as ‘different’ or ‘deviant’ has often turned out to be ‘the male 
norm.’835 The exact same point can be made about (inner and private) belief as the essence of 
religion: the ‘norm’ against which religious claimants have been judged in Strasbourg has turned 
out to be mainstream Protestant (or, better still, Protestantized) views of religion.
836
  
 No surprise, then, that any form of religious expression departing from the ‘norm’ has 
often been seen as ‘a problematic boundary crossing.’837 Peter Danchin has neatly illustrated how 
this has been the case of Muslim applicants.
838
 The ‘problematic boundary-crossers’ in 
Strasbourg, as the analysis in this Chapter shows, include a variety of other religious group 
members from Hare Krishna to Sikhs and some Christians. What is furthermore noteworthy is 
that the ‘convictions’ of Protestant countries remain scarce in Strasbourg while the ‘acquittals’ of 
Turkey and France – two Council of Europe countries with a strong variety of secularism – are 
abundant.
839
 This finding, as Silvio Ferrari observes, is telling ‘because all five Protestant 
countries until recently had a Church-State system that could potentially create problems in 
terms of religious freedom’ even though, of course, the Court acts only on the basis of individual 
applications.
840
 
 So this is one of the major inegalitarian implications of using a Protestantized view of 
religion as the standard against which religious claims are judged: certain forms of religion will 
obviously be less legally cognizable – or less ‘legal’ religions – than others. As a result, they will 
tend to be excluded from legal protection. Reducing religion to conscience, as Cecile Laborde 
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argues, ‘seems to deny protection to the cultural, habitual, embodied, and collective dimensions 
of religion’.841   
 Another problematic risk of legally imagining religion as essentially about (inner and 
private) belief is that it obscures instances in which religion is privatized as a result of religious 
discrimination and intolerance. Such a conception of religion risks overlooking the difference 
between deliberately maintaining one’s religion as private and being forced to maintain it as such 
out of ‘fear of social hostility’.842 Thus, by viewing religion primarily as inner belief the Court 
may fail to notice instances of what Kenji Yoshino terms ‘coerced covering’843 which result from 
hostile and prejudiced reactions to the visibility of some religious forms. The focus, therefore, 
should not be on visibility but rather on the hostility to such visibility.
844
   
 In short, the Court should take great care that, in conceiving of religion as an essentially 
inner or private matter, it does not end up legitimizing the discrimination and social exclusion of 
unpopular minority religious groups. S.A.S. v. France,
845
 a case currently pending before the 
Court’s Grand Chamber, may be a good illustration of this kind of invidious effects. The case 
concerns a Muslim woman challenging the so-called ‘burqa ban’ in France. As recent empirical 
studies have shown, the situation of women wearing the full-face veil is one of aggression and 
discrimination by the larger society.
846
 It is precisely this kind of vulnerability to prejudiced 
aggressions from the public that a taken-for-granted approach of religion as essentially (inner 
and private) belief is likely to miss. 
 
IV. Deconstructing the ‘Wall of Separation’847 
 
Having shown the hierarchical and inegalitarian implications that the Court’s privileging of 
belief over practice has carried (and risks carrying), I now argue that the dominant side of the 
binary (belief) suffers from an elementary lack: its dependence on the subordinate term 
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(practice). In this last part, and by means of deconstructive analysis,
848
 I thus ‘rescue’ the 
forgotten or marginalized term ‘practice.’ Moreover, taking my cue from feminist legal scholars, 
I argue that one way to counteract the hierarchies and inequalities between the dimensions of 
religion associated with one or the other side of the belief/practice distinction is to embrace both 
sides more interrelatedly.  
 The notion of a sharp and stable separation between belief and action is ‘controversial’849 
and remains ‘a matter of great contestation’ in several legal contexts, including international 
human rights law.
850
 The artificial and fixed nature of the belief/practice distinction has been 
criticized for, inter alia, obscuring the extent to which the two terms actually interact and are 
interdependent.
851
 In arguing for a clearer scope of the forum internum and a more sophisticated 
understanding of the belief/action relationship, Carolyn Evans for example observes in the 
Strasbourg context: ‘At some point, burdening external manifestations of belief must have 
serious implications for the internal realm.’852 Her assumption seems to be that a wider and more 
clearly defined notion of the forum internum would leave less room for States to require people 
to act in ways that contradict their religion/belief or to ‘pay a price’ for adhering to their 
religion/belief.
853
 Peter Petkoff also suggests exploring a ‘more relational understanding of the 
two forums.’854 Understanding belief and manifestation as ‘integrated aspects’ of freedom of 
religion, the argument goes, will emphasize the ‘flourishing’ rather than the ‘containment’ of 
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freedom of religion.
855
 While I agree with these authors on the need for a more complex analysis 
that reflects the interrelationship of belief and practice, I differ however on the motivation. My 
proposal of a more interrelated approach is motivated by the need to rescue ‘practice’ from its 
subordinate status and, ultimately, by the need to counteract bias and inequality.  
 
A. To the Rescue of Practice   
One example of how blurry the lines between belief and action – or between the forum internum 
and the forum externum – can get comes from conscientious objection cases. Forcing people to 
act in violation of their religious beliefs, as several scholars have shown, may entail an affront to 
their forum internum.
856
 Commenting on the cases of Valsamis v. Greece and Efstratiou v. 
Greece – concerning the punishment of Jehovah’s Witnesses students for refusing to participate 
in what they regarded as a military parade – Carolyn Evans persuasively shows how difficult it is 
to maintain a ‘neat distinction between the internal and the external realms’.857 As she argues, 
forcing someone to act in violation of her religious commitment is arguably equivalent to forcing 
her to recant a religion or belief.
858
 This is precisely what the Court appears to protect in recent 
cases concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses applicants’ conscientious objection to military service: 
that individuals are not forced – by means of criminal sanctions – to act against their conscience 
or deeply held beliefs.
859
 This sort of cases shows how it is not so easy to draw the line between 
‘external pressure inducing a forcible change in inner belief and external pressure obliging 
action that runs counter to inner belief.’860  
 In fact, it is hard to imagine how exactly a State may interfere with people’s religious 
beliefs if not by forcing some form of action upon them. Even the belief-centered cases discussed 
in the first part turn on some kind of external behavior. Take the cases concerning the right not to 
be obliged to manifest one’s religion/belief. They all required an action from the applicants: to 
communicate or disclose their (non-)religious beliefs. What is more, the flaws in constructing a 
belief/manifestation dichotomy are actually implicit in the Court’s formulation of this right: it 
‘falls within the forum internum of each individual’861 and yet is framed as ‘the right of an 
individual not to be obliged to manifest his or her beliefs.’862 Thus, when trying to talk about the 
forum internum, the Court immediately talks about manifestation, albeit in its ‘negative aspect.’ 
Moreover, think of Buscarini, the case brought by San Marino’s Members of Parliament obliged 
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to take a religious oath in order to keep their Parliamentary seats. This case may be a good 
example of forcing people to act against their beliefs (taking a religious oath),
863
 even though it 
may not be appropriate to call such an act ‘manifestation’ in the sense of Article 9 ECHR.864    
 Another illustration of how the Court’s reliance on a bright line distinction between belief 
and action can be problematic is Kalaç v. Turkey.
865
 The case concerned a Muslim judge 
working for the air force who was obliged to retire because ‘his conduct and attitude revealed 
that he had adopted unlawful fundamentalist opinions.’866 This conduct and attitude included 
giving legal assistance, taking part in training sessions and intervening in the appointment of 
servicemen who were members of a religious group with alleged ‘fundamentalist tendencies.’867 
The applicant’s allegation was that his compulsory retirement was based on his religious beliefs 
and practices. The Court’s conclusion, however, was that the retirement order was not based on 
his religious opinions or beliefs but on ‘his conduct and attitude.’868  
 Now, as the State itself admitted, it was through the applicant’s conduct that it learned 
about the applicant’s beliefs. Only then did his belief become apparent to the State. This thus 
shows one way in which belief depends on practice. Moreover, it was by striking at the 
applicant’s action that the State was able to strike at his ‘fundamentalist’ beliefs. As Paul Hayden 
asks, ‘how does one abridge the freedom to think or believe except by striking at some action 
motivated by that belief?’869 There is yet another way in which the interaction between the 
applicant’s belief and conduct is evident in the case. According to the hierarchical belief/action 
distinction, the applicant would be protected ‘for being a member of a group but not [for] doing 
things associated with the group’.870 However, the conduct for which he was forcibly retired – 
giving legal assistance, taking part in training sessions and intervening in the appointment of 
servicemen – was cast in a different light precisely for being a member of a ‘fundamentalist’ 
religious group.
871
 The same conduct would have hardly provoked the same sanction had it been 
motivated by the applicant’s affiliation to, say, an environmentalist organization. All this 
illustrates the relation of mutual dependence in which belief and action stands to each other.  
 One more illustration of the interrelation of belief and practice is Kosteski v. the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
872
 The case concerned a public company employee fined for 
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not showing up at work due to a conflict with a Muslim holiday. One of his complaints was that, 
by asking him to prove his faith, domestic courts interfered with the inner sphere of his belief. 
The Court rejected his complaint and upheld the domestic courts’ decision that the applicant did 
not substantiate ‘the genuineness of his claim to be a Muslim.’873 The Court held that, on the 
contrary, his conduct ‘cast doubt on that claim in that there were no outward signs of his 
practicing the Muslim faith or joining collective Muslim worship.’874 Leaving aside the fact that 
requiring this sort of substantiation is debatable, what matters for present purposes is that courts 
are ultimately looking for behavioral or outer signs to decode the applicant’s inner belief.  
 As all these examples make clear, the belief/action distinction is not as sharp as the Court 
often suggests. The question is therefore not whether belief and action relate to or depend on 
each other. Rather, the question is the extent to which a restriction on one of them affects the 
other. For example, the extent of the interference with the forum internum will depend, to a large 
extent, on the degree of the restriction on the forum externum, which can range from absolute 
prohibitions of certain actions to circumstantial and exceptional limitations.
875
 This is obviously 
no easy task and will most likely depend on the context and circumstances of each case.  
 The Court, however, has rarely acknowledged this sort of interdependence between belief 
and practice. In the cases of conscientious objection to military service, for example, it treats 
applicants’ failure to report for military service as a manifestation of their (religious) beliefs, 
without acknowledging any kind of implications for their forum internum.
876
 The same can be 
said of Kalaç; the Court says nothing about the kind of implications that the applicant’s forced 
retirement had for his forum internum.
877
 The reluctance to address these links may well be due 
to the fear that this would automatically mean finding a violation of Article 9 ECHR without 
assessing whether the interference is actually justified.
878
 Though this fear is not ungrounded, the 
Court has not always followed the absolute form of protection of the forum internum it advocates 
in theory.
879
 So something else must be afoot than just fear of opening up a space of absolute or 
unlimited protection of freedom of religion: the assumption that belief and practice actually 
belong to two different and independent realms.  
 There are however several problems with failing to acknowledge the connection between 
belief and practice altogether. One of them is that this failure ends up sustaining the extreme 
reading that a restriction can never infringe on the forum internum. On this reading, people 
always remain free to believe that a certain practice is a religious duty even though they are not 
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allowed to engage in it.
880
 That is, applicants can always be adherents of a certain religion even 
when they cannot behave as such. This approach reinforces the illusion that, as separable from 
behavior, belief always remains intact, untouched. As a result, it may sustain the idea that a State 
is condemning a person’s practice without passing a judgment on her beliefs when, in fact, it 
is.
881
  
 Moreover, the Court’s failure to recognize the interdependence of practice and belief in 
‘manifestation’ cases signals the background assumption that practice depends on belief, not the 
other way around. In the Strasbourg representational discourse, the relationship between the two 
terms appears unidirectional: belief is imagined as pre-existing and practice as its subsequent 
manifestation. This assumption is obvious not only in the status that belief and practice have in 
the Court’s principles (i.e. freedom of religion is first of all about belief and only additionally 
about manifestation) but also in the term ‘manifestation’ itself. The term begs the question: 
manifestation of what? The answer is of course ‘belief.’ Indeed, the Court often speaks of 
practice either as a ‘direct expression’ of belief882 or as ‘motivated’ or ‘inspired’ by it.883 Either 
way, this suggests that there is an actual belief lying beneath practice that comes first.  
 In conceiving the belief/practice relationship this way the Court creates two interrelated 
sets of hierarchy – spatial and temporal.884 By temporal hierarchy, I mean that the Court’s 
representational discourse orders the terms in a sequence according to which belief is prior to 
practice. By spatial hierarchy, I mean that the Court’s representational discourse divides the 
social world in internal (or private) and external (or public) categories.
885
 These spatial and 
temporal orderings sustain the foundational character of belief and the derivative nature of 
practice. Belief originates in the internal/private in a way that some have deemed ‘pre- or extra-
social’886 to only then manifest itself into the external/public space. As a result, belief in the 
Court’s case law appears as the source and origin of practice and the latter as its derivative effect.  
 The problem of this hierarchical construction is that it impedes investigating the ways in 
which things may go the other way around. As scholars of religion have noted, practice may 
sustain belief. For instance, in a critique of WC Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’ 
Talal Asad points out that Smith fails examining ‘how practice helps to construct faith.’887 Asad 
explains that, while Smith’s claim that faith ‘is an act that I make myself, naked before God’ 
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makes sense in ‘a particular language game,’ in others ‘faith is not a singular act but a 
relationship based on continuous practice.’888 One of other such ‘language games’ is the Islamic 
tradition.
889
  
 In conclusion, neither practice nor belief is foundational, as the two are mutually 
dependant. The distinction becomes problematic when the terms are posed in sharp contrast or 
opposition and, most crucially, when they are understood hierarchically, just like they are by the 
Court. I do not argue that the hierarchy should now be permanently reversed, that is to say, that 
the denigrated term (practice) should now be privileged. This would mean creating a new 
hierarchy, equally problematic for the reasons discussed in the previous part (practice would be 
the ‘norm’ against which to judge ‘deviation’ and deny protection). Simply embracing the 
favored side (belief) instead of challenging the devaluation of the other (practice) may also be 
flawed. This strategy would force many applicants to reshape their religiosity in a mould they 
may view as alien while allowing others to live comfortably in a mould they view as theirs.     
 
B. Breaking Out of the Belief/Practice Dichotomy   
Reversing the hierarchy or merely identifying with the privileged side would mean reinforcing 
the belief/practice dichotomy and, ultimately, associating with just one side of the dualism. Legal 
feminists have persuasively argued that strategies of this sort are flawed, as the result is a sense 
of incompleteness for many people. Indeed, in an analysis of binary constructions that associate 
the favored side with men (e.g., public, reason, objective) and the disadvantaged one with 
women (e.g., private, passion, subjective), Frances Olsen rejects an either/or approach: ‘[w]e 
cannot choose between the two sides of the dualism, because we need both.’890 Thus, claiming 
that passion is superior to reason or that subjectivity is superior to objectivity will not do.
891
 Nor 
will it do to secure women only the reason or the objectivity term of the dichotomy.
892
 For Olsen, 
the ‘possibility of wholeness’ and the expansion of choices available to women lie in the 
rejection of polarization of these dualistic pairs.
893
  
 I suggest following a similar approach when it comes to the belief/practice binary. Just 
like many women (and men) may need both sides of dualistic pairs, so may many religious 
adherents. Indeed, many religious people ‘consider themselves to be bound by the tenets of their 
faith to manifest that faith.’894 Dichotomous thinking – and the hierarchy it puts in place –
overlooks those for whom religious freedom is not just about freedom to believe but also about 
freedom ‘to act in accordance with those beliefs.’895 For many people, as Cecile Laborde 
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explains, ‘the religious experience is fundamentally about exhibiting the virtues of the good 
believer, living in community with others, and shaping one’s daily life in accordance with the 
rituals of the faith.’896 For these religious practitioners, their practices ‘are part and parcel of their 
belief system, identity and general way of life’.897 Since acknowledging the interrelation between 
belief and practice eschews any hierarchy between the two terms – and between the religions 
indentified more with one or the other – the result will be more room for equality and 
inclusiveness.  
 
Conclusion 
In unpacking and challenging the hierarchical and inegalitarian relations that the Court creates 
along religious lines by framing freedom of religion as fundamentally concerned with freedom of 
conscience or belief, this Chapter hopes to push for reconsideration of the Court’s implicit 
characterization of religion as belief or conscience. The assumption that belief is the defining 
feature of religion contradicts the egalitarian impulse that should underlie the Court’s approach 
to freedom of religion. It is high time for the Court to move away from the principle that makes a 
Protestantized understanding of religion the standard against which ‘others’ – including some 
Christians – are regarded as less ‘legal’ religions in an increasingly pluralized Europe. In the 
words of Talal Asad, ‘we have to abandon the idea of religion as always and essentially the 
same, and as dependent on faith that is independent of practical traditions.’898 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EXCLUSIONARY FACE OF ‘FAMILY LIFE’ IN STRASBOURG 
 
 
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a 
facilitative, pluralistic one in which we must be willing to abide 
someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the 
same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies. Even if 
we can agree, therefore, that ‘family’ and ‘parenthood’ are part 
of the good life it is absurd to assume that we can agree on the 
content of those terms, and destructive to pretend that we do.  
-- William J. Brennan, U.S. Supreme Court in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., U.S. 110, 141 (1987) (dissenting opinion) 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of family life developed by the Strasbourg Court in its Article 8 ECHR (right to 
respect for family life) case law has a Janus-faced character. On the one hand, the concept has an 
inclusive face. On this view, family life is a ‘broad’ term, ‘not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition’.899 The existence or non-existence of family life ‘is essentially a question of fact 
depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties’.900 The focus is thus on ‘the 
substance and reality of relationships’.901 What counts is whether there are ‘further legal or 
factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal relationship’.902 To be sure, this 
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‘reality’ approach has the capacity to include ‘less conventional family constellations’.903 In fact, 
the Court has ‘counted’ as family life a broad variety of bonds, including those between parents 
and minor children,
904
 adopted children and adoptive parents,
905
 and children and extended 
relatives (e.g., grandparents,
906
 aunts/uncles
907
). Most recently, the Court has established that ‘a 
cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership falls within the notion of 
“family life”’.908 
Yet, and despite its radical inclusive potential, this face of family life paradoxically co-
exists with a more restrictive, exclusionary face: that of the ‘core’ family, namely parents and 
minor children. The case that best epitomizes the exclusionary face of family life in Strasbourg is 
Slivenko v. Latvia. In this case, the Grand Chamber refused to count as ‘family life’ the 
relationship that a mother and her daughter claimed with their elderly parents (grandparents) in 
an attempt to avoid expulsion to Russia. According to this line of case law, usual emotional ties 
between adult relatives – including adult children and their parents – are not enough to fall 
within the scope of Article 8 ECHR. Applicants need to substantiate additional elements of 
dependence. The Slivenko Court holds:    
 
In the Convention case-law relating to expulsion and extradition measures, the main emphasis has 
consistently been placed on the ‘family life’ aspect, which has been interpreted as encompassing 
the effective “family life” established in the territory of a Contracting State by aliens lawfully 
resident there, it being understood that ‘family life’ in this sense is normally limited to the core 
family.
909
  
 
This narrow conception appears most prominently in the spheres of entry and expulsion of non-
nationals. Though the Court’s family life case law in the areas of entry and expulsion has 
attracted substantial legal commentary,
910
 to date, the restrictive construction of family life in 
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these areas has provoked only limited criticism.
911
 In critically and thoroughly assessing the 
Court’s limited (and limiting) construction of ‘family life’ in the Strasbourg case law, this 
Chapter seeks to fill the existing gap. At first sight, the inclusion of family life case law in this 
thesis may appear surprising, as claims of family lifestyles on cultural grounds have been raised 
only obliquely by applicants and hardly addressed by the Court. However, this is precisely the 
point. The fact that these issues have not given rise to any significant case law is just an 
illustration of how normalized and deep-seated the nuclear family ideal is in Strasbourg. 
Moreover, while cultural concerns may not be expressly raised in all cases, the fact that the 
applicants’ claims fall, over and over, outside the ‘core’ idea of family life suggest that different 
cultural conceptions of family life may be at work in the background of their applications. In 
short, the fact that the diverse cultural conceptions of family life has given rise to hardly any 
meaningful case law and very little scholarly comment makes this area of the Court’s case law 
potentially not only more interesting but also revealing of fundamental underlying processes that 
are too easily over-passed.  
The thrust of my argument is that the limited conception of family life that the Court 
requires primarily in admission and expulsion case law rests on a set of implicit assumptions that 
privilege an ideal mainstream cultural form of family while disadvantaging less dominant ones. 
It is probably no surprise that a large number of explicit or implicit challenges to the Court’s 
restrictive notion of family life come from European minority members and migrants of diverse 
origins outside Europe.  
Though all stages of the Court’s legal reasoning – from the interpretation of the 
autonomous concept of ‘family life’ to the balance of interests – offer an opportunity to examine 
the Court’s perceptions of family life, my analysis focuses primarily on the initial stage of the 
Court’s inquiry, that is, on the scope analysis. In examining a family life claim, the Court’s first 
task is to determine whether the bonds in question fall within the scope of family life or, in other 
words, whether the ties invoked by applicants amount to ‘family life’ within the meaning of 
Article 8(1) ECHR. The reason for focusing on this phase of the inquiry is because this is usually 
the stage at which the restriction most commonly takes place. If the concept of ‘family life’ itself 
cannot accommodate alternative family lifestyles, there is no way applicants’ practices will be 
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recognized at this level, let alone balanced in the proportionality (at least theoretically). The 
concept is therefore the fundamental unit and this why I focus on it. 
The Chapter is organized as follows. Part I unpacks the content of the Court’s restrictive 
notion of ‘family life’, determines the extent of its application in the Strasbourg case law, 
assesses the consequences of the limited notion, and offers (and rejects) possible explanations 
behind such a restrictive approach. Part II critiques the conception of family life articulated in 
some areas of the Court’s case law for its inegalitarian and exclusionary character. Part III makes 
the case for reconsidering the restrictive notion of family life and outlines possible bases on 
which such reconsideration might proceed while sketching an alternative approach.  
 
I. Unveiling and Unpacking the Court’s Restrictive Notion of Family Life 
 
In this part, I unpack the meaning and elements of the limited conception of family life adopted 
by the Court and determine the extent of its application, that is to say, the areas of the case law 
where the concept has been most commonly applied and the groups of applicants most frequently 
affected by it. Moreover, I outline the kind of implications that such a restrictive interpretation 
has had for the applicants and reject the justifications possibly underlying such an interpretation. 
The main claim of this part is that, despite family life’s normative openness to culturally diverse 
conceptions of family lifestyles in Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence, its receptiveness to such 
conceptions has in fact remained limited and largely unequal. 
 
A. Meaning and Extent of the Application   
 
The limited notion of family life has been applied predominantly – though not exclusively – in 
admission and expulsion case law. While the ECHR does not guarantee the right of an alien to 
enter and reside in the territory of a State, excluding someone from a country where her near 
relatives live may amount to interference with her right to respect for family life.
912
 In examining 
whether applicants’ claimed family links fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR, the Court has 
held, time and time again, that links outside the ‘core’ family – understood as parents and minor 
children – are excluded from family life in ‘immigration cases’913 or in cases ‘relating to 
expulsion and extradition measures’.914 These cases concern refusals to grant residence permits 
on family reunification grounds for reasons of economic well-being and immigration control as 
well as expulsions for reasons of crime and disorder prevention.   
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At times, however, the denial of existence of family life outside the ‘core’ surfaces other 
areas of the Court’s family life case law. One example is the exclusion of family life between 
adult relatives, including parents and adult children. Emonet and Others v. Switzerland is a good 
case in point.
915
 The case concerned the adoption of an adult child by her mother’s partner. The 
Court applied the principle that ‘relationships between parents and adult children do not fall 
within the protective scope of Article 8 unless “additional factors of dependence, other than 
normal emotional ties, are shown to exist”’.916 It found that, even though the child was an adult, 
she was in need of care and support following a serious illness that resulted in a disability.
917
 The 
Court then considered that ‘additional factors of dependence, other than normal emotional ties 
exist here which exceptionally bring into play the guarantees that derive from Article 8 between 
adults’.918   
There are other examples in the Court’s broader case law signaling that the principle 
denying recognition to relationships between adult relatives is seemingly more widely embedded 
in the Court’s Article 8 ECHR case law. In a series of cases against the United Kingdom, the 
European Commission of Human Rights has made implicit reference to this principle in response 
to demands by adult prisoners seeking protection of their ‘family life’ with parents and 
siblings.
919
 The Commission held that ‘in the context of prisoners or other persons who are 
detained the concept of “family life” must be given a wider scope than in other situations’.920 
The idea that ‘family life’ would otherwise have been given a narrower scope is thus implicit in 
the Commission’s reasoning.  
Extended family ties, in turn, have been accepted as ‘family life’ in the Court’s broader 
case law, albeit not consistently. As far back as the Marckx case, the Court has emphasized that 
family life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1, ‘includes at least the ties between near relatives, 
for instance those between grandparents and grandchildren, since such relatives may play a 
considerable part in family life’.921 Thus, grandparents claiming family ties with their 
grandchildren have usually been covered by ‘family life’ under Article 8 § 1 ECHR in a range of 
cases, including those concerning access to and care of grandchildren.
922
 Yet when it comes to 
links between other extended relatives, the Court does not appear equally receptive. An example 
is X. and Others v. Austria, a case that actually concerned second-parent adoption by a same-sex 
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couple. In rejecting the Government’s justification that Austrian law’s intention was preventing a 
woman from adopting a child while the legal ties with the child’s mother were maintained – a 
rule that would also prohibit an aunt from adopting her nephew while his relationship with his 
mother was intact – the Court’s Grand Chamber held:  
 
The Court notes firstly that the relationship between two adult sisters or between an aunt and her 
nephew does not in principle fall within the notion of ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 
of the Convention.
923
  
 
Eva Brems is right to conclude that ‘despite early recognition that members of the extended 
family enjoy some rights under article 8, recent case-law shows a renewed emphasis on the 
nuclear family, against evidence that this denies the experience of people from the Eastern, more 
recent state parties’.924 
In summary, in determining whether family life exists or not, the Court has most 
frequently applied a more restrictive approach in entry and expulsion cases. In fact, the Court has 
explicitly stated that the restrictive principle is limited to these cases. Thus – and even though 
sometimes the principle denying recognition to family life between parents and adult children, 
extended family members and adult relatives is applied in other areas of Article 8 ECHR case 
law – it has been migrants who have mostly been burdened by the Court’s limited approach. The 
ad hoc application of the restrictive conception of family life in other spheres of the Court’s case 
law is nonetheless revealing of how entrenched the conception of nuclear family life is in the 
Court’s reasoning.  
 
B. The ‘Outsiders’: Group Members Affected by the Court’s Restrictive Approach  
The Court’s narrow construction of family life has applied to different groups of non-nationals. 
Some of them are of European origin (e.g., Roma and Baltic Russians); others of origins outside 
the Council of Europe area (e.g., Algerian, Bangladeshi, Indian, Moroccan, Nigerian). Members 
of these groups have sought recognition of basically two sets of relationships under Article 8 
ECHR ‘family life’: (i) bonds between adult children and parents/siblings, and (ii) bonds 
between extended relatives.  
1. Roma  
One group of applicants affected by the Court’s limited notion of the ‘core’ family is the Roma 
minority. Applicants of Roma origin have sometimes expressly claimed to be culturally bound 
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together by a sense of family that goes beyond such a core. In Konstatinov v. the Netherlands, for 
example, a Serbian-born applicant of Roma origin complained that her deportation would keep 
her away not only from her husband and son but also from her husband’s relatives – namely his 
mother and siblings – and from her own siblings living in the Netherlands.925 Most notably, Ms. 
Konstatinov argued that since ‘family ties are more important for Roma than for many other 
people, such a separation would be emotionally very burdensome’.926  
The Court remains silent on the applicant’s extended family complaints. Instead, it 
focuses on her nuclear family claims: the relationship with her son. Yet not even this relationship 
is regarded as family life as the applicant’s son would soon come of age.927 As a result, and 
based on the case law according to which ‘relationships between adult relatives do not 
necessarily attract the protection of Article 8 without further elements of dependency’, the Court 
holds that the son’s suffering from asthma – as the applicant had claimed – does not constitute 
such a further element.
928
   
The notion of extended family also appears to have been vindicated on cultural grounds in 
the case of Lakatoš v. the Czech Republic.929 The applicant was a Slovak national, born in a city 
then on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, today the territory of Slovakia. He 
lived at his uncle’s home, was single and did not have children of his own.930 While it is not clear 
whether the applicant framed his family life claims in express cultural terms before the Court, it 
is obvious that cultural concerns were ultimately at issue in the case, as his complaints before the 
national courts show. In the course of the domestic judicial proceedings, in an attempt to resist 
expulsion from the Czech Republic, he substantiated his family ties in the following terms:  
. . . I belong to the Roma minority. It is generally known that we, Roma people, live by tradition in 
larger families than non-Roma people and that an integral part of such a large family are more 
distant relatives than parents and children, or possibly grandparents. We maintain very close 
emotional, and very often also financial, relations with distant relatives, i.e. with uncles, aunts etc. 
Until I was 15 years old, I had been brought up by my grandmother. I have a very close relationship 
with my uncle and aunt with whom I live in Prague. Although my ethnic background cannot be the 
key aspect to be dealt with by the court when imposing punishment, this fact should not be omitted 
altogether.
931
 
The Court does not embark on its usual first task of considering whether sufficient links exist 
between the applicant and his relatives as to give rise to the family life protection of Article 8 
ECHR. The Court speaks directly of private life when referring to these ties without even 
attempting to examine whether such links amount to family life.
932
 In the end, it does not 
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consider it necessary to examine the question whether there is interference with the applicant’s 
private life because, even assuming that this is the case, the complaint is, at any rate, manifestly 
ill-founded.
933
 The Court thus concludes that ‘there is no appearance of a violation of Article 8 of 
the Convention’.934  
To sum up, the applicant in Konstatinov seems to vindicate the importance of emotional 
ties in determining the existence of family life in line with what she deems ‘family’ as a member 
of the Roma minority. In Lakatoš, in turn, the applicant defends the special significance of 
extended family links in what he views as the Roma cultural tradition. Both judgments, however, 
remain silent on the applicants’ cultural perceptions. Instead, they measure the applicants’ family 
claims using the yardstick of nuclear family by which both applicants fail.  
Anthropologist Sal Buckler insightfully highlights a different understanding of extended 
family for members of the Roma minority in some parts of Europe: ‘[W]hat makes the 
experience of family different amongst Gypsies I have worked with in the UK is that their 
extended family network only comprises people who are known on a face-to-face basis. This is 
unlike the experience in the more mainstream, white, non-Gypsy worlds of the UK where many 
of us might be dimly aware of distant cousins, uncles and aunts – people to whom we are 
somehow related but whom we have never met’.935 This anthropological insight suggests that, in 
fact, the Court and the Roma applicants may have been operating under different assumptions of 
extended family: for the Roma applicants, extended family probably meant actual contact with 
distant relatives whereas for the Court extended family most likely meant actual distance with 
such relatives. This might explain the Court’s general presumption of non-existence of family 
life with extended family members and the subsequent requirement to substantiate additional 
elements (of dependence). What this shows is that not all extended family views or experiences 
are the same
936
 and that any a priori exclusion of such links from the scope of family life is 
problematic. Sal Buckler concludes: ‘Any curtailment of the Gypsies’ extensive face-to-face 
family, whether intended or not, results in a shrinking of their family until ‘family’ as Gypsies 
understand it to be is no longer possible’.937 
 
2. Baltic Russians   
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the Baltic countries’ 
independence, a number of applicants belonging to the Russian-speaking minority faced the 
disruption of their family lives arising from expulsion orders against them.
938
 In compliance with 
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treaties on the withdrawal of Russian troops, some of these applicants were required to leave the 
country as members of the families of retired Russian military officers.  
Slivenko v. Latvia is arguably the most well-known example. The applicants, a mother 
and her daughter, argued that forcing them out of Latvia would mean separating them from their 
elderly parents (grandparents) and breaking up their family life. The Court held that the 
deportation measure did not tear apart the applicants’ family life since the family, that is to say, 
mother, father and daughter, were deported to Russia all together.
939
 The elderly parents 
(grandparents), the Court said, were ‘adults who did not belong to the core family’ and were not 
shown to be ‘dependent members of the applicants’ family’.940 According to the Court, family 
life ‘established in the territory of a Contracting State by aliens lawfully resident there […] is 
normally limited to the core family’.941  
Judge Kovler’s partly dissenting opinion takes issue with the majority’s choice of ‘the 
traditional concept of a family […] that is to say, a conjugal family consisting of a father, a 
mother and their children below the age of majority, while adult children and grandparents are 
excluded from the circle’.942 The tradition of the extended family, Judge Kovler observes, is 
strongly rooted in Eastern and Southern European countries and enshrined in some of these 
countries’ basic laws.943 Family life, he concludes, is ‘plainly inconceivable for [the applicants] 
if they were denied the possibility of looking after those relatives’.944  
Relationships between adult siblings and between aunts/uncles and nephews/nieces have 
similarly sought recognition under family life in other cases against Latvia. Nowhere is this more 
clearly illustrated than in Sisojeva.
945
 In this case, the applicants explicitly advanced their claims 
on a cultural basis. They claimed to belong to the Udmurt ethnic group, ‘for whom the 
relationship between grandchildren and their grandparents was traditionally very close’.946 They 
argued that any attempt to cast doubt upon their family ties would then be ‘contrived and 
unfounded’.947  
The Chamber judgment, however, simply overlooks this aspect of their claim. It does not 
address the links between grandparents and grandchildren. Nor does it refer to the ties between 
the aunt and her sister’s children. Instead, it centers on the relationships between parents and 
children and between siblings, arguing that they are all adults not entitled to claim family life.
948
 
Again, the only judge sensitive to the applicants’ claim is Judge Kovler for whom the applicants, 
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of Udmurt ethnic origin, ‘traditionally have much stronger family ties between parents and adult 
children than is appreciated in Western Europe’.949  
 
3. Migrants from Outside the Council of Europe 
Applicants of a wide variety of national origins outside Europe – including Algerian,950 
Bangladeshi,
951
 Indian,
952
 Nigerian,
953
 and Pakistani
954
 – comprise yet another group of 
applicants claiming family life outside the ‘core’ of the family unit. Notably, a significant 
amount of these cases concerns the expulsion of ‘quasi-nationals’, that is, settled applicants with 
well-established links in the Member State in question.
955
 These applicants were either born in 
the ‘host’956 country or arrived there during early childhood.957 Applying the standard principle 
that relationships outside the core of the family unit do not count as ‘family life’, the Court has 
often rejected family ties between parents and adult children, between adult siblings and 
between extended relatives where additional elements of dependence were lacking.  
At times, however, the Court has relaxed its general approach by accepting the existence 
of family life between parents and adult children. The fact that applicants were still young and 
have not yet founded ‘a family of their own’ has seemingly played a role in the Court’s decisions 
in favor of the existence of family life in these cases.
958
 Maslov v. Austria is a good example.
959
 
Mr. Maslov – who lawfully entered Austria at the age of six, together with his parents and 
siblings – still lived at his parents’ home after reaching the age of majority and had no children 
of his own. In this case, the Court’s Grand Chamber recalls that it ‘has accepted in a number of 
cases concerning young adults who had not yet founded a family of their own that their 
relationship with their parents and other close family members also constituted “family life”’.960  
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Yet, at other times, relationships between adult children and parents/siblings have not 
been afforded recognition. For example, in Miah v. the United Kingdom the Court dismissed the 
family life claim by an applicant trying to resist expulsion.
961
 He was also a young adult not yet 
with ‘a family of his own’962 and had lived with his stepmother, his older brother, his brother's 
wife and daughter in the same house.
963
 The family, he claimed, was ‘close knit and maintained 
regular contact’.964 The existence of ‘family life’ was nonetheless denied by the Court given the 
lack of substantiation of additional elements of dependence with his parents and siblings.
965
   
The dependency requirement usually alludes to financial and material dependence.
966
 
While the meaning of financial dependence is self-evident, material dependence seemingly 
includes the kind of dependence associated with giving or receiving (mental and physical) care. 
In general, the threshold seems high: the health condition in question must be quite severe before 
the Court accepts the existence of dependence. In A.W. Khan v. the United Kingdom, for 
example, the Court dismissed the fact that family members suffering from different health 
complaints constituted a ‘sufficient degree of dependence to result in the existence of family 
life’.967 For the Court, there was no evidence to suggest that these conditions were ‘so severe as 
to entirely incapacitate [the applicant’s relatives]’.968 In Anam v. the United Kingdom, on the 
other side, the Court accepted that ‘the applicant has a higher degree of reliance on his mother 
and adult siblings than other adults as a result of his diagnosed mental health problems and finds, 
for this reason, that family life exists between them’.969 The Court has similarly admitted such a 
degree of dependency between an adult son with mental disabilities and his parents
970
 as well as 
between an adult son with impaired hearing and speech abilities and his parents/siblings.
971
  
Also, in Imamovic v. Sweden, the Court found it established that the applicant parents were 
‘somewhat dependent’ on their adult daughters (even when they had founded their own families) 
‘due mainly to the first applicant’s unstable health’ and found that in such circumstances their 
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situation amounted to family life.
972
 The Court considered that the father suffered ‘from rather 
severe mental and physical health problems, including threats to commit suicide’.973 
The dependency criterion has been criticized within the Court itself. Judge Spielmann is 
probably one of its most vocal critics. In various separate opinions, he has vindicated the 
importance of sentimental ties in the determination of the existence of family life.
974
 For 
example, he has found it ‘inconceivable’ that the majority attached ‘so little importance’ to the 
affective ties between a mother and her daughter.
975
 ‘Giving precedence to the criterion of 
dependency to the detriment of that of normal affective ties’ has struck him ‘as a very artificial 
approach to determining the existence of “family life”’.976 Judge Spielmann has not hesitated to 
question this line of case law for ‘greatly impoverish[ing] the notion of “family life”’.977  
 
C. Consequences of the Court’s Restrictive Approach 
 
The Court has been far from consistent when it comes to the consequences attached to the 
application of its narrow understanding of family life in entry and expulsion cases. One approach 
has been to reject the existence of family life altogether and to subsequently remove the family 
links in question from the scope of Article 8(1) ECHR. This approach means the end of the 
Court’s inquiry – and of the case – as there is obviously no examination of the justification of the 
interference, in particular, no assessment of the proportionality of the restriction in question. One 
example of this approach is S. and S. v. the United Kingdom.
978
 The Commission held that, in 
failing to establish any sort of material or financial dependence, the applicants’ relationship – 
that of a mother and her 33-year old son – could not attract the protection of Article 8 ECHR.979 
The result, therefore, was that their form of family life did not even engage Article 8 ECHR. The 
Court concludes: ‘there is no appearance of a breach of the right to respect for family life’.980 
Another approach consists in skipping any scope considerations of whether the alleged 
bonds amount to family life and in applying the dependency criterion directly in the 
proportionality analysis. A case in point is Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v. the Netherlands, concerning 
the refusal of residence permits on family reunification grounds to a couple’s children.981 The 
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Court concluded that the applicants did not establish that their two adult children were in any 
way financially or materially dependent on them.
982
 The effect of this approach is that 
applicants’ relationships are attached no weight in the proportionality. In fact, what happens is 
that the restrictive conception of family life requiring substantiation of dependency between 
adult relatives is simply applied at a different, later stage: the proportionality analysis.
983
 The 
application in Kwakye-Nti and Dufie was declared ‘manifestly ill-founded’, since the Respondent 
State struck a fair balance between the applicants’ interests and its own.  
A third approach has been to exclude the links in question from the scope of ‘family life’ 
and announce that they will count instead as ‘private life’. In other words, notwithstanding the 
denial of family life, the Court states that it will still take these ties into account under the private 
life heading of Article 8 § 1 ECHR.
984
 The Court, however, does not always end up including 
these links – at least not explicitly – in the assessment of whether the interference with 
applicants’ private life is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In Slivenko v. Latvia, for 
example, the Court states it will consider the mother’s and her daughter’s links with their parents 
(grandparents) under ‘private life’ but, in the end, says no word on these links in the 
proportionality.
985
 At other times, the Court simply reiterates in the proportionality that the 
applicants have failed to meet the dependency criterion. The Court thereby (re)applies the 
restrictive conception of family requiring substantiation of dependency between adult relatives at 
a different stage.
986
 Either way, the ultimate consequence in both cases is that the applicants’ 
alleged family relationships are given no weight in the proportionality.   
Yet another (somewhat similar) approach applied in cases concerning non-nationals who 
have spent most of – if not all – their lives in the ‘host’ country is that ‘[r]egardless of the 
existence or otherwise of a “family life”, the expulsion of a settled migrant . . . constitutes an 
interference with his or her right to respect for private life’.987 This is because ‘the totality of 
social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitutes part 
of the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8’.988 This approach may carry 
several consequences. Sometimes – and notwithstanding the refusal to count applicants’ links as 
‘family life’ – the Court assesses these links in the proportionality when determining the strength 
of applicants’ ties to the ‘host’ country. For example, in Onur v. the United Kingdom, the Court 
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found that the applicant did not enjoy family life with his mother and siblings ‘as he has not 
demonstrated the additional element of dependence normally required to establish family life 
between adult parents and adult children.’989 Yet in the proportionality the Court did mention his 
mother, brother and three of his sisters and the fact that they were all in the United Kingdom, 
since they held either British citizenship or permanent residence.
990
 Other times, however, the 
Court simply omits assessing applicants’ family links when examining their private life in the 
proportionality.
991
 So, in other words, there is no guarantee that the applicants’ family situation 
will ultimately be evaluated later on in the analysis. What is more, even if they were to count at 
the proportionality stage, this does not necessarily mean that the Court will attach strong weight 
to these relationships. In A.H. Kahn v. the United Kingdom, for example, the Court found in the 
proportionality that the applicant’s family life with his parents and siblings was ‘limited in its 
extent’, albeit without specifying why.992  
In other cases, the Court has found that there was actually no need to establish the 
existence of family life between adult children and their parents in the scope analysis.
993
 The 
argument here is that ‘in practice the factors to be examined in order to assess the proportionality 
of the deportation measure are essentially the same regardless of whether family or private life is 
engaged’.994 Most recently, in Berisha v. Switzerland – a case concerning the refusal of residence 
permits on family reunification grounds to the applicants’ three children born in Kosovo – the 
Court left the question of whether the parents had family life with their oldest young adult son 
‘open’.995 These sorts of approach, though questionable for their lack of clarity and certainty – 
the Court avoids saying whether these links come or not within the family life scope of Article 8 
ECHR – at least leave room for weighing up the elements arising from family relationships 
outside the core in the proportionality.
996
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In conclusion, the Court appears more and more willing to recognize family relationships 
falling short of the ‘core’ family within the scope of Article 8 ECHR, usually under the heading 
of ‘private life’ – especially in cases concerning the expulsion of established non-nationals. This 
development has led some to argue that ‘the restrictive new understanding of family life does not 
translate into a restriction of rights protection’.997 This is because, while family life may be 
restrictive, private life is simultaneously expanded to ‘catch’ those links falling short of family 
life. These links, therefore, in theory count as part of migrant applicants’ wider social relations, 
regardless of their family life situation. It is indeed true that the extent of the guarantee 
ultimately remains the same – because family and private life are equally protected under Article 
8 ECHR
998
 and because, in any event, migrants’ family links beyond the core count as private 
life. The fact remains, however, that the restrictive principle – and its underlying assumptions – 
stays in place. At the end of the day, there is no official recognition of the value of extended 
family links and of family links between grown-ups qua family life for migrants in Article 8 
ECHR jurisprudence.  
Moreover, under the ‘private life’ formula (i.e., the Court examines the family links in 
question under ‘private life’) and the ‘open’ formula (i.e., the Court leaves the question open, as 
the elements to be weighed are ultimately the same), these links are supposed to be assessed in 
the proportionality analysis. The problem, however, is that in practice these family relationships 
are not always considered at this stage of the analysis. Sometimes, the Court either omits 
assessing these relationships or explicitly rejects them following the (re-)application of the 
restrictive rationale. The Court thus seems to want to have it both ways: retain the freedom to 
count these links whenever it regards them as substantial enough to be worthy of protection 
while officially keeping the restrictive principle intact in family migration case law. Either in the 
scope or in the proportionality – and regardless of the outcome in the particular cases – the Court 
keeps in place the problematic assumption that equal treatment is measured by a biased norm, 
that is to say, by a norm whose criteria for inclusiveness correspond to the cultural religious 
particularities of only some. I return to these inegalitarian implications in Part II.  
 
D. Possible Explanations to the Court’s Restrictive Approach 
Why is the notion of family life overall so ‘impoverished’ – as Judge Spielmann would say – in 
immigration cases? Why does the Court accept for example that relationships between 
grandparents and grandchildren are part of family life in access cases in mainstream society 
while denying them in the context of family migration? One would have expected the Court to 
offer some kind of justification for its prescriptively narrow model in light of the increasing 
plurality of family forms in Europe and the large recognition of this reality in the rest of its 
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Article 8 ECHR case law. The fact, however, is that the justification for the restrictive approach 
remains largely opaque in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.   
Two sets of explanations for the Court’s differential, restrictive approach come to mind. 
In the first place, the Court’s restrictive stance in admission and expulsion case law may be 
motivated by the need to put a limit to the number of family members entitled to Article 8 ECHR 
protection in order to enable Contracting States to keep immigration under control and protect 
their economic well-being.
999
 There is, however, a partial limitation to this explanation: whereas 
this may account for the Court’s restrictive approach in entry cases – where immigration control 
and economic well-being are at stake – it does not necessarily explain why the Court would keep 
a similarly restrictive stance in expulsion cases. Indeed, in the latter cases, different sorts of 
considerations are normally at issue (e.g., protection of national security, prevention of disorder 
and crime). Most importantly, in expulsion cases – unlike family reunification cases where 
applicants seek to introduce their relatives in the ‘host’ country – applicants’ family members 
have usually long been established in the territory of the Member State. In other words, the 
acceptance of someone’s family life would generally not mean an increase of the migrant 
population in its territory, at least not directly.   
The idea that the Court may be using the notion of ‘core’ family as a way of restricting 
the applicability of family life to as few individuals as possible when immigration is at issue may 
partly account for the restrictive approach but does not necessarily justify it. While immigration 
control and economic well-being concerns should certainly partake of the proportionality 
analysis, they cannot serve to justify the (unequal) removal of applicants’ family bonds from the 
scope of Article 8 ECHR. The Court would otherwise be sneaking into the scope considerations 
that belong in the proportionality.
1000
 What is more, the fact that those bonds fall within the 
scope of Article 8 ECHR does not necessarily mean that the applicants’ interests will ultimately 
prevail. First, the Court may always attach less weight to those family ties deemed weak when 
balancing applicants’ rights against State interests in the proportionality (instead of discarding 
them a priori at the definitional stage based on covert balancing). And then, even when the 
family ties in question are deemed strong, they may still be overridden by stronger State 
countervailing interests, such as immigration control. In sum, accepting wider family life bonds 
does not automatically entail that these bonds will trump State interests. The Court can still 
eschew placing a disproportionate burden on the State in the proportionality analysis.  
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In the second place, it is equally possible that the Court intended its narrow construction 
of family life to be in line with Member States’ definitions of family life in their domestic 
immigration laws. In EU Member States, for example, only the sponsor’s spouse and the 
couple’s minor children are eligible for family reunification, although it remains up to Member 
States to authorize family reunification of dependant first-degree relatives in the direct ascending 
line and adult unmarried children.
1001
 A partial limitation of this explanation is however that it is 
not clear whether the same restrictive approach prevails in immigration laws of non-EU Council 
of Europe Member States.   
The explanation that the Court is probably adopting a conception of family life prevalent 
in State Parties’ immigration laws echoes the role of European consensus in constructing the 
meaning of the ECHR autonomous concepts. Even assuming – for the sake of the argument – 
that the consensus in the Council of Europe Member States’ domestic immigration laws is wide, 
the argument is not entirely convincing in view of the Court’s broader case law. In the first place, 
it does not appear from the Strasbourg wider case law that the Court has decisively relied on the 
majority of domestic laws when constructing the meaning of autonomous ECHR concepts,
1002
 
even when, at times, it has claimed that these concepts ‘must be examined in the light of the 
common denominator of the respective legislation of the various Contracting States’.1003 Second 
– and most crucially – the Court has highlighted the importance of adopting an interpretation, 
‘which avoids inequalities of treatment based on distinctions which, at the present day, appear 
illogical or unsustainable’.1004 In the next part, I take issue with the unequal treatment arising 
from the Court’s interpretation of family life in Article 8 ECHR migration case law.   
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II. Challenging the Restrictive Conception of Family Life 
The Strasbourg appears oblivious to the fact that the family life notion largely prevailing in 
certain spheres of its case law is in practice advancing a certain cultural appropriation of the 
concept. The idea of core family endorsed by the Grand Chamber in Slivenko clearly alludes to 
the nuclear family model, that is to say, to an essentialist conception of family frequently 
idealized in some parts of Western Europe.
1005
 Helena Wray, for example, notes that ‘in 
European kinship, the critical relationship is between nuclear family members’.1006 
Anthropologist Roger Ballard explains how the priority given to conjugality in European 
kinship, reinforced by a commitment to individualism, has eroded inter- and intra-generational 
bonds:  
 
Having reached [adulthood], it is further expected that these free and autonomous individuals will 
select partners, marry, and set up similarly structured autonomous conjugal families of their own. 
To be sure, member of these autonomous households still expect to keep in contact with their 
parents and siblings, but such relationships are sustained by far weaker bonds of reciprocity than 
those associated with conjugality. Hence, for example, they are only expected to be associated with 
co-residence in contexts of exceptional economic hardship.
1007
 
 
Ballard contrasts these experiences with those of non-European settlers for whom family life is 
‘grounded not so much in the conjugality tie between husband and wife [but in] more demanding 
links of mutuality’ that bind wider family members.1008  
By all accounts, the reality of family life in Europe is more complexly diversified. As 
Judge Kovler observes in his dissent in Slivenko, the tradition of the extended family appears 
more strongly rooted in Eastern and Southern European countries’.1009 In fact, the form of family 
life favored in Article 8 ECHR migration jurisprudence – and, at times, in family life 
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jurisprudence more broadly – is not even the ‘standard’ in Western Europe.1010 For example, in 
Mediterranean Europe, it is not uncommon for adult children to share parental household: ‘the 
process of leaving the parental household is quite different . . . the definitive departure of young 
people tends to coincide more or less closely with their marriage and finding a stable job’.1011 
The Roma model of family, as discussed in Part I.B.1 of this Chapter,  if not found as such 
everywhere in the world, acts as another reminder that the model of the nuclear family is the odd 
one out in the world, and an impoverished one, as Judge Spielmann puts it.
1012
  
There are two problematic consequences flowing from using this particular cultural ideal 
of family as the standard against which to judge family life. In the first place, in construing 
family life in such restrictive, biased terms, the Court may be demanding many applicants to 
meet requirements they might view as entirely alien to their own cultural understandings while 
allowing others to comfortably live by theirs. The Court’s approach thus raises familiar concerns 
over ‘forcing people into a homogeneous mold that is untrue to them’ and that, furthermore, is 
not in fact neutral but a ‘reflection of one hegemonic culture’.1013 Moreover, in restricting a 
priori the personal bonds entitled to claim protection under ‘family life’ to one particular view, 
the Court may be in practice disadvantaging family lifestyles that do not fit into the strict nuclear 
model. Thus, the result is that the Court may be either encouraging these applicants to fit into an 
alien mould or denying them recognition (and sometimes protection) for not fitting into it. Either 
possibility carries negative exclusionary/egalitarian implications. In the end, only ‘deviant’ (non-
dominant) family lifestyles are either excluded or required to conform.
1014
  
The ideal of nuclear family required by the Court in family migration case law is 
furthermore particularly problematic because the model is out of tune with the reality of diverse 
family structures prevailing in contemporary Europe.
1015
 Family has experienced rapid changes 
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in the region over the past decades
1016
 and, as a result, has become ‘less uniform and 
homogenous’.1017 The Court’s approach may thus be viewed as rather paradoxical in a region 
where the conception of the nuclear family has been increasingly undermined. Indeed, 
employing the nuclear family model appears out of place in a world of divorce, remarriage and 
single parenting, to name just a few of today’s diverse family forms.1018 Moreover, it appears that 
multigenerational bonds have become increasingly important in some Western societies.
1019
 
Some argue that they ‘will not only enhance but in some cases replace nuclear family 
functions’.1020 The Court itself has said that ‘there is not just one way or one choice in the sphere 
of leading and living one's family or private life’.1021 In short, ‘the nuclear family as a cultural 
ideal does not accurately reflect the reality of many families today’.1022 There is therefore ‘far 
less in the way of shared conceptions of family life than is sometimes supposed’.1023   
To summarize, the Court’s restrictive conception of family life in migration case law 
appears deeply inegalitarian and out of tune with social reality.
1024
 It sets a standard that 
privileges a Western European cultural ideal of family life, against which many migrants’ 
lifestyles are implicitly judged ‘deviant’ – or as having the ‘wrong’ kinship relationships. 
Moreover, it excludes migrants from protection of a broader variety of family life forms usually 
available to the larger society without a clear justification. The result is that there is not much 
choice left to applicants: they either conform to a mainstream cultural standard (nuclear family) 
or risk different, inferior treatment.  
 
III. Moving Away from the ‘Nuclear Family’ Bias (and the Dependence Criterion)  
In this part, I propose that the Court consider moving away from the nuclear model as the 
yardstick. This proposal is twofold. It first requires abandoning the family life narrative reflected 
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in the notion of ‘core’ as the standard against which migrant (and other) applicants’ families are 
measured. In addition, it entails using criteria more attuned with the reality of Europe’s cultural 
diversity and more equally responsive to the varied forms of family life of those subject to the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Reconsideration of the Court’s current approach may thus be justified on the 
two bases discussed in the previous part: equality and reality.   
My proposal is that the Court simply sticks to the general principle prevailing in its wider 
case law. According to this principle, family life is ‘essentially a question of fact depending upon 
the real existence in practice of close personal ties’.1025 This would reduce – if not fully dispel – 
inegalitarian exclusions of family life forms, while still allowing the Court to discard those ties 
that fail to meet the condition of closeness in the scope part of the analysis. What should count, 
therefore, are ‘legal or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal 
relationship’.1026 This approach would not only be compatible with the Court’s case law itself; it 
would also keep applicants’ affective ties at the center of the inquiry. There is a host of relevant 
factors that the Court traditionally takes into account in determining the existence in practice of 
close personal ties. Cohabitation,
1027
 demonstrated interest and commitment,
1028
 and frequency 
of contact
1029
 are some of these factors.      
Butt v. Norway – concerning the expulsion of adult brother and sister to their country of 
origin – is one of the few expulsion cases where the Court has explicitly applied a ‘close 
emotional ties’ criterion when establishing whether the applicants’ relationship with their 
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extended relatives fell within the scope of Article 8 ECHR
. 1030
 In this case, cohabitation creates a 
presumption of closeness. The Court reasons:  
 
During most of their stay in Norway, the applicants lived at the home of their maternal uncle and 
aunt (their mother’s brother and sister) with family in Oslo, who took care of them. As observed by 
the High Court in its judgment of 14 November 2008 . . . the applicants lived with them until 2005 
and must therefore be presumed to have close emotional links to this part of the family. The Court 
further finds it established that the applicants lived with their uncle and aunt for most of the time 
thereafter.
1031
  
 
Alternatively, the Court can go further and adopt a broad conception of family life, 
encompassing all kinds of affective relations – and avoiding internal thresholds in the scope 
analysis – to then evaluate the closeness of applicants’ family links the proportionality.1032 Since 
closeness is a matter of degree and depends on a range of factors (e.g., cohabitation, 
commitment, dependence) its consideration might not so easily proceed in a black-and-white 
fashion (as required by a threshold-type of analysis).
1033
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‘the comparative strength or weakness of [settled migrants’ family or social ties in the 
Contracting State where they reside] ‘is, in the majority of cases, more appropriately considered 
in assessing the proportionality of the applicant’s deportation under Article 8 § 2’.1034 This 
approach is illustrated in Baghli v. France, a case concerning a ten-year exclusion order against 
an Algerian national who had lived in France since the age of two, as so have all the members of 
his family.
1035
 After accepting the existence of family between the adult applicant and his 
parents/siblings in the scope analysis,
1036
 the Court goes on to conclude in the proportionality 
that that the applicant ‘has not shown that he has close ties with either his parents or his brothers 
and sisters living in France’.1037    
In assessing closeness, dependency can be one more factor but not the criterion or the 
sole factor. The requirement of dependency, as framed by the Court, appears to be a problematic 
proxy for the determination of whether applicants’ relational ties amount to family life. First, it 
overestimates financial/material independence while trivializing emotional dependence of adult 
family members. Indeed, implicit in this requirement is the assumption that the adult family 
member – although less and less young adults – is prototypically financially and materially 
independent. Only exceptionally (as a result of e.g., mental and physical health problems or 
financial hardship) do they rely on their family relatives, including parents, for support. Second, 
the requirement of dependency trivializes the emotional ties involved in family life not only by 
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 See, e.g., ECtHR, Akbulut v. the United Kingdom, 10 April 2012 § 16. 
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1037
 Ibid. § 48.   
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making clear that these ties are not per se enough to amount to family life – no matter how close 
they may be – but also by giving precedence to financial or physical considerations at the 
expense of emotional dependence.  
In examining closeness, the Court can additionally show greater sensitivity to the cultural 
backgrounds and understandings of family life informing applicants’ claims, especially when this 
aspect is raised by them explicitly. In fact, this approach has been advocated by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) when it comes to the refugee family: ‘pragmatism and 
flexibility, in addition to cultural sensitivity, [should] be brought to bear in the process of 
identifying members of the refugee family’.1038 
It goes without saying that neither of the proposed approaches – sticking to the closeness 
criterion in the scope or in the proportionality analyses – means that the applicants’ close family 
links will necessarily override States’ interests. The ultimate outcome of the case will always be 
determined by the balancing of the interests at stake – that is to say, by balancing applicants’ 
interest in developing her family life in the Contracting State against the State interests in its 
economic well-being, immigration control or crime prevention. 
 
Conclusion  
In this Chapter, I have shown that the radical inclusive potential of the notion of ‘family life’ 
prevailing in the Court’s broader Article 8 ECHR case law is largely muted in the areas of 
admission and expulsion of non-nationals. By restricting a priori the personal bonds entitled to 
claim protection under family life to one particular cultural view – the predominantly Western 
essentialist ideal of the nuclear family – the Court is in practice disadvantaging family lifestyles 
that do not fit into it. As a result, it is either excluding these lifestyles from recognition (and 
sometimes from protection) or forcing them to fit into an alien mold without even offering a 
clear justification for this unequal treatment. This Chapter has sought to encourage the Court to 
move away from the approach currently prevailing in its migration case law towards a more 
inclusive account that makes room for other forms of family life qua family life on a par with the 
nuclear family. A more egalitarian and workable concept of family life, as the Butt judgment 
shows, is possible.  
 
*  *  *  
 
The analysis in Chapters IV and V shows that the Court’s assumptions informing its 
understandings of religion and family life do not reflect universal or all-inclusive conceptions. 
On the contrary, these assumptions privilege specific historical and cultural constructs that 
produce and disadvantage an array of ‘others’. Viewed in this light, the fundamental issue 
                                                          
1038
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Family Protection Issues, 4 June 1999, EC/49/SC/CRP.14 at 
4, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae9aca00.html [accessed 6 October 2013]. Emphasis added.  
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becomes not just one of opening up the prevailing conceptions of religion and family life but one 
of equally opening them up. My proposal goes in the latter direction. It pushes for conceptions of 
religion or family life that comprehend one form not as the form but as a form of religion or 
family life. For example, instead of seeing internal belief as the mark of freedom of religion, I 
propose seeing it as a mark, that is, as one more mark among others. The point is therefore not to 
replace the Protestant or the nuclear family standards with other religious or family lifestyle 
models. The point is to include them alongside the Protestant and the nuclear family forms.   
To conclude Part II, and like in the previous Part, I want to offer a scheme of what the 
proposed inquiries in freedom of religion and family life jurisprudence may look like. The first 
scheme illustrates my proposal to interpret the two forums of freedom of religion more 
interactively in order to avoid a hierarchy between the two of them – and the religious forms and 
experiences associated with one or the other. The second scheme illustrates my suggestion to 
adopt the more inclusive approach to family life usually followed by the Court in broader areas 
of its Article 8 ECHR case law. In particular, this scheme illustrates the proposal to place 
emphasis on the real or de facto indicators of family life, in particular, closeness. The second 
scheme further shows the different factors (rather than requirements) the Court can rely on to 
determine closeness (e.g., cohabitation, dependency, frequency of contact, cultural 
understandings).  
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I. FREEDOM OF RELIGION INQUIRY 
 
 
 
II. FAMILY LIFE INQUIRY  
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PART III 
OPENING UP THE SUB- RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL ECHR SUBJECT 
 
 
Feminists, no less than anyone else, and perhaps more than 
people who have felt at home in the prevailing conceptions of 
reality, want something to hang on to, some sense of the validity 
of our own perceptions and experience, some certainty – not 
more experiences of doubt. Yet, each form of certainty hazards a 
new arrogance, projecting oneself, one’s own experience, or 
one’s own kind as the model for all. 
-- Martha Minow
1039
 
 
This part brings into view two more exclusionary workings flowing from the Court’s assessment 
of cultural and religious claims. These forms of exclusion recreate the pitfalls discussed in the 
previous parts but at a different level: the particular is posited as the universal not across groups 
but within groups. The first way in which the Court replicates this form of exclusion is by 
elevating one cultural or religious practice/way of life to the group paradigmatic practice/way of 
life and by further fixing it as the essence of group identity. For instance, ‘the turban’ is at the 
core of the Sikh identity. Likewise, the ‘Gypsy way of life’ remains essential to the Roma 
cultural identity even though social reality may show that many Roma no longer travel 
continuously. Thus, unlike the kinds of exclusions and hierarchies discussed in the two previous 
parts – the ones within the abstract human rights subject and the abstract religious and cultural 
human rights subject – this form of exclusion and hierarchy takes place within the sub- religious 
and cultural human rights subject.  
The second way in which the Court recreates exclusion is in fact more complex. It 
resembles the first form in that it posits one particular feature or experience as representative of 
the whole group. Yet it differs from the first version in that it additionally equates this feature or 
experience with negative stereotypes. Thus, in this second form, the exclusions and hierarchies 
occur (i) within groups because one particular feature or experience is elevated as the defining 
characteristic of the whole group and (ii) most crucially – and the aspect I focus on in this last 
Chapter – across groups because, in further depicting the practice in question in negative terms, 
it creates an us/them binary. For example, depicting the Islamic headscarf as a symbol of 
religious oppression not only obscures variation within the group of Muslim women – who may 
wear (or not) the headscarf for a broad array of reasons – but inherently creates hierarchies 
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across several groups (e.g., Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims, Muslim women vis-à-vis non-
Muslim women, assigning the former subordinate status).  
In short, the two versions of exclusions and hierarchizations studied in this part involve a 
reductionist process – the group or collective is reduced to one general trait and this is posited as 
the group trait. Yet one fundamental difference is that, whereas under the first form of exclusion 
or hierarchization the trait is valued or esteemed, under the second form the trait is devalued or 
delegitimized.  
Using language as an entry point of my analysis
1040
 and incorporating a major post-
modern insight – the rejection of fixed, coherent and homogenous conceptions of the self and 
group identity
1041
 – I critically examine the Court’s representations of applicants’ religious and 
cultural groups and practices in its legal discourse. One form the post-modern problematization 
of group representation has taken is known as anti-essentialism.
1042
 In its most basic sense, anti-
essentialism is the objection to the idea that categories of people or collectives (e.g., women, 
Muslims, heterosexuals) have a constituting, unchanging ‘essence’. There are however several 
understandings of essentialism. Anne Phillips, for example, identifies four: (i) attributing certain 
characteristics to everyone within a category; (ii) attributing certain characteristics to the 
category itself ‘in ways that naturalise or reify what may be socially created or constructed’; (iii) 
using collectives in ways that assume homogeneity and unification within the group and (iv) 
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Press, 2002) and Phillips, Anne, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE (Princeton University Press, 2007).  
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treating certain characteristics as defining the group.
1043
 The anti-essentialist objection seeks to 
address a number of dangers. One of them is the neglect of intra-group difference manifested in 
the privileging of certain perspectives or experiences at the expense of others.
1044
 A significant 
part of Chapter VI focuses on this danger: the exclusionary consequences arising from treating as 
universal the particular cultural or religious characteristics or views of some members within the 
group. But Chapter VI also discusses a particular invidious form in which essentialism may 
manifest itself: negative stereotypes.
1045
    
In brief, incorporating the anti-essentialist insight does not mean giving up on group 
categories and generalizations. In fact, postmodernism does not reject group or identity 
categories (e.g., woman, race) but rather ‘problematizes and de-essentializes them’.1046 Since in a 
postmodern perspective, ‘identity is always constructed,’1047 the challenge is to identity as 
essential or natural rather than to identities as socio-historical constructs.
1048
 Moreover, the law, 
as I will explain in more detail below, works on the basis of generalizations and categorizations. 
Indeed, the legal analysis of difference with its focus on categorizations ‘bears much similarity to 
legal analysis in general’: in its judicial form, legal analysis ‘typically addresses whether a given 
situation “fits” in a category defined by a legal rule or instead belongs outside of it’, asking “Is 
this a that?”’1049 A rigid ban on group categorizations and generalizations may furthermore 
impede acknowledging and remedying the inequalities and disadvantages along these group 
categories.
1050
 That is, such a ban may impede scrutinizing the kinds of group-based 
vulnerabilities discussed in Part I (the ones arising from societal contexts and arrangements that 
make the individuals situated in society through certain groups more likely to suffer harm).  
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In incorporating anti-essentialist insights, I simply aim to adopt a critical posture to the 
use of group generalizations and categorizations. This critical stance involves reflecting on ‘how, 
when and why’ such generalizations and categorizations originate and are employed.1051 
Moreover, it requires acknowledging their partial, revisable and contingent nature.
1052
 In the 
words of Dianne Otto, ‘the issue is not one of dispensing with abstractions or of refining them 
until they are “correct.” It is, rather, of continually questioning which categories we use in 
human rights discourse and contesting the power that is attributed to them by modernity's dual 
constructions of Standard and Other’.1053 The Chapter that follows is an attempt to embrace this 
critical posture.   
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CHAPTER VI 
RELIGION AND CULTURE IN THE STRASBOURG DISCOURSE:  
THE RISKS OF NATURALIZING AND STEREOTYPING

 
 
 
Introduction  
In examining how the law talks about people, James Boyd White distinguishes between 
characters and caricatures. While characters, he argues, are ‘believable, full, complex’, 
caricatures reduce people to ‘single exaggerated aspects, to labels, roles, moments from their 
lives’.1054 ‘The law’, he pithily pronounces, ‘is a literature of caricature’.1055  
Over the past few decades, a number of legal scholars has wrestled with the (in)capacity 
of the law to do full justice to individuals’ complex, shifting subjectivities on the ground.1056 One 
of the main questions underlying these scholars’ concerns is how the law, with its ‘discomfort 
with uncertainty’ and ‘thirst for fixed answers’, can be attentive and responsive to unstable lived 
experiences.
1057
 This concern holds not only for the law in its basic form, the rule, but also for 
one of its flexible versions – adjudication. Indeed, legal cases tend to neglect detail and 
complexity ‘on the side of the facts and on the side of the law’.1058 In other words, contrary to 
experience, which is ‘personal, ambivalent, shifting, contextual’, legal cases are supposed to be 
‘clear’.1059  
The gaps between a real-life person and her ‘legal persona’ become especially visible in 
the context of legal proceedings,
1060
 as the law has its own recognizability terms, that is, the rules 
that facilitate claimants’ recognition in the courtroom. If they want to make sense to courts, 
claimants have to tell their stories and present themselves in legally recognizable ways. This not 
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only means translating everyday language into legal language,
1061
 turning personal traits into 
legal arguments,
1062
 transforming stories into rule-oriented narratives
1063
 and following ‘rules of 
evidence and procedure’.1064 Most fundamentally, this may also mean turning particularities into 
generalities,
1065
 narratives into meta-narratives,
1066
 ‘characters’ into ‘caricatures’.1067 Applicants’ 
real-life and complex stories may thus get lost in the various layers of judicial translation, 
including legal counseling, which often turns the personal into the collective or ‘represses the 
litigant as a distinctly contingent subject in order to reconstruct it in rhetorically effective 
ways’.1068 
Law’s need for clarity and certainty may partly explain why litigants often adopt fixed 
notions of group identity
1069
 in what is known as ‘strategic essentialism’.1070 The ‘essentialising 
proclivities of law’1071 are particularly at work in assessments of group identity traits – including 
cultural and religious traits – as individuals inevitably come to courts as part of collectives.1072 In 
the words of Susanne Baer: ‘Whenever a “culture” or a “religion” claims recognition, we have 
the problem of reification, in that this suggests that the culture or religion is homogenous’.1073 
Or, as stated by the South African Constitutional Court: ‘There is a danger of falling into an 
antiquated mode of understanding culture as a single unified entity that can be studied and 
defined from outside’.1074 In fact, attempts to capture any group commonality often fall prey to 
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charges of ‘essentialism’.1075 Essentialism has been understood as ‘a belief in the real, true 
essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the “whatness” of a given 
entity’.1076 These properties may be attributed to ‘everyone identified with a particular category’ 
or to the ‘category itself’, often in naturalizing and reifying ways.1077 The assumption is that all 
within the category ‘share the same inherent characteristics’.1078  
Scholarly literature – notably feminist legal and political theory – is full of warnings 
against the essentialist understandings of collective identities traditionally associated with 
identity politics.
1079
 Wrongs include reducing people to ‘one trait, one viewpoint and one 
stereotype’,1080 trapping people in categories that deny self-definition,1081 fixing differences 
among groups and ‘imposing uniformity within them’1082 and policing group boundaries ‘to 
regulate internal membership’.1083Another fundamental objection to positing one group 
experience as paradigmatic at the expense of others – which is what essentialism is mostly 
about
1084
 – is that it reinforces hierarchies within groups or categories.1085 The experiences of 
some are thus either ignored or treated as ‘different’ from the ‘norm’.1086   
Incorporating these insights from the anti-essentialist critique and borrowing tools from 
critical discourse analysis, this Chapter scrutinizes the ways in which the Strasbourg Court 
represents individuals’ religious and cultural practices in its legal discourse. My analysis starts 
from the assumption that, given the nature of legal discourse and of cultural and religious claims, 
some degree of abstraction or generalization is inevitable. For instance, it is hard to imagine an 
analysis of Article 9 ECHR (freedom of religion) or Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination) 
without the categorizations intrinsic to their operation. It is equally hard to think of cultural and 
religious claims without individuals’ identifications with groups and, as a result, without some 
level of collectivization. The challenge is distinguishing inevitable and inoffensive 
generalizations from more problematic ones. As Anne Phillips puts it: ‘Essentialism is a way of 
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thinking not always so easily distinguished from more innocent forms of generalisation, and 
what is wrong with it is often a matter of degree rather than categorical embargo’.1087  
The crucial questions therefore are when and why the Court’s generalizations of 
applicants and their practices become problematic. These questions are far from minor if one 
considers that the law ‘imposes itself coercively on the lives of those who come within its 
embrace.’1088 The Court’s articulation of a certain notion of religious or cultural identity may 
thus impose the power of the law behind the designated identity.
1089
 Moreover, over time, the 
Court’s discourse may sustain ‘a vocabulary of identities’ that may either channel future 
claimants ‘into recognized identity categories with conventional scripts for behaviour’1090 or 
exclude them from protection. This is because of ‘the sedimenting effects’ produced by the 
development of case law, which tends to entrench ideas about what group traits ‘are’.1091  
I argue that the Court’s reliance on generalizations becomes problematic when, following 
the applicant’s exclusion (usually by reducing her to and replacing her by one general trait), the 
Court (i) equates the trait in question with negative stereotypes and (ii) posits the trait in question 
as the group’s ‘paradigmatic’ practice or as representative of the whole group.1092 I further 
contend that these two forms of depictions are harmful both for the individuals (actual applicants 
and those likely to be affected by the Court’s rulings in the future) and for the groups concerned 
because of the inequalities they sustain across and within groups.  
The Chapter proceeds as follows. After offering a brief explanation of the methodology, I 
present the chief research findings of my study and offer an in-depth analysis of the Court’s 
discourse in the areas where I have found problematic depictions. My findings suggest that the 
Court uses the two problematic modes of reasoning mentioned above most frequently when 
assessing the practices of Muslim women, Sikhs and Roma Gypsies. This part is followed by a 
brief comparison with the Court’s broader case law, including gender and sexuality cases, with a 
view to offering possible explanations for why problematic representations are to be expected in 
certain groups of cases. Based on the lessons drawn along the Chapter, I conclude by sketching 
out the basic elements of an approach capable of mitigating the stereotyping and essentializing 
risks.   
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I. Methodology  
 
A. Selection of Cases and Scope of the Analysis   
 
This Chapter looks at the Court’s discourse in primarily three areas of its case law: freedom of 
religion (Article 9 ECHR),
1093
 the right to respect for minority cultural lifestyle (Article 8 
ECHR)
1094
 and non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).
1095
 The reason for focusing on these 
ECHR provisions is because these are the ones through which applicants have most commonly 
demanded protection of their religious and cultural practices. The selected cases comprise a mix 
of ‘high-profile cases’ – which I define as Grand Chamber and widely-cited cases in the Court’s 
jurisprudence – and less known cases. Moreover, the sample includes a mix of Grand Chamber 
judgments, Chamber judgments and inadmissibility decisions passed over roughly the last fifteen 
years.
1096
 Though the selection of cases is by no means complete, it is substantial enough to 
allow for meaningful analysis.   
The analysis is based on two levels of investigation. The first (and broad) level involves a 
look into the Court’s wider discourse on identity traits – in particular, case law concerning 
individuals claiming protection of their religious/cultural practices and case law involving 
women and sexual minorities.
1097
 I compare the Court’s language in these different areas of its 
identity-based case law in order to identify significant patterns – i.e. which groups of applicants 
                                                          
1093
 Article 9 ECHR does not only guarantee freedom of religion but also freedom of thought and conscience. It is 
therefore difficult to establish the exact number of ‘freedom of religion’ rulings on the basis of an Article 9 ECHR 
search in the Court’s database ‘HUDOC’. However, my sample makes sure to include all Level of Importance ‘1’ 
judgments/decisions on ‘freedom of religion’. This level is assigned by the Court itself and means that the ruling in 
question makes a significant contribution to the development, clarification or modification of its case-law. 
Moreover, the selection includes all relevant judgments/decisions featuring in the 2013 ‘Freedom of Religion’ 
factsheet prepared by the Court. Additionally, the case selection includes several high-profile rulings from others 
areas of the Court’s case law, including freedom of association, the right to respect for family life and the right to 
education, as they also involve religious claims. In total, I have examined sixty seven rulings involving religious 
claims.  
1094
 Article 8 ECHR guarantees the right to respect for home, private and family life but the Court has derived from 
this provision a right to protection of one’s minority way of life (see, e.g., ECmmHR, G. and E. v Norway, 3 
October 1983). For this reason, finding and determining the exact number of cases concerning the protection of 
applicants’ cultural practices/ways of life in the HUDOC database is not a straightforward enterprise. Moreover, 
there is no available factsheet on the issue. Thus, in order to find the relevant cases, I have used the following search 
terms in HUDOC: ‘way of life’, ‘cultural practice’, ‘minority lifestyle’ and ‘lifestyle’. I have run the same search 
with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (protection of property), as this is another ECHR provision through which cultural 
claims might be channelled. In total, I have examined twenty one rulings involving cultural practices.  
1095
 The study focuses on discrimination cases to the extent that they concern applicants’ cultural and religious 
practices. This means that these cases are already included in the results under other relevant ECHR provisions 
(Articles 8, 9, 11, Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 2 of Protocol 1). This is because Article 14 ECHR is not 
autonomous but has effect only in relation to ECHR rights.  
1096
 I take 1998 as a point of departure for the case selection because, since 1998, the Strasbourg Court has sat as a 
full-time Court, following the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the ECHR. The cases have thus been selected from 
the period of 1 January 1998-15 July 2013.   
1097
 Cases on women, gays, lesbians and transsexuals have been selected from factsheets prepared by the Court on 
the following themes: ‘Reproductive Rights’, March 2013; ‘Violence against Women’, May 2013; ‘Sexual 
Orientation’, May 2013; and ‘Gender Identity’, May 2013. These factsheets, though not exhaustive, contain 
important, high-profile rulings. In total, I have looked at fifty gender and sexuality cases.  
200 
 
(and their traits) are represented most problematically in Strasbourg – and to formulate possible 
explanations for why problematic representations are to be expected in certain groups of cases. 
The second (and specific) level of inquiry involves in-depth discourse analysis of the sub-sets of 
cases where problematic patterns have been found. Since this form of analysis only allows space 
for detailed discussion of a limited number of cases, I focus solely on four problematic 
judgments: Leyla Şahin v. Turkey,1098 Dahlab v. Switzerland,1099 Mann Singh v. France,1100 and 
Chapman v. the United Kingdom.
1101
 
 
B. Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
My analysis of the Court’s discourse relies on a set of heuristic tools employed in critical 
discourse analysis, a form of analysis that views representation in discourse as ‘a constructive 
practice’ rather than as just neutral communication of events or ideas.1102 For critical discourse 
analysis, the language through which identities are constructed reveals ‘a subject’s attitudes and 
ideologies’.1103 This strand of discourse analysis focuses on ‘the relation of language to power 
and privilege’.1104 In particular, it looks at the role that ‘structures, strategies and other properties 
of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events’ play in the (re)production of inequality 
in society.
1105
 
Of particular relevance for my analysis are some notions developed by critical discourse 
scholar, Theo van Leeuwen, in his work on representation of social actors and social actions.
1106
 
Van Leeuwen critically examines the transformations that take place in the re-contextualization 
of social practices – that is, in discourse.1107 These transformations may include substituting, 
excluding and adding elements of such practices (e.g., social actors, time, location) by way of 
different representational choices.
1108 
Each of these choices, he claims, takes place through 
‘specific linguistic or rhetorical realizations’.1109 Simply put, Van Leeuwen’s idea is that, when 
we represent a social practice, we add new meanings by transforming the actual elements of the 
practice through different linguistic and rhetorical means.  
Van Leeuwen’s work is particularly apt to illuminate my task for various reasons. One of 
them is that representation – more specifically, the representation of facts and of the individuals 
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involved in the facts – is at the heart of the adjudication enterprise.1110 Another reason lies in the 
purpose of Van Leeuwen’s scheme, which coincides with the main purpose of my investigation: 
scrutinizing the ways in which actors and practices are represented in discourse (in my case, in 
legal discourse). I do not employ in my analysis all the notions developed in Van Leeuwen’s 
broad scheme but only those that are – per my hypothesis – potentially highly relevant. 
My study of the Court’s discourse has particularly benefited from his notions of exclusion 
of social actors, objectivation of social actions and assimilation of social actors by 
collectivization. On the exclusion of social actors, Van Leeuwen observes: ‘When the relevant 
actions (e.g., the killing of demonstrators) are included but some or all of the actors involved in 
them (e.g., the police) are excluded, the exclusion does leave a trace.’1111 He makes a further 
distinction between the full exclusion of social actors, which he calls ‘suppression’ (the actors 
are referred nowhere in the text), and their less radical exclusion, which he dubs ‘backgrounding’ 
(the actors ‘may not be mentioned in relation to a given action, but they are mentioned elsewhere 
in the text’).1112 The objective is to identify patterns of inclusion/exclusion and to combine them 
with the ways in which social actors are represented.
1113
 
As regards the ‘objectivation’ of social actions, Van Leeuwen explains that this is one 
way in which social actions may be ‘deactivated’, that is, ‘represented statically, as though they 
were entities . . . rather than dynamic processes’.1114 In turn, collectivization is a form of 
assimilation of social actors that occurs when they are referred to as groups by means of 
pluralities (e.g., Christians) or by means of ‘a mass noun or a noun denoting a group of people’ 
(e.g., the community).
1115
   
The exclusion of social actors and the objectivation of their social actions may take place 
through various linguistic forms, including ‘nominalization’ and ‘passivization’. Nominalization 
consists in ‘turning verbs into nouns’1116 and passivization in privileging the passive voice over 
the active voice.
1117
 An example of nominalization would be ‘the attack on demonstrators’; an 
example of passivization, ‘demonstrators were attacked’1118.  
The notions borrowed from Van Leeuwen’s scheme serve as a starting point for my 
analysis, which I further supplement with insights from (legal) scholarship on stereotyping and 
essentialism.  
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II. Stereotyping and Naturalizing in the Court’s Discourse 
In this part, I introduce the areas of the Court’s case law where I have most frequently found the 
two problematic modes of reasoning outlined in the introduction and offer an illustration of their 
operation by means of in-depth discourse analysis. Moreover, I unpack the harmful 
consequences of these forms of reasoning both for the individual applicants involved in the 
particular cases and for their groups more broadly. 
 
A. Key Findings  
 
My first (and broad) level of analysis of the Court’s discourse on identity traits reveals a 
widespread use of collectivizations of the applicants and objectivations of their traits. 
‘Transsexualism’,1119 ‘pregnancy’,1120 ‘homosexuality’1121 and the ‘Gypsy way of life’1122 are but 
a few examples of objectivations of applicants’ traits. ‘Transsexuals’,1123 ‘women’ (or ‘a 
woman’)1124 ‘sexual minorities’1125 and ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses’1126 are, in turn, just some 
instances of collectivizations.  
On one side, I have found that, oftentimes, the deployment of objectivations and 
collectivizations seems inevitable, intrinsic to the operation of the law or legal reasoning. This 
happens, for example, when the Court has to determine whether a difference in treatment exists 
by way of comparators in discrimination cases (e.g., same-sex couples and different-sex 
couples,
1127
 men and women
1128
). It also occurs when the Court refers to the content of domestic 
laws and regulations (e.g., ‘the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in universities’,1129 under 
Polish law ‘abortion is lawful where pregnancy poses a threat to the woman’s life or health’,1130 
French law opens up the possibility of ‘adoption by a single homosexual’1131).    
On the other side, my findings also demonstrate that, other times, collectivized 
representations of applicants and objectivized depictions of their traits result in two types of 
problematic portrayals. The first kind of problematic depiction involves negative stereotyping: 
following the applicant’s reduction to and disappearance behind an objectivized trait or a 
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collectivized representation, the Court associates the trait or group in question with a stereotype 
that ‘assigns difference’.1132 This kind of stereotyping generally reflects ‘prejudice or bias’ about 
a group, exacerbating its subordination.
1133
 Broadly speaking, stereotypes are ‘associations and 
beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people 
think about and respond to the group’.1134 Stereotyping is a form of ‘intergroup bias,’ which in 
turn is a tendency to ‘evaluate one’s own membership group (the in-group) or its members more 
favorably than a non-membership group (the out-group) or its members’.1135 Anne Phillips views 
stereotyping as a form of essentialism whose problem lie in over-generalizations and a failure to 
see the characteristics that do not fit the preconceptions about a certain group.
1136
 Individuals are 
therefore assumed to posses certain characteristics by simple virtue of group membership, 
regardless of their actual capabilities and circumstances.
1137
 The second type of problematic 
representation entails what I will refer to as ‘naturalizing’: following the applicant’s reduction to 
and disappearance behind an objectivized trait or a collectivized representation, the Court 
associates the trait in question with an unchanging core of the applicant’s group identity. Two 
forms of essentialism are at work in this mode of reasoning: the attribution of certain 
characteristics to some ‘static “essence”’, in a move that ‘naturalises differences that may be 
historically variant and socially created’ and the treatment of such characteristics ‘as the defining 
ones for anyone in the category’.1138 
My examination suggests that these two problematic forms of legal reasoning feature 
most frequently in cases concerning members of religious and cultural minorities. In particular, 
the Court appears to most commonly assign difference through negative stereotyping in cases 
concerning Muslim women and to engage in naturalizations in cases involving Sikhs and Roma 
Gypsies.  
 
B. Negative Stereotypes  
The cases exhibiting the first form of problematic representation concern Muslim women 
prohibited from wearing the headscarf.
1139
 What these cases have in common is that the Court 
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tends to neglect the applicants and to focus nearly exclusively on their practices or symbols as 
though they had a separate existence, associating them with negative stereotypes. In other words, 
the Court talks to symbols and about symbols in harmful stereotypical ways, without regard to 
the applicants’ views or circumstances and without any basis on the evidence of the cases.   
I examine the Court’s discourse in this first group of cases through the lens of Dahlab v 
Switzerland and Leyla Şahin v Turkey. Dahlab concerns a female Muslim teacher prohibited 
from wearing the headscarf at a State school. Leyla Şahin concerns a female Muslim student not 
allowed to wear the headscarf at a State university. The Court declared Dahlab inadmissible and 
rejected Leyla Şahin on the merits. It examined the two cases primarily under Article 9 ECHR 
(freedom of religion).
1140
  
 (i) The Entrance of ‘the Headscarf’ 
A critical analysis of the Court’s representation of the applicants and their religious practices in 
Dahlab and Leyla Şahin shows that the applicants, though not really suppressed – the judgments 
include references to them elsewhere – are constantly pushed into the background in the Article 
9 ECHR reasoning.  
In Dahlab, in determining whether the restriction on the applicant’s freedom of religion 
was necessary in a democratic society, the Court states: 
 
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such 
as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young 
children. The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, an age at which children wonder 
about many things and are also more easily influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it 
cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising 
effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran 
and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It 
therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils.
1141
 (Emphasis added)  
 
In this passage, the Court backgrounds the applicant through nominalization. Instead of using an 
active verb clause with the applicant as the subject, the Court suppresses the applicant and turns 
the verb ‘to wear’ into the noun ‘the wearing of’ the headscarf. By means of nominalization, the 
Court does not only background the agent (the applicant) but also objectivizes her action 
(wearing the headscarf). Indeed, the action is thereby represented statically, as though it were an 
entity. Moreover, while the applicant is nearly excluded from the text, her supposed victims 
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remain there, albeit in collectivized forms (‘very young children’, ‘applicant’s pupils’, 
‘children’). In fact, the Court names the applicant only once: when it talks about her alleged 
victims.  
In Leyla Şahin, in turn, in assessing whether the interference with the applicant’s freedom 
of religion was necessary in a democratic society, the majority holds: 
 
. . . In addition, like the Constitutional Court . . . the Court considers that, when examining the 
question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, it must be borne in mind the impact which 
wearing such a symbol, which is presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have 
on those who choose not to wear it. As has already been noted (see Karaduman, decision cited 
above, and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above, § 95), the issues at stake 
include the protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ and the ‘maintenance of public order’ 
in a country in which the majority of the population, while professing a strong attachment to the 
rights of women and a secular way of life, adhere to the Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on 
freedom in this sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to 
achieve those two legitimate aims, especially since, as the Turkish courts stated, . . . this religious 
symbol has taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years.
1142
 (Emphasis added).  
 
Here, the Court also backgrounds the applicant and objectivizes her practice through 
nominalization (‘wearing such a symbol’) and other noun phrases that act as either the subject 
(‘this religious symbol’) or the object (‘the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish 
context’). As a result, the Court leaves the applicant out and turns ‘the headscarf’ or ‘the symbol’ 
into the centre of its discourse. What is furthermore distinctive about the Court’s representation 
of the headscarf in Leyla Şahin is the deletion of agency through ‘passivization’. The Court tells 
us that the symbol is ‘presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty’ but omits to say 
who actually ‘perceives’ or ‘presents’ the Islamic headscarf as such. Consciously or not, the fact 
is that the Court omits agency by leaving unspecified who exactly does the labeling of 
‘compulsory’.  
Whereas the agency of Leyla Şahin is deemphasized by way of nominalizations, the 
agency of the supposed victims is emphasized by the use of the word ‘choose’ in ‘those who 
choose not to wear it’.1143 Moreover, while the applicant is fully displaced by an objectivized 
version of her practice, her alleged victims remain in the text, albeit in a collectivized and 
somehow indeterminate form.  
One of the reasons why critical discourse scholars have long viewed nominalizations with 
suspicion is because they facilitate reification.
1144
 Critical discourse scholar, Roger Fowler, 
explains how, by means of nominalization, ‘processes and qualities assume the status of things: 
impersonal, inanimate, capable of being amassed and counted, paraded like possessions’.1145 
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This is precisely what happens in Dahlab and Leyla Şahin: nominalization leads to the reification 
of the applicants’ religious practices. By turning verbs into nouns, the Court linguistically creates 
a ‘thing’. It suggests that ‘the headscarf’ has a real or tangible existence, external to that of the 
applicants. It gives ‘the headscarf’ a life of its own, while denying the lives of the applicants.  
 (ii) The Harmful Impact on the Case 
The representational moves described above involve several negative effects in the particular 
cases, the majority of which play out in the analysis under Article 9(2) ECHR. This is the stage 
at which the Court establishes whether the interference with applicants’ rights is necessary in a 
democratic society, most crucially, whether the interference is proportionate to the aim it 
pursues. The first negative effect of fading the applicants into the background is the exclusion of 
their own views and particular circumstances from the proportionality analysis. The applicants 
are rendered virtually invisible.
1146
 The Court does not just disregard the motivations behind their 
decisions to wear the headscarf.
1147
 It pays no attention to the effects (suffering and loss) of the 
bans.
1148
 In short, in excluding the applicants from the analysis the Court obviously eschews all 
possibility of balancing the importance of the applicants’ practices – and the 
personal/professional/educational costs involved – against the importance of the public interests 
or rights of others at issue.   
Another negative implication implicit in the Court’s the reification of the applicants’ 
action of wearing the headscarf and the simultaneous obfuscation of their agency is the 
transformation of ‘the headscarf’ into the agent of the process of threatening others. Thus, in 
Dahlab, unable to locate the threat in the applicant – more precisely, in the quality and content of 
her teaching
1149
 – the Court searches for a location elsewhere, namely in the headscarf itself. As 
the Dahlab’s passage quoted earlier shows, the Court locates the threat in the headscarf by 
signifying the symbol by reference to: (i) its inherent or essentialist characteristics (‘powerful’, 
‘external’ and ‘imposed’) and (ii) the possible reaction of others (young children on whom the 
symbol may have an impact). Thus, the powerful, visible and imposed symbol, on one side, and 
the children’s tender age, on the other, come together to define the threat that the symbol 
represents: ‘some kind of proselytising effect’. In Leyla Şahin the Court similarly turns the 
reified symbol into a threatening agent. Like in Dahlab, the threat does not come from the 
applicant herself. The threat instead comes from a combination of the essentialist attributes of the 
symbol (its ‘compulsory’ character) and the Turkish context (majority adhering to Islam and 
extremist political movements seeking to impose their symbols on society).  
                                                          
1146
 See Vojdik, Valorie K., ‘Politics of the Headscarf in Turkey: Masculinities, Feminism, and the Construction of 
Collective Identities’, 33 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender (2010) at 672. 
1147
 See ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001, p. 1 and ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 29 June 2004 § 
85 (Chamber Judgment).   
1148
 See Evans, Carolyn, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks 
in the Intellectual Architecture’, 26 Journal of Law and Religion (2010-2011) at 330 and Rorive, Isabelle ‘Religious 
Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer,’ 30 Cardozo Law Review (2009) at 2683.  
1149
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207 
 
A third troubling consequence implicit in the Court’s objectivation of the applicants’ 
practices is delegitimation. Relying on the authority of national courts, the Court resorts to what 
Van Leeuwen calls ‘authorisation’1150 in order to delegitimize ‘the wearing of the headscarf’. 
Indeed, many of the negative attributes that the Court ascribes to the Islamic headscarf come 
from domestic courts’ discourses. In describing the applicants’ religious practices, the Court 
either explicitly refers to these courts’ decisions or uses words taken from these sources. For 
example, ‘like the [Turkish] Constitutional Court’, the Court keeps in mind the impact that a 
symbol perceived as compulsory may have on others.1151 Similarly, ‘as the [Swiss] Federal Court 
noted’, the Court states that the wearing of the headscarf is hard to square with gender 
equality.1152  
But this is not the only way in which the Court delegitimizes ‘the wearing of the 
headscarf’. The Court employs another form of delegitimation, which Van Leeuwen dubs ‘moral 
evaluation’.1153 This sort of delegitimation is based on ‘specific discourses of moral value’.1154 
One explicit value on the basis of which the Court delegitimizes the Islamic headscarf is ‘gender 
equality’, a Council of Europe value1155 and, ultimately, a value of any democratic society.1156 
Thus, in Dahlab, it finds it ‘difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination’.1157 In 
Leyla Şahin, as Judge Tulkens observes in her dissent, the majority considers that wearing the 
headscarf is ‘synonymous with the alienation of women’.1158  
By failing to ‘see’ the specific circumstances and motivations of the applicants and by 
relying instead on the domestic courts’ (negative) preconceptions of ‘the headscarf’ the Court 
falls into a kind of essentialism referred to as ‘one of over-generalisation [and] stereotyping’.1159 
As Carolyn Evans notes, the Court implicitly advocates two contradictory stereotypes: Muslim 
women as victims of oppression in need of protection and Muslim women as aggressors from 
whom everyone needs protection.
1160
 Evans compellingly argues:  
 
The first stereotype is that of victim – the victim of a gender oppressive religion, needing protection 
from abusive, violent male relatives, and passive, unable to help herself in the face of a culture of 
                                                          
1150
 Van Leeuwen defines authorisation as ‘legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, 
and/or persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested’. Van Leeuwen, Theo, DISCOURSE AND 
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1151
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University Press, 2008) at 110. 
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 Ibid. 
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male dominance . . .  The second stereotype relied on by the Court is that of aggressor – the Muslim 
woman as fundamentalist who forces values onto the unwilling and undefended.
1161
  
 
These generalizations are easily made, without being concretely substantiated with statistics or 
other evidence in the particular cases.
1162
 The Court’s reliance on unfounded generalizations 
about Muslim women harms the particular applicants, for they are denied equal access to 
benefits (e.g., education or work) based on preconceptions that do not match their actual 
characteristics, needs and circumstances.
1163
 As feminist legal theorists have shown, stereotyping 
may cause distributional harms to stereotyped group members.
1164
 The harm of ‘maldistribution’, 
in the words of Nancy Fraser, involves the denial of resources and benefits based on norms that 
delegitimize certain groups.
1165
  
To summarize, in backgrounding the applicants and objectivizing their practices, the 
Court impoverishes the content of the proportionality test. Indeed, it (i) fails to assess what is at 
stake for the applicants and simultaneously (ii) renders their practices vulnerable to abstract, 
harmful stereotypical assessments by others (e.g., governments, domestic courts, the Strasbourg 
Court itself). The overall result is thus the reduction of the weight of the applicants’ interests in 
the proportionality.  
 
(iii) The Harmful Impact beyond the Case  
 
The Strasbourg Court is often thought to be ‘one of the most important discoursing machines in 
the world’ given the ‘pan-European [human rights] legal framework’ it produces1166 and ‘the 
most juridically mature of human rights regimes’.1167 Indeed, it has been argued that the Court 
‘has established itself as the most effective regional system for the protection of human rights in 
the world’.1168 These perceptions give the Court’s representational discourse singular and 
influential force, far beyond the circumstances of the particular cases. Thus, the Court’s legal 
                                                          
1161
 Ibid. 
1162
 Ibid. at 54. See also, Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte, WHO BELIEVES IN HUMAN RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE 
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not correspond to her actual needs, abilities, and circumstances.’). 
1164
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discourse does not just have implications for the parties involved in the specific cases but may 
affect future applicants and their groups as well.    
One of the profound, broader implications of the Court’s use of negative stereotypes is 
the ‘misrecognition’ of the group in question (in the case of Dahlab and Leyla Şahin, of Muslims 
in general and of Muslim women in particular). The ‘misrecognition’ harm caused to stereotyped 
groups
1169
 operates by constituting them ‘as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible 
– in other words, as less than full partners in social interaction’.1170 Indeed, the stereotype that 
Muslim women are oppressed in fact contains a mix of stereotypical assumptions (gender/ 
religious/orientalist/racial) that constitute not just Muslim women but Muslims more generally as 
‘inferior’ and ‘wholly other’. Thus, the stereotype implicitly regards Muslim men as oppressors, 
reflecting a historical, colonialist interpretation of gender relations between Muslim men and 
women, which constructs ‘Muslim men as barbaric oppressors of women, inherently inferior to 
Western men’.1171 Moreover, the stereotype implicitly portrays a religion, ‘Islam’, as ‘barbaric’ 
and ‘backward’ compared with the ‘West’.1172  
In negatively stereotyping Muslims and Muslim women, the Court thus assigns them a 
lower status vis-à-vis non-Muslim women and non-Muslims, thereby (re)producing hierarchies 
between groups – or inter-group hierarchies. Stereotypes, as Alexandra Timmer argues, ‘often 
serve to maintain existing power relationships’, upholding ‘a symbolic and real hierarchy 
between “us” and “them”’.1173 The Court (re)creates these hierarchies by implicitly relying on a 
series of dichotomies (e.g, agency/victimization and reason/culture)
1174
 and by further 
associating one group with the ‘positive’ side (agency/reason) and the other group with the 
‘negative’ side (victimization/culture). This kind of thinking creates hierarchies between the 
sides of the dichotomy and between the groups associated with one or the other. Thus, whereas 
Muslim women are assumed to be wholly determined and victimized by their cultures (their 
religious practices are ‘imposed’ on them by the Koran), non-Muslims (including non-Muslim 
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women) are assumed to be rationally choosing agents. The dyad echoes the ‘culture versus 
citizenship dichotomy’ that Leti Volpp has insightfully identified as underlying the French 
headscarf debates: ‘[t]he citizen is assumed to be modern and motivated by reason; the cultural 
other is assumed to be traditional and motivated by culture’.1175  
Besides the misrecognition implications for applicants’ groups, the Court’s stereotyping 
reasoning also has potentially damaging implications for future applicants: future Muslim 
applicants wearing the headscarf will have a hard time showing that they do not match the 
Court’s negative image of ‘the Islamic headscarf’, let alone challenging the image itself. In fact, 
the Court’s stereotypical constructions of the applicants’ religious practices in Leyla Şahin and 
Dahlab have already turned into principles that, by now, have become well-entrenched in the 
Court’s ‘headscarf’ case-law.1176   
 
C. Naturalizations    
The cases examined in this part involve the second kind of flawed depiction: the kind that entails 
equating the trait in question with the group’s ‘paradigmatic’ practice/way of life. As I 
mentioned earlier, I refer to this problem as ‘naturalization’ because it privileges and freezes as 
natural what in fact is historically contingent or socially constructed.
1177
 This sort of portrayal 
seems to appear most often in cases concerning Sikhs
1178
 and Roma Gypsies.
1179
  
I analyze this kind of representation through the lens of Mann Singh v. France and 
Chapman v. the United Kingdom. Mann Singh concerns a Sikh man denied the renewal of his 
driver’s license for refusing to take off his turban for the picture. Chapman deals with the claim 
of a Gypsy woman evicted from her own land for stationing her caravan there without planning 
permission. The Court rejected Chapman’s alleged violation of her right to respect for home, 
private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) and dismissed her discrimination complaint (Article 14 
ECHR). Mann Singh’s claims – including his freedom of religion complaint (Article 9 ECHR) – 
were all declared inadmissible.   
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(i) The Entrance of ‘the Turban’ and ‘the Gypsy Way of Life’ 
In both Mann Singh and Chapman, the Court backgrounds the applicants and objectivizes their 
practices, albeit through different representational means. The linguistic move in Mann Singh is 
passivization – the use of the passive voice instead of the active voice. In assessing whether 
Mann Singh’s wearing of his turban falls within the scope of Article 9(1) ECHR, the Court says:  
According to the applicant, the Sikh faith compels its members to wear the turban in all 
circumstances. It is considered not only at the heart of their religion, but also at the heart of their 
identity. Therefore, the Court notes that this is an act motivated or inspired by a religion or 
belief.
1180
 (Emphasis added).  
In the second sentence of this passage, the Court states that the turban is ‘considered’ to be at the 
heart of the Sikh religion and identity without saying who actually considers the turban as such. 
The context indicates that it is Mann Singh who views the turban this way.
1181
 However, with the 
passive construction in ‘[the turban] is considered’ – that is to say, with the deletion of Mann 
Singh as the subject – the Court separates the turban from its wearer, objectivizes his religious 
practice by reducing it to ‘the turban’ and, ultimately, gives the practice a life of its own, ready to 
travel around its case law in the form of a principle.
1182
   
In Chapman, in turn, the Court’s preferred representational form to push the applicant 
aside is collectivization. In determining whether Article 8(1) ECHR was at issue, the Court says:  
 
The Court considers that the applicant's occupation of her caravan is an integral part of her ethnic 
identity as a Gypsy, reflecting the long tradition of that minority of following a travelling lifestyle. 
This is the case even though, under the pressure of development and diverse policies or by their 
own choice, many Gypsies no longer live a wholly nomadic existence and increasingly settle for 
long periods in one place in order to facilitate, for example, the education of their children. 
Measures affecting the applicant's stationing of her caravans therefore have an impact going 
beyond the right to respect for her home. They also affect her ability to maintain her identity as a 
Gypsy and to lead her private and family life in accordance with that tradition.
1183
 (Emphasis 
added). 
In this passage, the Court first foregrounds the applicant but then leaves her aside, assimilating 
her to ‘that minority’ and ‘many Gypsies’. By way of collectivization, therefore, the Court 
separates the applicant from her group, sending her backstage and bringing her group centre 
stage.  
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In another of part of its legal reasoning – more precisely, when setting out the principles 
necessary to determine if the refusal to let the applicant stay on her land was justified – the Court 
affirms: ‘[T]here is thus a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of 
Article 8 to facilitate the Gypsy way of life’.1184 Here, the Court, first of all, objectivizes the 
applicant’s lifestyle by representing it statically rather than dynamically: ‘the Gypsy way of 
life’.1185 The Court thereby abstracts the way of life from those who, like the applicant, give life 
to a nomadic lifestyle. Moreover, the Court reduces the Gypsy way of life to one single trait: 
nomadism. It implies that there is no other form of living the Gypsy way of life than sticking to 
nomadism.
1186
  
Collectivizations and objectivations allow the Court to assess Mann Singh’s and 
Chapman’s practices or lifestyles in highly essentialist terms: the Court closely ties their 
practices to the Sikh and Gypsy identities. At work in the two cases is the kind of essentialism 
that treats ‘certain characteristics as the defining ones for anyone in the category, as 
characteristics that cannot be questioned or modified without thereby undermining one’s claim to 
belong to the group’.1187 While in Mann Singh the defining characteristic is the turban, in 
Chapman the defining trait is travelling.  
Now, on what basis does the Court characterize the applicants’ practices in these 
essentialist ways? In Chapman, the Court resorts to history. By recourse to ‘the long tradition’, 
the Court insists that travelling remains essential to all Gypsies. This is so even when, by the 
Court’s own admission, reality may show that travelling is not practiced homogenously within 
the group (many of them no longer live a ‘wholly nomadic existence’ as a result of either 
pressure or choice). In this way, the Court ends up freezing the group in time ‘to a retrospective 
and nostalgic understanding of their identity’.1188 In Mann Singh, in turn, the Court states without 
any further elaboration that the turban ‘is at the heart of’ the Sikh religion and identity. In turning 
the nomadic lifestyle or the turban into a fixed and ‘natural’ defining group characteristic, the 
Court obscures the socially created and contingent character of the traits in question.  
 
 (ii) The Impact on the Cases  
In contrast to Dahlab and Leyla Şahin, the Court’s reliance on generalizable and reducible 
(group) traits in Chapman and Mann Singh serves, to some extent, to better understand the 
applicants’ positions.1189 Indeed, the essentialist construction of Chapman’s and Mann Singh’s 
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practices leads to their recognition in the ‘scope’ analysis. This is the threshold stage at which 
the Court establishes whether the claim in question attracts the protection of an ECHR provision. 
In both cases, the Court decides that the applicants’ practices do fall within the scope of Articles 
9 and 8 ECHR.    
For instance, in Mann Singh, the turban counted as ‘a manifestation’ of the applicant’s 
religion for the purposes of Article 9(1) ECHR,
1190
  largely because the practice was viewed at 
the core of the Sikh faith and identity. In Chapman, in turn, the Court’s reliance on essentialist 
views of the applicant’s group lifestyle seems to have been instrumental in the expansion of the 
scope of Article 8 ECHR: the Court recognizes that at stake is not just the applicant’s right to 
respect for home but also her right to lead her private and family life in accordance with her 
tradition as a Gypsy.  
Moreover, in Chapman, the Court’s reliance on other generalizable group-based traits 
such as ‘vulnerability’ results in yet another significant recognition for the applicant: the 
establishing of a positive obligation to facilitate ‘the Gypsy way of life’, even though the 
obligation turns out to be limited in scope.
1191
 The Court holds:  
 
[T]he vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be 
given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework 
and in reaching decisions in particular cases . . . To this extent, there is thus a positive obligation 
imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the Gypsy way of life.
1192
 
 
In the rest of the reasoning, however, the Court gives lip service to these recognitions. In the 
proportionality analysis, Mann Singh’s and Chapman’s essentialized traits are either completely 
eclipsed by the States’ alleged countervailing interests or expressly used to diminish the weight 
of the applicants’ interests. Indeed, in Mann Singh the applicant’s essentialized practice plays no 
role in the proportionality. Mann Singh and what is at stake for him – including the alleged 
importance initially recognized to the turban for his Sikh identity – is virtually absent in the 
Court’s analysis of whether the interference with his right was justified. The Court looks 
exclusively at the State’s justifications of public order and security and concludes that the 
obligation to take off the turban for the driver’s license picture was necessary in a democratic 
society.
1193
  
In Chapman, on the other hand, the Court’s essentialist view expressly serves to reduce 
the seriousness of what is stake for the applicant in the proportionality. The Court says: ‘[T]he 
present case is not concerned as such with the traditional itinerant Gypsy lifestyle’.1194 In the 
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eyes of the Court, the applicant’s lifestyle does not fit ‘the Gypsy way of life’ because she no 
longer lived a nomadic lifestyle. The Court finds that she was actually ‘a resident on site’ during 
considerable periods.
1195
 The conclusion is therefore that the applicant did not ‘wish to pursue an 
itinerant lifestyle’.1196  
The applicant is therefore no longer viewed as a (‘proper’ or ‘authentic’) group member 
but just as an individual who ‘chose’ to settle.1197  As Julie Ringelheim insightfully argues,  
 
This reading of the facts appears narrowly individualistic in two ways: first, notwithstanding its 
acknowledgment that caravan life holds an important place in Gypsy collective identity, at the end 
of the day the majority discards the cultural dimension of the issue and reduces the wish of Ms. 
Chapman to live in a caravan to a question of mere individual preference.
1198
  
 
Thus, the essentialist glasses do not allow the Court to see the more complex circumstances in 
which the applicant found herself. An acknowledgment of such circumstances – more precisely, 
of the fact that the applicant was pushed into a settled way of life by policies unresponsive to her 
travelling lifestyle – could have led to a different conclusion. The dissenters, in fact, reached a 
different conclusion. They rejected the government’s argument that the applicant’s intention to 
settle down should detract from the seriousness of the interference.
1199
 They noted instead that 
pressure from UK law ‘has had the effect of inducing many Gypsies to adopt the solution of 
finding a secure, long-term base for their caravans on their own land’.1200  
There are therefore two troubling consequences flowing from the majority’s essentialist 
approach in the Chapman proportionality analysis. In the first place, the Court’s essentialist 
reasoning causes misrecognition harm to the applicant. In positing one form of lifestyle as ‘the’ 
group’s paradigmatic type, the Court sets a standard against which the applicant’s practice is 
judged ‘deviant’. The problem here is thus one of intra-group exclusion and inequality: since the 
applicant’s lifestyle is not as ‘authentic’ as the practices of other group members who have stuck 
to travelling, her lifestyle is taken less seriously and her group membership called into question. 
In the second place, and in connection with the first problem, the Court’s essentialist reasoning 
paradoxically serves to strip the applicant’s case of the group dimensions (she is no longer 
considered a ‘proper’ member of the vulnerable group in question). This group- and context-
stripping approach misses key structural elements that would have allowed for a better 
appreciation of the vulnerable position in which the applicant found herself. Indeed, one of such 
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elements was the disadvantageous impact of the planning regulations on the applicant’s lifestyle 
as a member of a particularly vulnerable group. In failing to address this vulnerability and 
disadvantage, the Court fails to address inter-group exclusion and inequality.  
It may be argued that it is legitimate for the Court to underline any inconsistencies 
between Chapman’s account of the Gypsy lifestyle and her own actual way of life, as it was the 
applicant herself who used such an essentialist account to reinforce her claims.
1201
 This argument 
should be however rejected on the following basis. The applicant’s and the Court’s appeals to 
essentialism cannot be evaluated in the same way given the different positions of power from 
which essentialist arguments are deployed:
1202
 the applicant relies on essentialist arguments from 
a non-dominant position (that of a vulnerable minority) while the Court does it from a dominant 
one (that of a supranational court). As Annie Bunting argues in another context, essentialism 
employed to critique dominant discourses and essentialism employed from dominant positions 
should be evaluated asymmetrically, as the latter may serve to reinforce exclusion and 
inequality.
1203
 The crucial questions are therefore ‘by whom’ and ‘in what context’ the 
essentialist rhetoric is used.
1204
 In the case of the Court, given the authoritative force of its 
essentialist depictions, it might be problematic to rely on naturalizing depictions simply because 
the applicant does it herself.  
To summarize, the deployment of essentialism is double-edged in Chapman. At the scope 
level, the Court’s essentialist arguments were seemingly instrumental in the recognition of the 
applicant’s right to lead her private and family life in accordance with her traditional lifestyle as 
a Gypsy. In the proportionality analysis, however, the Court’s essentialist arguments served to 
minimize the seriousness of what was stake for the applicant and to detach her case ‘from its 
wider context and from the global difficulties faced, in the whole country, by the minority she 
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belonged to’.1205 As with Leyla Şahin and Dahlab, the Court thus reduces the weight of 
Chapman’s interests in the proportionality and fails to appreciate the misrecognition harm 
implicit in the impugned decision. The underlying rationale is however different in the two sets 
of cases. While in the Leyla Şahin and Dahlab cases the Court undermines what is at stake for 
the applicants by forcing them into a mould it condemns, in the Chapman case, the Court reduces 
the importance of the applicant’s interests by forcing her out of a mold it esteems.  
 
(iii) The Impact beyond the Cases  
 
Contrary to its discourse in Leyla Şahin and Dahlab, the Court’s discourse in Chapman and 
Mann Singh does not go as far as delegitimizing the applicants’ group practices via negative 
stereotyping. This is probably one of the most significant differences between the group of cases 
studied in the previous part and those examined in this part. Indeed, the Court does not deem ‘the 
wearing of the turban’ contrary to Convention values such as gender equality. Nor does it 
describe the ‘Gypsy way of life’ as, say, a threat to the rights of those who lead a sedentary 
lifestyle. 
Yet the Court’s essentialist discourse results in ‘naturalizing’. One of the problems 
arising from naturalizing is that it sets up ‘a standard by which to judge deviation’.1206 The 
danger of this sort of reasoning therefore lies in the exclusions and inequalities it may sustain by 
deeming some lifestyles or practices ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ and others ‘deviant’. In Chapman and 
Mann Singh, for instance, the Court’s naturalizing language implicitly (re)affirms intra-group 
exclusions and inequalities: those who do not follow the ‘core’ practices of travelling in a 
caravan or wearing a turban – or do not follow them strictly – may be regarded as less ‘members’ 
than others or, simply, as not ‘members’ at all. Briefly put, ‘those who do not fit are in 
trouble’.1207 Chapman herself is a tragic example.  
Moreover, the Court’s naturalizing reasoning also risks (re)producing inter-group 
exclusions and inequalities. This kind of risk is illustrated in Horie v. the United Kingdom – a 
little-known inadmissibility decision concerning a New Traveler who had pursued a nomadic 
lifestyle for almost three decades.
1208
 The Court says obiter dicta that, unlike ‘Romani gypsies’ 
and ‘Irish Travellers’, ‘New Travellers live a nomadic lifestyle through personal choice and not 
on account of being born into any ethnic or cultural group’.1209 The Court hereby reaffirms the 
natural or immutable status of ‘travelling’ in the Gypsy tradition, albeit by a different criterion – 
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birth
1210
  – implying that those who are gypsies by choice are not ‘real’ gypsies. Once the trait is 
cast in this immutable way, it serves to exclude groups practicing itinerant lifestyles such as Ms 
Horie’s from recognition.    
The reasoning in Chapman, Mann Singh and Horie thus leads to a classic essentialism 
problem: the policing of group boundaries. Mann Singh may have met the criterion of group 
membership but Sikh applicants not wearing the turban ‘in all circumstances’ will most likely 
fail the test, just like Chapman and Horie failed their group membership tests. 
In some of its later ‘caravan’ case law, the Court has adopted more inclusive and socially 
constructed accounts of applicants’ lifestyles.1211 For instance, in Connors v. the United 
Kingdom, the Court has refused to deploy the sort of generalizations that ‘would identify the 
nomadic lifestyle as the essence of gypsy life and culture’.1212 Moreover, in several post-
Chapman inadmissibility decisions, the Court has toned down its naturalizing discourse by 
dropping one of the most problematic sentences
1213
 and by accepting that the applicants 
remained Gypsies even though they had switched to a more sedentary way of life.
1214
  
All this, however, does not necessarily mean that the problem posed by naturalizing 
depictions of ‘the Gypsy way of life’ no longer exists. First of all, in these inadmissibility 
decisions the Court, at the end of the day, re-affirms the Chapman rationale by concluding that 
the applicants’ cases did not ultimately concern ‘traditional itinerant gypsy life styles’.1215 Most 
importantly, Connors is a Chamber judgment and the others are inadmissibility decisions. 
Chapman, in contrast, is a Grand Chamber judgment and, therefore, remains the authority on the 
matter. Moreover, Horie, a 2011 case, confirms that problematic essentialist assumptions about 
Gypsies are not yet fully behind.   
 
III. Contrasts with the Court’s Broader Case Law   
 
In other areas of its cultural- and religious-practice jurisprudence, the Strasbourg Court has 
largely circumvented the problematic depictions discussed in the previous part. The same holds 
for the case law concerning gender and sexuality.
1216
 In this part, I point to four major ways in 
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which the Court’s wider discourse has mostly avoided the stereotyping and naturalising pitfalls 
that pervade its discourse on Muslim women, Sikhs and Roma Gypsies.  
 
(i) Rejecting Unfounded Generalizations  
 
Aware of the lack of evidence in several cases, the Court has either refrained from making 
generalizations about the applicants’ practices/traits or rejected governments’ general 
assumptions as justifications for restrictions on their rights. Take Eweida and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, brought by four Christian applicants not allowed to manifest their religion at 
work – two of them by visibly wearing a cross.1217 The case of Ms. Eweida, a British Airways 
employee and the only of the four applicants to win the case, is especially illustrative. The airline 
justified the ban alleging the need to protect its corporate image. The Court rejects this argument: 
‘There was no evidence that the wearing of other, previously authorised items, of religious 
clothing, such as turbans and hijabs, by other employees, had any negative impact on British 
Airways’ brand or image’.1218  
Another example is Lautsi v. Italy, a case concerning a mother’s unsuccessful attempt to 
have crucifixes removed from her children’s State school.1219 The Court’s Grand Chamber notes:  
 
There is no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious symbol on classroom walls 
may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or does not 
have an effect on young persons whose convictions are still in the process of being formed.
1220
  
To be sure, the Lautsi and Eweida judgments also rely on characteristics inherently attributed to 
the symbols at issue. Thus, ‘a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol’.1221 And ‘Ms 
Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot have detracted from her professional appearance’.1222 
The properties of these symbols (‘passive’ and ‘discreet’) are exactly the opposite of the 
attributes used to characterize ‘the headscarf’ (‘powerful’ and ‘ostentatious’). Moreover, whereas 
the headscarf’s inherent characteristics in Dahlab and Leyla Şahin served to construe the symbol 
as a threat, the innate properties of Ms. Eweida’s cross and the crucifix on a wall served to 
minimize the threat. Either way, the fact is that, unlike in Dahlab and Leyla Şahin, in Lautsi and 
Eweida the Court additionally takes care to refer to (the absence of) evidence in support of its 
conclusions.  
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Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia is another good case in point.
1223
 The 
applicants complained about the dissolution of their religious community. The Russian 
government argued, among other things, that the dissolution was necessary to protect the 
followers’ health from damages arising from refusals of blood transfusions. In rejecting the 
government’s argument, the Court points to the lack of evidence:  
 
[T]he domestic judgments did not identify any member of the applicant community whose health 
had been harmed or cite any forensic study assessing the extent of the harm and establishing a 
causal link between that harm and the activities of the applicant community.
1224
  
 
In other cases, the Court has examined governments’ allegations of improper proselytism in light 
of the available evidence. Indeed, unlike in Dahlab – where the headscarf proselytising effects 
are assumed rather than proven – in these other cases the Court makes sure to either point to 
evidence
1225
 or its lack thereof
1226
 in order to accept or dismiss governments’ reasons to protect 
others from proselytizers’ pressure. The same approach surfaces in various cases concerning 
claims of religious discrimination in child custody and access disputes.
1227
 For instance, in 
Palau-Martinez v. France, a case in which a Jehovah’s Witness mother’s custody of her two 
children was withdrawn, the Court concludes: ‘the Court of Appeal ruled in abstracto and on the 
basis of general considerations’.1228 
Several examples from the Court’s sexual orientation case law illustrate a similar 
approach. Emphasizing the lack of evidence, the Court has for instance rejected governments’ 
arguments that ‘the mere mention of homosexuality [in public]’ ‘would adversely affect children 
or “vulnerable adults”’1229. The Court has likewise noted ‘the lack of concrete evidence to 
substantiate the alleged damage to morale’ as a result of the presence of homosexuals in the 
armed forces.
1230
 Similarly, it has highlighted ‘the lack of evidence adduced by the Government 
in order to show that it would be detrimental to the child to be brought up by a same-sex 
couple’.1231  
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 (ii) ‘Seeing’ the Applicants  
 
Contrary to Dahlab and Leyla Şahin, the Court has ‘seen’ the applicants in several cases. One 
example is Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey.
1232
 At the heart of the controversy was the 
prosecution of members of the group ‘Aczimendi tarikatı’ for wearing their religious garment in 
the streets on the occasion of a religious ceremony. The Court observes: ‘[T]here is no indication 
in the case file that the way in which the applicants manifested their beliefs through certain 
clothes constituted or was likely to constitute a threat to the public order or pressure on 
others’.1233  
Here, the Court does not look at ‘the’ black tunic, ‘the’ black turban and ‘the’ stick – the 
items of clothing at issue in the case – but at the specific way in which they were worn by the 
applicants. In Leyla Şahin, for example, and as I have shown earlier, the Court fails to see the 
concrete way in which the applicant manifested her religion. Her claim was precisely that the 
manner in which she wore her headscarf was ‘neither ostentatious nor intended as a means of 
protest and did not constitute a form of pressure, provocation or proselytism’.1234   
In Eweida, the Court even acknowledges the importance of what was at stake for the four 
Christian applicants – winner and losers. For example, in the case of Ms Chaplin, a nurse who 
unsuccessfully sought to visibly wear a crucifix at a State hospital, the Court holds: ‘the 
importance for the second applicant of being permitted to manifest her religion by wearing her 
cross visibly must weigh heavily in the balance’.1235 Again, the Court’s approach in these cases 
contrasts with the one in Dahlab and Leyla Şahin, where the Court ignores the importance that 
wearing the headscarf may have had for the applicants.  
In its case law concerning transsexual applicants, the Court has actually condemned one 
State for not ‘seeing’ the applicant, more precisely, for substituting its own general assumptions 
for the views of the applicant. In Van Kück v. Germany, a case concerning a transsexual seeking 
reimbursement of the expenses of a gender reassignment operation, the Court holds: ‘[T]he Court 
of Appeal, on the basis of general assumptions as to male and female behaviour, substituted its 
views on the most intimate feelings and experiences for those of the applicant and this without 
any medical competence’.1236  
 
(iii) Limiting Generalizations  
 
In a number of cases, the Court has confined generalizations of applicants’ traits and experiences 
to particular contexts and circumstances. In Eweida, for instance, the Court does not assess the 
impact of ‘the cross’ – or of ‘the wearing of other items of religious clothing’ – on corporate 
image in general. Rather, the Court limits the assessment to those items worn by the applicant, 
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Ms Eweida, and ‘by other employees’ and to their impact on a particular corporate image, that of 
British Airways.  
Even in Lautsi where the symbol in question was worn by no one – it was hanging on a 
wall – and the levels of objectivation and generalization were therefore higher, the Court does 
not just speak of ‘the crucifix’. It also speaks of ‘crucifixes in the classroom’. There is therefore 
an important difference of degree in the generalizations used in Dahlab and Leyla Şahin (the 
wearing of the headscarf) and those employed in Eweida and Lautsi (the applicant’s cross and 
the display of crucifixes in classrooms).  
Let me now briefly turn to two examples of the Court’s gender case law: Opuz v. Turkey 
and Rantsev v. Cyprus, as they further illustrate how the Court has kept the degree of 
generalizations confined to specific contexts and circumstances. Relying on extensive 
background data, the Court has established in Rantsev that ‘a substantial number of foreign 
women, particularly from the ex USSR, were being trafficked in Cyprus on artistes visas.
1237
 In 
Opuz, based on reports and statistics, the Court concludes that the highest number of reported 
domestic violence victims was in Diyarbakir, Turkey, and were all women.
1238
 The Court does 
not affirm that (all) women are trafficked and exploited or that (all) women are subject to 
domestic violence. The point, rather, is that some women in specific contexts and circumstances 
are more vulnerable than others to trafficking, exploitation or domestic violence. Moreover, the 
affirmations are substantiated with ample material such as statistics and reports. This approach 
contrasts with the implicit unfounded over-statement that ‘(all) Muslim women are oppressed’ 
made in Dahlab and Leyla Şahin. 
 
(iv) ‘Seeing’ Social Constructions  
 
Contrary to the approach adopted in Mann Singh and Chapman that freezes or naturalizes certain 
cultural and religious practices, the Court has sometimes acknowledged the socially created 
character of the generalization in question. The best examples seem to come from the Court’s 
gender and sexuality jurisprudence. For instance, in several cases concerning the lack of legal 
recognition of post-operative transsexuals, the Court has emphasized the ‘stress’ and ‘alienation’ 
that ‘a post-operative transsexual’ suffers as a result of ‘a discordance between the position in 
society . . .  and the status imposed by law’.1239 This discordance, the Court acknowledges, places 
‘the transsexual in an anomalous position, in which he or she may experience feelings of 
vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety’.1240  
To be sure, there is a collectivized form of representing the applicants – ‘the transsexual’ 
– and a generalization of their experiences and feelings. However, the emphasis is on the socio-
legal circumstances – lack of legal recognition – that make post-operative transsexuals likely to 
experience such feelings. The Court does not say that transsexuals are vulnerable, humiliated or 
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anxious. Nor does it hold that alienation is ‘at the heart of’ transsexuals’ experience. The socially 
constructed nature of the attributes ascribed to transsexuals is thus implicitly or explicitly 
recognized in the legal reasoning. There is undoubtedly an assumption that certain experiences 
are common to (all) post-operative transsexuals (e.g., stress and alienation). Yet in positing these 
traits as relational (as arising from deficits in legal arrangements) rather than as inherent in 
transsexuals, the Court treats these generalized experiences as contingent and revisable. A social 
constructivist approach may therefore eschew the immutability assumptions at the basis of the 
Court’s reasoning in some cases of culture and religion: membership would not necessarily be 
conferred by birth or by the immutability of certain practices but may acquire meaning through a 
range of other influences.   
 
IV. In Search of Explanations   
 
(i) Negative Stereotypes  
 
One possible explanation for why negative stereotypes are most commonly deployed by the 
Court in cases concerning Muslim women – in particular, when governments invoke 
justifications based on gender equality – point to the use stereotypical images of Muslims in 
public discourses in Europe. There is ample material pointing to the widespread use of negative 
stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim women in these discourses.
1241
 These images are so 
embedded in such discourses that the Court probably does not notice that it is further 
contributing to their perpetuation. Thomas Hammarberg, former Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, has lamented that ‘in Europe, public discussion of female 
dress, and the implications of certain attire for the subjugation of women, has almost exclusively 
focused on what is perceived as Muslim dress.’1242 What is more, the Court’s discourse meshes 
strikingly well with post-September-11 discourses more broadly. As Sherene Razack notes, three 
kinds of stereotypes have come to dominate these discourses: ‘the dangerous Muslim man, the 
imperilled Muslim woman and the civilized European’.1243  
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In fact, these images have deeper and broader historical roots.
1244
 For instance, the idea 
that ‘immigrant women require liberation’ is deeply entrenched in discourses associated with 
colonialist feminism.
1245
 These discourses have been criticized for describing ‘other’ women ‘as 
“always/already victim,” passively waiting to be rescued from cultural norms that mysteriously 
impose no restraints on Western feminists’.1246 Not even international human rights law seems to 
escape this stereotype. Indeed, one of the female subjectivities dominating international human 
rights law is what Dianne Otto calls the ‘victim’: this subject embodies colonial gender 
narratives ‘created by the masculine bearer of “civilization” who rescues “native” women from 
“barbarian” men’.1247 
While Islamic rules and practices are certainly not the only victims of the Court’s 
negative stereotypical constructions,
1248
 they appear to be one of the most frequent targets. The 
Strasbourg Court’s use of negative stereotypes in the so-called ‘headscarf’ cases seems in fact a 
symptom of a larger disease. The Court has portrayed other Islamic practices or rules as 
incompatible with gender equality in two major Grand Chamber judgments. For example, 
employing the exact same forms of delegitimation – authorization and moral evaluation – the 
Court has stated in Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey that Sharia, with its rules on the legal 
status of women, ‘clearly diverges from Convention values’.1249 Similarly, the Court has held in 
Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey – a discrimination case unsuccessfully brought by a Muslim woman denied 
surviving spouse benefits because she was religiously but not civilly married:  
 
[T]he Court notes that in adopting the Civil Code in 1926, which instituted monogamous civil 
marriage as a prerequisite for any religious marriage, Turkey aimed to put an end to a marriage 
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statements of the Court about Islam law deny the complexity and heterogeneity of Islam and come dangerously 
close to orientalism and Islamophobia’.). 
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tradition which places women at a clear disadvantage, not to say in a situation of dependence and 
inferiority, compared to men.
1250
  
 
The Court accepts in these terms the legitimacy of the reason invoked by the Turkish 
government (protection of women) to justify the differential treatment of the applicant’s religious 
marriage. Again, objectivation (‘a marriage tradition’) results in delegitimation (‘places women 
at a clear disadvantage’). This does not pass unnoticed to Judge Kovler, who regrets that the 
majority refrains ‘from making any assessment of the complexity of the rules of Islamic 
marriage, rather than portraying it in a reductive and highly subjective manner’.1251  
The Court’s delegitimation of Islamic marriage becomes yet more striking when 
compared with the judgment in Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, a discrimination case partly won by a 
Roma woman denied surviving spouse status for social benefits purposes due to the lack of 
recognition of Roma marriage.
1252
 In this case, the Court portrays the Roma community as 
exhibiting certain positive characteristics – own, well-established and deeply rooted values in the 
Spanish society – that make the applicant’s beliefs worth being taken into consideration in the 
assessment of her good faith.
1253
 In these terms, and contrary to Islamic marriage, Roma 
marriage is legitimized.   
S.A.S. v. France,
1254
 a case currently pending before the Court’s Grand Chamber, will be 
a crucial test on whether the Court falls back on negative stereotypes when portraying Muslim 
women’s practices. The case concerns a Muslim woman challenging the so-called ‘burqa ban’ in 
France. The negative stereotype of Muslim women as oppressed in need of protection has been at 
the heart of the debates surrounding bans on full-face veils in Europe.
1255
 Indeed, one of the most 
influential justifications of these bans – usually couched in terms of gender equality – includes 
the view of this item of clothing as a ‘symbol of patriarchal authority and of female subservience 
to men’.1256 In S.A.S, the French government has actually made the gender equality argument in 
these terms.
1257
  
S.A.S. thus offers the kind of elements that have typically led the Court to negatively 
stereotype Muslim women (or Islamic rules and practices concerning women). This time, 
though, several third-party interveners have submitted empirical studies showing that many of 
the interviewed women wearing full-face veils in countries such as France and Belgium are not 
                                                          
1250
 ECtHR (GC), Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey 2 November 2010 § 81.   
1251
 Ibid. Concurring Opinion of Judge Kovler at p 27.  
1252
 ECtHR, Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, 8 December 2009. Admittedly, the Court had it easier in Muñoz Díaz: there were 
already instances of recognition of spouse status to other people who believed in good faith that they were married 
even though their marriages turned out to be invalid. Moreover, the Spanish government itself had implicitly 
recognised the applicant’s married status by issuing family-related documents.  
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 Ibid. §§§ 56, 59 and 68.  
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 See, e.g., Grillo, Ralph and Shah, Prakah, ‘Reasons to Ban? The Anti-Burqa Movement in Western Europe’, 
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 Ibid. at 27.  
1257
 French Government’s Observations, 29 May 2012, paragraphs 85-89 and 98.  
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coerced by their male relatives but rather wear it out free choice.
1258
 There are two distinctive 
arguments made by third parties that may allow the Court to break out of the stereotypical 
constructions that pervade its ‘headscarf’ discourse: (i) ‘the ban did not materially probe the 
assumption that women are oppressed by wearing the full-face veil’ and (ii) some studies 
actually demonstrate the opposite.
1259
  
 
(ii) Naturalizations  
 
Offering a hypothesis for why the Court is most likely to naturalize applicants’ traits in certain 
types of cases is a more challenging venture. A partial and tentative explanation includes a mix 
of elements, most notably applicants’ arguments, the Court’s own ‘assumptions of orthodoxy’1260 
about groups with which it is not sufficiently familiar, and the assent of those directly or 
indirectly involved in the case (e.g., governments, religious authorities).  
To be sure, this combination partly explains the Court’s use of naturalizing language in 
Chapman and Mann Singh: the applicants’ naturalized self-representations,1261 the Court’s own 
assumptions that all Gypsies travel in caravans since birth or that all Sikhs wear the turban
1262
 
and the absence of dispute by the governments.
1263
  
A look at the Court’s broader freedom of religion and right to respect for (minority) 
cultural way of life case law suggests that the lack of dispute by other parties is in fact crucial in 
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(2012) at 19. 
1261
 See Mann Singh’s Application of 11 June 2007 at p. 10 and Joint Memorial on Behalf of the Applicants to the 
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Smith v. the United Kingdom and Lee v. the United Kingdom §§§§§§§ 95, 118, 123, 151 and 160.  
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making naturalizing assumptions more likely in certain cases than in others. Indeed, in several 
instances where the centrality of a practice to a specific group or tradition has been contested 
either from the inside (group authorities)
1264
 or from the outside (governments),
1265
 the Court has 
avoided assumptions of orthodoxy. For example, in Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
the centrality of the practice of visibly wearing a cross was disputed. On one side, the 
Government argued that the applicants’ desire to wear a visible cross, ‘was not a recognised 
religious practice or requirement of Christianity, and did not therefore fall within the scope of 
Article 9’.1266 On the other side, the applicants argued that ‘the visible wearing of a cross or 
crucifix was clearly an aspect of the practice of Christianity in a generally recognised form’.1267 
None of the Eweida applicants went however as far as freezing or naturalizing the practice in 
question by situating it at the core or essence of Christianity. Given the way in which the dispute 
was framed, it would have been unlikely for the Court to characterize ‘the cross’ as being at the 
‘core’ of the Christian identity.   
 
Conclusion 
In unpacking and challenging two major pitfalls arising from the Court’s assessment of cultural 
and religious claims – negative stereotyping and naturalizing – this Chapter hopes to push for a 
more critical use of group generalizations and categorizations in the Court’s freedom of religion 
and right to respect for cultural lifestyle discourse. In fact, underlying some of these modes of 
reasoning is a deeper view of culture and religion as static and homogeneous that runs the risk of 
reinforcing intra-group and inter-group hierarchies and exclusions.  
Ironically, the Court’s own case law suggests several strategies to keep ‘a keen eye on 
generalizations:’1268 seeing the (lack of) evidence, seeing the individual applicant, seeing social 
constructions and keeping generalizations limited. In making sure to incorporate these levels of 
inquiry – which can be roughly referred to as evidentiary, individual and contextual (see scheme 
below) – the Court is most likely to keep generalizations ‘under control’. However, if these 
strategies are to work effectively, they must be accompanied by a deeper transformation of the 
way in which the Court looks at applicants’ cultures and religions – as changing and 
heterogeneous rather than fixed and homogenous. A supranational court ruling in an increasingly 
pluralized Europe cannot delegitimize or privilege some group practices over others based on 
negative stereotypes or presumptions – rather than on demonstrable facts – without risking its 
own delegitimation. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has sought to expose the distinctiveness of a series of ‘universals’ – i.e., archetypical 
human rights beneficiaries – inhabiting Articles 8, 9 and 14 ECHR that oftentimes operate to 
privilege some religious and cultural applicants while disadvantaging or marginalizing others. 
The study has made an effort to take on board a well-known critique against arguments that 
advocate the recognition of culture and religion: these arguments tend to obscure the broader 
patterns that subordinate and disadvantage social actors by constituting some ‘as normative and 
others as deficient or inferior’.1269 My examination attempted to incorporate this concern by 
looking at both sides of the power system: advantage (those benefited by the purported 
universals) and disadvantage (those excluded or marginalized for not fitting).  
In the process, several ‘universals’ have emerged and their exclusionary and inegalitarian 
consequences have been revealed. Since these ‘universals’ are scattered through this thesis, I 
would like take the conclusion as an opportunity to put them all together in a final ‘picture’. To 
this end, I will gather the contours of the ‘universals’ exposed in each of the Chapters and 
attempt to weave the commonalities among them. Moreover, I will use this opportunity to 
harness the proposals spread throughout the thesis in what I call ‘an inclusive multilayered 
framework for adjudicating claims of culture and religion’.   
 
I. The ‘Universals’ Inhabiting the ECHR Religious and Cultural Subject  
 
A. ‘Universal’ I 
 
One of the ‘universals’ unveiled in this study may be called ‘Universal’ I. This ‘universal’ 
exhibits the characteristics of the quasi-disembodied subject, imported into international human 
rights law from a naturalistic conception of ‘man,’ which takes rationality and whole autonomy 
as the marks of human nature.
1270
 Traces of ‘Universal’ I appear mostly in the Court’s freedom 
of religion case law, in the form of an ‘invulnerable subject’. This invulnerable subject echoes 
Gerard Quinn’s notion of ‘masterless man’1271 as well as the liberal subject that Martha Fineman 
seeks to replace: one based on ‘notions of independence, autonomy, and self-sufficiency that are 
empirically unrealistic and unrealizable’.1272  
                                                          
1269
 This is a classic critique against multiculturalism and against identity politics in general. Nancy Fraser, for 
example, has famously proposed to re-conceive misrecognition in these terms in order to address social 
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Doctrinal Innovation in the UN Disability Convention’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds.) THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 37.   
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 Fineman, Martha Albertson, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, 20 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism (2008) at 11.  
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According to the logic of this invulnerable subject, the applicants should have not signed 
an employment contract in the first place if they wanted to remain able to comply with their 
religious duties.
1273
 Nor should have they chosen to enroll in the military
1274
 or in a secular 
university
1275
 to start with. Moreover, the applicants should have found a replacement if they 
wished to celebrate a religious holiday and still ensure that their clients would be represented in a 
court hearing.
1276
 Likewise, if expelled from a State school for refusing to take off their religious 
clothing, the applicants could always go to a private school or take classes by 
correspondence.
1277
 Similarly, the applicants should have never settled if they wanted her 
interests as Gypsies to be taken seriously.
1278
 The applicants, even though part of a religious 
minority, can ultimately advocate and obtain support for their concerns in the democratic 
process.
1279
  
What all these cases have in common – despite their different particular circumstances – 
is that the Court does not interrogate the frameworks, arrangements or contexts that might be at 
the root of the problem. The Court, instead, directly interrogates and indicts the individuals. 
These applicants are thus socially, historically and institutionally de-contextualized. They are 
atomistic agents who fall into disadvantage as a result of their choice or individual preference 
rather than as a result of societal/institutional arrangements that render them more vulnerable to 
discrimination and other human rights violations.
1280
  
 
B. ‘Universal’ II  
 
Another ‘universal’ ‘installed’ in the ECHR subject is the Protestant one. ‘Universal’ II arises 
from a sharply dichotomized and hierarchical understanding of belief and practice – reflected in 
the privileging of the forum internum over the forum externum of freedom of religion. As a 
result, this ‘universal’ is paradigmatically disembodied – cerebral and internal – and therefore 
largely invisible. At best, s/he is private, in the sense that s/he practices her or his religion in 
discrete spheres such as synagogues, mosques or churches. The embodied and, therefore, public 
religious subject whose habitual or material religiosity spills over other spheres outside 
individual conscience, worship places or home appears often ignored, marginalized or trivialized.  
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C. ‘Universal’ III   
 
‘Universal’ III, one of the main inhabitants of the Court’s family life jurisprudence, echoes 
aspects of both ‘Universal’ I and ‘Universal’ II. Its contours emerge from the Court’s privileging 
of the nuclear form of family life – particularly in the areas of entry and expulsion – and, above 
all, from the dependency requirement. The dependency requirement is reflected in the Court’s 
principle that there is no family life between adult relatives unless they prove elements of 
dependence besides the usual emotional bonds. The first assumption implicit in this requirement 
is that the adult family member is prototypically financially and materially independent from her 
or his family – although this appears to be less and less the case when it comes to young adults. 
Only exceptionally does the adult family member rely for support on parents, siblings and 
extended family relatives. And only exceptionally does the adult family member enjoy family 
life with them. This particular aspect resembles features of the invulnerable logic present in 
‘Universal’ I (the wholly autonomous, self-sufficient individual).  
Another assumption underpinning the dependency requirement is that the adult family 
member’s emotional dependence is not enough in and of itself to merit protection. In making 
clear that these ties are not per se enough to amount to family life, this requirement trivializes the 
emotional ties involved in family life no matter how close they might be. They artificially give 
precedence to financial or physical considerations at the expense of emotional dependence. This 
trivialization and marginalization of the emotional aspect of family life implicit in the 
assumptions underpinning ‘Universal’ III sits well with the rationalistic features of both 
‘Universal’ I and ‘Universal’ II.  
 
D. (Sub-) ‘Universal’ IV  
 
This ‘universal’ emerges within cultural and religious groups and is the result of positing certain 
group traits (e.g., wearing a turban, living and travelling in a caravan) as the traits for all those 
within the group. In fixing the traits in question as the essence of the group identity, the Court 
ends up recreating the same problem present in the other ‘universals’ but at another level. 
‘Universal’ IV, therefore, is the sub- cultural and religious group member by whose standard 
other members are judged.  
 
E. The Universals’ ‘Other’ (or the Non-Universal)   
 
Sustaining and reaffirming ‘Universals’ I and II are some group members construed as their 
‘opposite’ or ‘other’. These group members are oftentimes portrayed as lacking agency (they are 
victimized) and reason (their practices appear to be ‘imposed’ on them by their religion). These 
depictions are in turn based on implicit binaries of agency/victimization and reason/culture. 
Associated with the devalued sides of these binaries, this ‘Other’ serves to reaffirm the 
privileged position of ‘Universal’ I. Indeed, unlike this ‘Other’, ‘Universal’ I is fully autonomous 
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and rationalistic. The ‘Other’ also sustains ‘Universal’ II, as s/he represents the embodied and 
public side of a dichotomy that actually values the other side: the disembodied and private. In 
this way, this ‘Other’ acts as the ‘visible’ outsider of the ‘invisible’ insider of ‘Universal’ II.  
 
F. More Inclusive ECHR (Religious and Cultural) Subjects  
 
The Court has recently made a significant move towards the erasure of one of the fundamental 
manifestations of ‘Universal’ I by calling into question the long upheld principle that applicants 
remain free to resign from their jobs if they wish to practice their religion.
1281
 Yet, significant as 
this move might be, it is still too soon to tell whether it will represent any definitive shift in the 
Court’s freedom of religion jurisprudence. Another clear opening towards a more inclusive and 
egalitarian ECHR subject is the concept of group vulnerability, examined in Chapter I. The 
vulnerable group member, however, has yet to make her/his appearance in freedom of religion 
and language cases. Moreover, it has yet to be meaningfully applied in cultural lifestyle cases. 
 
II. An Inclusive, Multilayered Framework for Adjudicating Religious and Cultural 
Claims   
In this Section, I put together the strategies suggested throughout this thesis in what I call ‘an 
inclusive multilayered framework for adjudicating religious and cultural claims’. The strategies 
are not meant to exclude one another. On the contrary, they are meant to overlap and be mutually 
reinforcing. Moreover, they operate in different layers: the first layer offers strategies to render 
the abstract ECHR subject more inclusive; the second layer to make the religious and cultural 
ECHR subject more inclusive; and the last layer to turn the sub- religious and cultural ECHR 
subject more inclusive. Together, they all seek to contribute to a more genuinely universal ECHR 
subject.  
 
A. Layer I: The Pursuit of Equality within the Abstract ECHR Subject 
The first set of proposals draws on the Court’s own opening towards a more inclusive ECHR 
subject: the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’. These proposals retain two of the main 
characteristics of the concept developed by the Court: particular and relational. Yet the 
suggestions go further and expand the potential of the relational aspect of group vulnerability. 
Moreover, aware of the risks inherent in the concept, these proposals also suggest ways of 
lessening such risks. The result is a powerful and reflective heuristic device, more capable of 
fulfilling its potential: the advancement of substantive equality. Applied reflectively and with 
further refinement, group vulnerability holds out the promise of undermining ‘Universal’ I.  
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 ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 15 January 2013 § 83. 
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(i) Group Vulnerability’s Particular Aspect  
The term ‘particularly’ that the Court has tended to use when referring to some vulnerable groups 
underlines the idea that people belonging to these groups are simply ‘more’ vulnerable than 
others as a result of specific historical and social group-based experiences. The particular aspect 
of group vulnerability points to two characteristics: (i) group-specific and (ii) heightened 
vulnerability (vulnerability is experienced to a larger extent by members of these groups). The 
particular aspect thus contains the ‘who’ question and the ‘extent’ question: which groups are 
particularly vulnerable? These two characteristics have triggered asymmetrical protection in the 
Court’s case law: the heightened vulnerability experienced by some groups has resulted in 
heightened protection for them. The asymmetry introduced by group vulnerability has 
manifested itself in three ways: special positive obligations, increased weight of applicants’ harm 
in the scope and proportionality analyses, and narrowed margin of appreciation.  
 
(ii) Group Vulnerability’s Relational Aspect  
The Court’s notion of vulnerable groups can also be understood as relational because it views the 
vulnerability of certain groups as shaped by social, historical and institutional forces. Thus, the 
Court locates vulnerability not in the individual alone but rather in her wider social 
circumstances. The relational aspect embeds the ‘what’ (or the ‘why’) question: what is it that 
makes the group the applicant is (made) part of particularly vulnerable? Or, put more simply, 
why is her group particularly vulnerable? The role of this aspect has been crucial in shifting the 
focus from the individual applicant to the historical, institutional and social 
arrangements/contexts that render her more vulnerable to various harms, including 
misrecognition and maldistribution.  
(iii) Group Vulnerability Expanded  
My first suggestion in Layer I is that the Court considers applying the particular and relational 
aspects of group-vulnerability reasoning to religious and cultural applicants. Deeming an 
applicant a member of a particularly vulnerable group is most likely to take the Court out of the 
‘miniature frame’ within which it has tended to examine cultural and religious (discrimination) 
claims. This miniature frame has largely produced ‘Universal’ I: the de-contextualized, a-
historical applicant, fully responsible for her/his misfortune and, therefore, for remedying it. 
Introducing group vulnerability analysis in these types of cases will thus most likely enlarge the 
Court’s frame of analysis so as to include an investigation of the contextual circumstances or 
arrangements at the root of the applicant’s disadvantage.   
My second suggestion is that the Court applies a refined version of the relational aspect 
of group vulnerability. By a refined version, I mean that, once out of the miniature frame, the 
Court expands its inquiry yet further so as to include – along with the interrogation of the 
applicant’s increased vulnerability – an investigation of the lessened vulnerability of others. Put 
differently, my proposal is that the inquiry also asks how the same environment that is 
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disadvantaging some is simultaneously advantaging others. The expansion of the concept’s 
relational dimension should come particularly handy in Article 14 ECHR analysis of apparently 
neutral norms that yet negatively burden religious and cultural applicants. This does not mean 
that the privilege embedded in the ‘neutral’ norm will be unjustified. Rather, it means that, at the 
very least, this privilege will be more closely scrutinized.   
In conclusion, I propose that the Court employs group vulnerability analysis in order to 
(i) leave the miniature frame within which it tends to examine cultural and religious 
(discrimination) claims and (ii) look both ways – to the disadvantage side and the advantage side 
– once out of the miniature frame.  
 
(iv) Group Vulnerability’s Risks Reduced   
This thesis has argued that, for all its inclusive potential and power to further substantive 
equality, the concept of group vulnerability also risks sustaining the very exclusion and 
inequality it aims to redress. An unreflective application of group vulnerability carries several 
risks. In the first place, an uncritical application of the concept might reinforce the stereotyping 
and stigmatization of an already stereotyped or stigmatized vulnerable group. In the second 
place, it might deny individual group members’ agency and impose paternalistic protection. In 
order to mitigate, if not fully dispel, these risks, I suggest that the Court supplement group 
vulnerability analysis with the following inquiries, one of them collective, the other individual. 
The Court should ensure that (i) it is specific about why it considers that group particularly 
vulnerable and (ii) it demonstrates why that makes the particular applicant more prone to certain 
types of harm or why the applicant should be considered and treated as a vulnerable member of 
that group in the instant case.  
Layer I, in conclusion, suggests that the Court moves from a miniature to a larger frame 
of analysis, and in so doing, ‘attacks’ ‘Universal’ I. The larger frame will enable the Court to see 
the individual within a larger picture, in which s/he is no longer viewed as the sole responsible 
for her or his disadvantage and in which s/he is no longer regarded as ‘different’ or ‘visible’.  
 
 
Miniature Frame of ‘Universal’ I 
  
  
Atomistic Individual 
Invulnerable 
Different 
Visible  
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Large Frame of More Vulnerable ECHR Subject 
       
      
Individual Embedded in Historical/Social/Institutional Context 
  Particularly Vulnerable Group Member  
  ‘Different’ from Hidden Beneficiary 
  ‘Visible’ vis-à-vis Invisible Beneficiary  
 
           
B. Layer II: The Pursuit of Equality within the ECHR Cultural and Religious Subject   
The second set of proposals seeks to counteract exclusions and hierarchies – and, ultimately, 
inequalities – within the ECHR cultural and religious subject. It does so, by pushing for 
understandings of ECHR religious and cultural subjectivity more capable of ‘hosting’ the 
‘opposites’ of ‘Universal’ II and ‘Universal’ III. Crucially, these proposals do not aim at ousting 
any of these ‘universals’. Rather, they recommend that their ‘opposites’ cohabit on a par with 
them. These strategies are therefore about de-universalizing ‘Universal’ II and ‘Universal’ III – 
that is to say, about them losing their status of ‘universal’.  
 
(i) ‘Universal’ II Shares Room with ‘Universals’ on a More Equal Basis 
 
My suggestion for the Court to achieve a more equal ECHR religious subject requires 
transforming the distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum of freedom of 
religion into a more interactive and textured one. This entails two fundamental moves. First, it 
requires that the two forums – and the characteristics associated with them – be no longer 
conceived in sharp and fixed opposite terms: internal v. external; embodied v. disembodied; 
cerebral v. material; private v. public. Second, it involves rejecting a hierarchy between the 
‘opposite’ terms, according to which some of them are favored over others (e.g., the 
disembodied, cerebral and private is valued over the embodied, material and public). The 
concrete suggestion is to interpret the relationship between the forums less as opposites and more 
as interrelated or interdependent. My argument is that, the more the Court considers the two 
forums interrelatedly, the less likely it is to produce hierarchical and inegalitarian relations 
between the religious subjectivities associated with one or the other side of the dichotomy.  
 
(ii) ‘Universal’ III Shares Room with ‘Universals’ on a More Equal Basis   
 
My proposal for the Court to achieve a more equal ECHR family life subject involves 
abandoning the family life narrative reflected in the notion of ‘core’ as the standard against 
which migrant (and other) applicants’ family lives are measured. Moreover, it requires adopting 
as a rule the reality approach frequently employed in its larger family life case law. According to 
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this approach, family life ‘is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in 
practice of close personal ties’.1282 The closeness (including emotional closeness) criterion has 
the virtue of being more realistically and equally responsive to the varied forms of family life of 
those subject to the Court’s jurisdiction in contemporary Europe. 
Layer II, in summary, recommends that the Court avoids positing ‘Universal’ II and 
‘Universal’ III as the mark against which all forms of religious experience and family life are 
measured and that, instead, recognize them a a mark, that is to say, as one more mark among 
(equal) others. 
 
 
Freedom of Religion More Genuine Universal  
 
 
‘Universal’ II Cohabits with ‘Universals’ on Equal Footing 
Proposal: Rejection of Dichotomous/Hierarchical Distinction 
between the Forum Internum and the Forum Externum  
 
 
 
Family Life More Genuine Universal 
 
 
 
‘Universal’ III Cohabits with ‘Universals’ on Equal Footing 
Proposal: De Facto Close Family Ties Criterion 
 
 
 
 
C. Layer III: The Pursuit of Equality within the Sub- Religious and Cultural ECHR Subject  
Just like my proposals in Layer II seek to de-universalize ‘universals’ rather than to oust them, so 
do my suggestions in Layer III but at different level. My suggestions in this last layer are aimed 
at making more equal room within the ECHR sub- religious and cultural subject. In particular, 
they recommend turning Sub- ‘Universal’ IV into a sub- cultural or religious group member in 
lieu of the sub- cultural and religious group member. 
                                                          
1282
 ECtHR (GC), K. and T. v. Finland, 12 July 2001 § 150. See also, ECmmHR, K. v. the United Kingdom, 
Decision of 15 October 1986, p. 199; ECtHR (GC) Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, 2 November 2010 § 93 and ECtHR Alim v. 
Russia, 27 September 2011 § 70.  
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Three overlapping strategies are therefore suggested to de-universalize Sub- ‘Universal’ 
IV: individual, evidentiary and contextual. The first strategy seeks to prevent the individual 
applicant from being engulfed by group experiences that s/he may not share. The second is 
mostly intended at counteracting the delegitimation of certain group practices on the basis of 
generalized presumptions rather than of demonstrable facts. The last strategy aims at preventing 
that the Court sees certain group practices as natural or immutable and encouraging that it views 
them instead as socially and historically contingent and, therefore, changing and revisable. 
Together, these strategies can be powerful means of mitigating essentialist and stereotypical 
generalizations that posit the religious or cultural experience of some group members as the 
experience that operate to exclude those who do not fit or to render them less group members.  
Ironically, all these strategies build on approaches that the Court itself has adopted in 
other areas of its case law (e.g., gender and sexuality case law) and, sometimes, even in some of 
the areas I have examined in this study (e.g., freedom of religion, respect for cultural lifestyle). 
They all show that the Court is capable of ‘seeing’ the individual behind the group, ‘seeing’ the 
evidence – or in fact seeking out evidence of harm and pointing to the lack thereof – and ‘seeing’ 
the social, historical and institutional contexts within which certain group traits take shape. On 
one side, this optimistically suggests that Sub- ‘Universal’ IV may not be so pervasive in the 
Court’s freedom of religion and the right to respect for traditional lifestyle jurisprudence. On the 
other side, however, this does not erase the fact that some religious and cultural groups are still 
haunted by exclusionary ‘sub-universals’.   
In summary, in offering the three strategies (individual, contextual and evidentiary) my 
intention is for the Court to construe a more genuinely sub-universal. Together, all of them will 
likely prevent the Court from confusing certain group practices with the practices of all group 
members and from either fixing them as the defining practice or delegitimizing them with no 
basis on demonstrable facts.  
 
Cultural and Religious More Genuine Sub- Universal  
 
 
Individual Inquiry 
Contextual Inquiry 
Evidentiary Inquiry 
 
  
III. Topics for Future Research  
This Ph.D. study has exposed and challenged the exclusions and hierarchies along cultural and 
religious lines created by several taken-for-granted assumptions operating at different levels of 
the ECHR ‘universal’. In so doing, it has reached the more structural inequalities embedded 
therein and encouraged re-thinking of unstated norms that all too often pass for natural and 
237 
 
universal. In this way, the study has addressed the harm of misrecognition. It has identified the 
multiple forms misrecognition has taken at different levels. Moreover, it has suggested concrete 
ways in which they might be redressed. In all these ways, this Ph.D. has not just sought to make 
a contribution to academic studies seeking to go deeper in their inquiries and understandings of 
the interplay between equality, religion and culture in ECHR law. It has more concretely 
contributed to a more egalitarian and robust freedom of religion and respect for cultural lifestyle 
case law in Strasbourg. 
The study thus leaves several issues ripe for further analysis. One of them is that of 
intersectionality. How do these forms of embedded religious and cultural inequalities interact 
with others, including gender and national (ethnic) origin? Do similar images of exclusionary 
‘universals’ emerge along these other lines? For example, does the ‘Other’ (e.g., irrational, 
victimized, embodied) of ‘Universal’ I and ‘Universal’ II overlap in meaningful ways with 
‘others’ of gendered ‘universals’ built on similar dichotomies of reason/emotion and mind/body? 
Does it overlap with ‘others’ of orientalist ‘universals’ built upon the agency/victimization or the 
reason/culture dichotomies? What kinds of compounded inequalities and exclusions emerge as a 
result?  
Of equal significance might be the examination of the potential of group vulnerability to 
address and redress the distributive consequences of the religious and cultural inequalities 
revealed in this study. Apart from obscuring misrecognition, emphasis on religion and culture 
has also been accused of displacing maldistribution.
1283
 The charge is that framing the issues in 
terms of recognition of religion and culture tends to displace economic subordination.
1284
 One 
question here is: Does this hold true for the Court’s freedom of religion and respect for cultural 
lifestyle case law? If so, can this sort of harm be brought into sharper focus in religious and 
cultural discrimination cases? Or would they be more adequately addressed under other ECHR 
provisions? Moreover, what are the connections, if any, between the forms of misrecognition 
unveiled in this study and maldistribution? Might group vulnerability serve to bridge the gap 
between these two harms?  
Judgments are obviously not the work of the Court alone; they are influenced by a range 
of elements, most notably the arguments made in the courtroom.
1285
 A third theme worthy of 
further exploration might be the role of other legal actors such as States, applicants, and third-
party interveners in the (re-)production of these ‘universals’ and non-universals. An examination 
of this type might require looking into materials not always considered closely in legal 
scholarship: applicants’ and States’ written submissions and third-party interventions. The study 
might be supplemented with empirical work like interviews with applicants, their 
representatives, third-party interveners and the Court’s judges. These interviews might prove 
useful in better understanding the reasons behind the processes by which these constructions 
                                                          
1283
 See, prominently, Fraser, Nancy, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, 3 New Left Review (2000) 107-120.  
1284
 Ibid. 
1285
 As suggested in Chapter VI, the Court is not the only one to ‘blame’ for some stereotypical or essentialist 
assumptions about applicants’ religious and cultural groups and their practices. Applicants and States do play their 
part.  
238 
 
come about. For example, why do legal representatives portray applicants in certain ways and 
not in others? Do they perhaps strategically exaggerate some aspects while obscuring others? Do 
they recognize any double-edged character involved in these strategies? To what extent do they 
represent applicants’ lived experiences? And to what extent do these experiences get lost in legal 
translation?  
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